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The Definition and Division of Marital
Property in California: Towards
Parity and Simplicityt
By CAROL S. BRUCH*
Introduction
Recent Developments in California
With the adoption of no-fault divorce in 1970,1 California's rule
for the division of community property at divorce2 approached the
t © Copyright 1982, Carol S. Bruch.
This Article was prepared by the author for the California Law Revision Commission
and is published here with the Commission's consent. It was written to provide the Com-
mission with background information to assist the Commission in its study of this subject.
However, the opinions, conclusions, and recommendations set forth are entirely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent or reflect the opinions, conclusions, or recommenda-
tions of the California Law Revision Commission. A related study by the author, Manage-
ment Powers and Duties Under Caifornia'r Community Property Laws, was completed in
1980 for the Commission and will appear in Volume 34 of the Hastings Law Journal.
* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Davis. A.B., 1960, Shi-
mer College; J.D., 1972, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. The author
expresses her thanks to Timothy Roake and Madeleine Weiss, 1981 graduates of King Hall,
and to Allison Mendal and Diane Wasznicky, 1980 graduates, for their fine research assist-
ance. She also gratefully acknowledges the expertise and insights on tax law so generously
provided by her colleague, Professor Bruce Wolk.
1. 1969 Cal. Stats. ch. 1608, § 4506, at 3324 (effective Jan. 1, 1970).
2. The current formulation is found in CAL. CrV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1981):
"(a) Except upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of the
parties in open court, the court shall, either in its interlocutory judgment of dissolution of the
marriage, in its judgment decreeing the legal separation of the parties, or at a later time if it
expressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a property division, divide the community prop-
erty and the quasi-community property of the parties, including any such property from
which a homestead has been selected, equally. For purposes of making such division, the
court shall value the assets and liabilities as near as practicable to the time of trial, except
that, upon 30 days' notice by the moving party to the other party, the court for good cause
shown may value all or any portion of the assets and liabilities at a date after separation and
prior to trial to accomplish an equal division of the community property and the quasi-
community property of the parties in an equitable manner.
"(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the court may divide the community property
and quasi-community property of the parties as follows:
"(1) Where economic circumstances warrant, the court may award any asset to one
party on such conditions as it deems proper to effect a substantially equal division of the
property.
"(2) As an additional award or offset against existing property, the court may award,
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long-standing rule for division at death.3 Equal division was man-
dated, albeit with minor exceptions for special circumstances. 4 Wo-
men, who were protected as the innocent spouses in many pre-1970
divorce cases and therefore received more than half of the acknowl-
edged community property, were now limited to a fifty percent share,
in accord with no-fault theory.5 This change, which enhanced hus-
from a party's share, any sum it determines to have been deliberately misappropriated by
such party to the exclusion of the community property or quasi-community property interest
of the other party.
"(3) If the net value of the community property and quasi-community property is less
than five thousand dollars ($5,000) and one party cannot be located through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, the court may award all such property to the other party on such con-
ditions as its deems proper in its final judgment decreeing the dissolution of the marriage or
in its judgment decreeing the legal separation of the parties.
"(4) Educational loans shall be assigned to the spouse receiving the education in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances rendering such an assignment unjust.
"(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), community property personal
injury damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries unless the court, after
taking into account the economic condition and needs of each party, the time that has
elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual of the cause of action, and all other
facts of the case, determines that the interests of justice require another disposition. In such
case, the community property personal injury damages shall be assigned to the respective
parties in such proportions as the court determines to be just, except that at least one-half of
such damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries. As used in this sub-
divison, "community property personal injury damages" means all money or other property
received or to be received by a person in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for his or
her personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for the settlement or compromise of a
claim for such damages, if the cause of action for such damages arose during the marriage
but is not separate property as defined in Section 5126, unless such money or other property
has been commingled with other community property.
"(d) The court may make such orders as its deems necessary to carry out the purposes
of this section."
3. In 1923, wives were given succession and testamentary rights equal to those of their
husbands. 1923 Cal. Stats. ch. 18, § 1401, at 29-30 (current version at PROBATE CODE § 201
(West 1956)).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b), (c) (West Supp. 1981), set forth at note 2 supra.
5. Under the former law, a divorce was granted to an innocent party on the basis of
the other spouse's marital fault. CAL. CIV. CODE § 92 as amended by 1941 Cal. Stats. ch.
951, § 1, at 2547 (repealed 1969) (listing adultery, extreme cruelty, willful desertion, willful
neglect, habitual intemperance, conviction of a felony, and incurable insanity as grounds).
Women were the petitioners in most cases under that law. See, e.g., Seal, A Decade of No-
Fault Divorce: What It Has Meant Financially for Women in California, FAM. ADVOCATE,
Spring 1979, at 10, 12 (75.2% of San Diego County divorces in 1968 resulted from actions
filed by wives). An equitable distribution of community and quasi-community property was
ordered in cases of adultery, incurable insanity, or extreme cruelty; in other cases equal
division was mandated. CAL. CIV. CODE § 146, enacted CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 146, 147 (1872),
as amended by 1951 Cal. Stats. ch. 1700, §§ 10, 11, at 3913 (amending § 146 and repealing
§ 147), andfinally amended by 1968 Cal. Stats. ch. 457, § 1, at 1077-78. In 1969, the grounds
enumerated in § 92 were replaced by the current "irreconcilable differences" and "incurable
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bands' property interests, was partially offset by the increasing preci-
sion of property valuation techniques. Gradually, it became apparent
that husbands frequently had received important community assets
under the old law to which either no dollar value or inaccurate values
had been assigned. Some of these assets are now valued and divided,
but others are not. For example, although vested pensions had been
subject to division for many years, 6 until 1976 other pension rights were
not.7 Because married men are more likely than married women to
acquire valuable pension rights through employment,8 these unvalued
assets typically went to husbands. Similarly, although the goodwill of a
business or profession was invariably awarded to the spouse who re-
ceived the business, the assigned values may well have been artificially
low. Most importantly, until 1982, California courts were consistently
unwilling to classify a spouse's enhanced earning capacity as commu-
nity property.9 Although this rule may now be changing, the transfor-
mation is still far from complete.' 0 This asset, the most valuable in
many marriages, therefore goes to a spouse without mention in the
property division. On the other hand, debts, not considered property
insanity," and the section was renumbered as § 4506. 1969 Cal. Stats. ch. 1608, § 4506, at
3324.
6. French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941); Sweesy v. Los Angeles
County Peace Officers' Retirement Bd., 17 Cal. 2d 356, 110 P.2d 37 (1941). Case law later
included vested but not mature pensions, (i.e., pensions under which payments were not yet
due). In re Marriage of Bruegel, 47 Cal. App. 3d 201, 120 Cal. Rptr. 597 (4th Dist. 1975)
(employee had worked the required number of years but had not yet reached the plan's
minimum retirement age); Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1st
Dist. 1972) (employee was eligible to retire but had not done so).
7. The California Supreme Court extended the definition of community property to
include unvested pension rights in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561,
126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). More recently, the right to enhance a pension through the repay-
ment of previously withdrawn community property contributions has also been recognized
as a community asset. In re Marriage of Lucero, 118 Cal. App. 3d 836, 173 Cal. Rptr. 680
(4th Dist. 1981).
8. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF LIBRARY OF CONGRESS FOR THE SUB-
COMM. ON RETIREMENT INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE SELECT COMM. ON AGING,
96TH CONG., IST SESS., WOMEN AND RETIREMENT INCOME PROGRAMS: CURRENT ISSUES
OF EQUITY AND ADEQUACY 81-83 (Comm. Print 1979); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION
POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 27-28
(1981).
9. See In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1st Dist.
1979); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (3d Dist. 1969). But see
Aarons v. Brasch, 229 Cal. App. 2d 197, 200 n.1, 40 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156 n.1 (1st Dist. 1964).
10. The court of appeal issued an opinion in In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App.
3d 656 (4th Dist. 1982) that would have authorized recovery under some circumstances.
Because a rehearing was granted, however, this opinion has been withdrawn, and there is as
yet no new opinion. For a discussion of Sullivan, see notes 186-90 & accompanying text
infra.
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and therefore treated separately at divorce before 1970,11 gradually
have been incorporated into the equal division calculus. 12 As a result,
divorcing women now receive a smaller share of a larger, yet still in-
complete, pool of community property, and bear a larger share of re-
sponsibility for the couple's debts.
At the same time, related changes in support law have been inter-
preted as reducing the justifications for spousal support. The impact
has been dramatic. Although spousal support seems rarely to have
been awarded to more than fifteen percent of divorcing women, those
few who receive awards under the new law receive smaller amounts for
a shorter period. 13 Child support awards also lag farther behind pov-
erty levels,' 4 and since 1972, have been authorized only until a child's
eighteenth birthday.' 5 Because children remain almost exclusively in
their mother's care after divorce, inadequate child support awards have
an additional negative effect on the finances of California's divorced
women. Taking into account all court-ordered support transfers, the
California Divorce Law Research Project found sharp disparities in the
household and per capita incomes of California couples one year after
their 1977 divorces: in each category, former husbands improved their
situations while their former wives' incomes had dropped precip-
itously. 16 The combined impact of decreased post-divorce support,
equal division of recognized community property assets and debts, and
inflation can be seen most graphically in changed dispositions of the
family home.
The soaring real estate market, which has resulted in a home's eq-
11. 1 B. ARMSTRONG, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 855 (1953). This rule coexisted with a
rule mandating the equal division of community property in some cases. See note 5 supra.
But see C. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties Under California's Community Property
Laws n.67 (Sept 19, 1980) (unpublished study completed for the California Law Revision
Commission) [hereinafter cited as Bruch, Management Powers] (to be published in Volume
34 of the Hastings Law Journal).
12. Bruch, Management Powers, supra note II, at nn.59-60.
13. See Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth.- Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difer-
ence, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 143 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Weitzman & Dixon, Alimony Myth];
see also Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce. What It Has Meant Financial for Women in
California, FAM. ADVOCATE, Spring 1979, at 13; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE 1922, at 29, table 22 (1925) (14.7%); B. BRYANT, AMERICAN WOMEN TODAY
AND TOMORROW 24 (1977) (14% in 1975).
14. Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody A wards. Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns
for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, U.C.D. L. REV. 473, 497 (1979);
Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce. What It Has Meant Financiallyfor Women in Califor-
nia, FAM. ADVOCATE, Spring 1979, at 13.
15. 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1748, § 23, at 3746 (amending CAL. CODE § 25 (West 1954)); see
also 1972 Cal. Stats. ch. 38, § 4, at 50.
16. See note 197 infra.
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uity being a major community property asset for divorcing families
who owned homes has also reduced the likelihood that a custodial par-
ent will be able to maintain the home or secure comparable housing
after divorce. Case law has responded to the pressure to sell homes
created by the equal division mandate by developing a technique that
maintains joint ownership of the house as an incident of child support
in certain cases involving minor children.17 The remedy is not gen-
erally available18 and when granted, is granted only for a limited
period. 19
Home ownership is but one example of the increasing complexity
of property divisi6n under current California law. Special problems
also have developed with regard to pensions: the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution sometimes divests a non-employee
spouse of any interest in a federal pension,20 the divison of other pen-
sions is frequently troublesome,21 and there is confusion concerning
payments that involve recompense for disabilities.22 Other changes in
17. In re Marriage of Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444 (4th Dist. 1980)
(division of parents' property interest postponed; children awarded interim use of the non-
custodial parent's equity as an element of child support); In re Marriage of Boseman, 31 Cal.
App. 3d 372, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (2d Dist. 1973) (same).
18. No reported case has yet extended the reasoning to a case in which spousal support
or support of an adult dependent child was at issue, nor to one in which use of a separate
property residence was requested. See the pre-Boseman case, Robinson v. Robinson, 65 Cal.
App. 2d -118, 150 P.2d 7 (2d Dist. 1944), in which a divorcing wife was denied a life estate in
her husband's separate property realty. The court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to
"dispose" of the husband's separate property, but did not discuss the liability of separate
.property for support claims. C. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4805, 4807 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981)
(including separate property in lists of possible support sources).
19. Several judges at the California Center for Judicial Education and Research's 1981
California Superior Court Family Law and Procedure Institute reported to'the author that
their practice is to make Boseman awards in appropriate cases, but not to extend these
awards for more than a few years. Three and one-half to four years were given as maxi-
mums, even in cases with young children. Conversations with judges in Sacramento, Cali-
fornia (March 25, 1981). This approach is consistent with the Main County finding of
Judith Wallenstein and Joan Kelly, who reported frequent moves by children and their cus-
todial parents following property dispositions. Within three and one-half to four and one-
half years after their parents' separation, "almost two-thirds of the youngsters had changed
their place of residence, and -a substantial number of these had moved three or more
times .... In many cases the move was precipitated by the necessity of selling the family
home as part of the final financial settlement." J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING
THE BREAKuP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 183 (1980).
20. See McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S.Ct. 2728 (1981) (federal military pension law
preempts California community property law); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572
(1979) (California powerless to apply community property principles to federal Railroad
Retirement Act pension).
21. See notes 131-42, 331-39, 374-78 & accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 155-56 & accompanying text infra.
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the law have raised questions about the rules controlling tort recov-
eries, 23 the valuation of good will, 24 post-separation income, 25 assets
acquired with mixed separate and community components26 (including
questions of title and the relevance of borrowed moneys27), the divorce
court's jurisdiction over separate property28 and over claims arising out
of a couple's cohabitation before marriage,29 the treatment at death30 or
divorce3' of property brought to California, and distribution by a pro-
bate court of some forms of property and debts.32
An examination of the issues posed in typical divorce and probate
cases over the past decade, and of the relative financial postures of di-
vorced men and women, indicates that the system stands in need of
reform. Marriage should entail neither convoluted doctrines, exorbi-
tant litigation costs, impoverishment of widows and widowers, nor
strikingly disparate post-divorce wealth.
Recent Developments in Other States
Sister states have shown concern for these issues by sharing in the
recent major reforms of divorce and probate law. As summarized in a
recent article by William Cantwell, Reporter for the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws' contemplated Uniform Marital Property Act,33
All in all, the trendline shows the gradual evolution of ... at least
some acceptance of the basic theory of community property-within
a marriage there is a sharing of contribution and result which should
be recognized by adoption of the sharing principle [at death or di-
vorce] and abandonment of control by evidence of the name on
paychecks and the accidental objective fact of the title on whatever
assets are accompanied by title evidence. 34
Although willing to forego the simplicity of a pure common law
rule that recognizes ownership according to title or, if there is no title,
23. See notes 143-54 & accompanying text infra.
24. See notes 157-69 & accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 204-15 & accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 81-100 and 125-26 & accompanying text infra.
27. See notes 233-88 & accompanying text infra.
28. See notes 295-99 & accompanying text infra.
29. See note 300 & accompanying text infra.
30. See notes 229-32 and 387-90 & accompanying text infra.
31. See notes 229-32 and 351-55 & axompanying text infra.
32. See notes 373-96 & accompanying text infra.
33. A partial reading of the Uniform Act's submission draft took place at the Commis-
sion's July 1981 meeting. The completion of the first reading is scheduled for 1982, and a
second reading is planned for 1983. Two readings are required for adoption. Telephone
conversation with William Cantwell, Esq., of Denver (April 23, 1982).
34. Cantwell, Man + Woman + Property = , Pondering the Marital Equation, 6 PROB.
LAW. 1, 67 (1980).
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in the person who acquired the asset, most states do not require a 50-50
division of marital property.35 Two primary reasons account for this
reluctance to follow California's lead. First, most of these states have
an established tradition of awarding property from one person's sepa-
rate wealth, however and whenever acquired, at divorce or death. The
case law and judicial practice of these states are accustomed to evaluat-
ing the equities of the parties' relative financial positions at divorce.
This learning is expected to remain relevant to divisions in which only
one of the former factors, marital guilt, has been removed from the
equation.3 6 Second, these states are reluctant to import the complex
doctrines that are considered necessary to a strict community property
system such as California's. Instead, efforts have centered on structur-
ing and controlling the discretion of trial judges, whose freedom to
make subjectively based decisions is viewed as a real, albeit lesser,
danger.37
Five of the eight community property states have maintained flex-
ible division rules as components of their no-fault divorce laws,38 en-
35. Id. at 45.
36. Id. The Governor's Commission recommended a similar rule of equitable division
when it proposed no-fault divorce for California. CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
ON THE FAMILY, REPORT, 45-46 (1966) (hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
REPORT).
37. See, e.g, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (Alternatives (a) & (b));
Foster, Equitable Distribution, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1980, at 1, col. 2 ("The court, in its decision
[under New York's new equitable distribution law], must set forth the factors it considered
and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived by either party or counsel. This
provision is mandated to guard against an abuse of discretion and to facilitate appeals.").
38. Only California, New Mexico, and Louisiana'mandate equal distribution of the
community property at divorce and do not authorize any property awards from separate
property. Compare CAL. Cry. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1981), LA. Crw. CODE ANN. arts.
1290, 1308, 2336, 2341 (West 1952 & Supp. 1981), LA. CODE Cry. PRO. ANN. art. 82 (West
1960) and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1978) (equal division of community property is pro-
vided by case law: Michelson v. Michelson, 86 N.M. 107, 520 P.2d 263 (1974)) with ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (Supp. 1980) ("[Tlhe court shall assign each spouse's... sepa-
rate property to such spouse. It shall also divide the community, joint tenancy and other
property held in common equitably... without regard to marital misconduct."); IDAHO
CODE § 32-712 (Supp. 19.80) ("The community property must be assigned ... as the court
... deems just... Unless there are compelling reasons otherwise, there shall be a substan-
tially equal division... . [A] homestead.., from the separate property of either... must
be assigned to the former owner. . . subject to the power of the court to assign it for a
limited period to the other spouse."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1979) ("[Ihe court...
Is]hall make such disposition of... [tihe community property... and... [a]ny... joint
tenancy [property] ... as appears just and equitable ... ." The court may also set aside
property or place burdens on it for the benefit or support of the children.) and TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.63 (Vernon 1975) ("[Ihe court shall order a division of the estate of
the parties [as] the court deems just and right.. . ." An award may be made from separate
property under case law: Campbell v. Campbell, 586 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979));
March 1982]
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hancing the similarities to common law property jurisdictions. Finally,
both the Munts Bill in Wisconsin,39 which proposes a form of commu-
nity property, and the submission draft of the Uniform Marital Prop-
erty Act incorporate division rules that permit limited exceptions to
equal division of community property and access to separate
property.40
Principles for Reform
The major differences in current marital property laws revolve
around three points: prescribing property rights of the spouses during
marriage, defining the pool of property that may be divided at divorce
or death, and allocating the parties' respective interests in this property
at the marriage's end. The first of these topics has been dealt with else-
where.41 As to the latter two, Professors Verrall and Sammis have re-
marked that:
The [California community property] system is one which can be tol-
erated but which is in need of a comprehensive review to make it
meet the minimum conditions of an acceptable marital property sys-
tem. These conditions should at least be a system simple enough to
be generally understood by the people, a system coordinated with the
business and the governmental orders of the day, and a system quick
and cheap of administration. No one of these conditions can be said
to characterize the California system.42
This Article suggests a number of reforms designed to bring Call-
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1980) ("[T]he court shall ... make such dispo-
sition of the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as shall
appear just and equitable .... " Among the factors to be considered are "(t)he economic
circumstances of each spouse. . . including the desirability of awarding the family home or
the right to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse having custody of any children.").
39. The most recent version of the proposal is found in 1981 Wisconsin Assembly Bill
370 (April 16, 1981). For convenience, citations to the legislation will be made to the section
numbers that will eventually appear in the statutes if the proposal is enacted, not to the
section numbers of the bill itself. Because the bill presents materials in numerical order,
according to the proposed statutory numbers, this citation technique will provide quick ac-
cess to both the proposed language and to the statutes if enacted. Although A.B. 370 failed,
its author plans to reintroduce it during the next legislative session. Telephone conversation
with Peg Davey, Assistant to Representative May Lou Munts, in Madison, Wisconsin (April
23, 1982).
40. The Wisconsin proposal makes no suggested amendments to the state's current eq-
uitable distribution rule, which is codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West Special Pam-
phlet 1980). Division rules are set forth in the UNIFORM MODEL MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
§ 16(a),(b),(c) (Submission Draft 1981) (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws).
41. Bruch, Management Powers, supra note 11.
42. H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 7 (2d ed. 1971).
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fornia closer to these goals. More importantly, it seeks to enhance sub-
stantive fairness by promoting three sometimes conflicting goals:
comparable treatment of both spouses, protection for their children,
and predictability. The discussion highlights major problems in the ap-
plicationof California's definitional and dispositional rules of commu-
nity property law. It .suggests ways to simplify the system .without
sacrificing equity, in accord with the established principle of equal divi-
sion, subject to carefully defined exceptions. The tension between cer-
tainty and equity often requires that the suggested solutions have the
substance as well as the appearance of compromise. They should be
tested individually and collectively for the degree to which they pro-
mote sound accommodations of conflicting policies and sensible solu-
tions to common problems.
Defining the Community
History: What Is Not Separate Is Community
Community property is defined by negative inference under Cali-
fornia law. Only separate property is defined in the state constitution:
'Property owned before marriage or acquired during marriage by gift,
will, or inheritance is separate property." 43 This language traces di-
rectly to a clause in California's first constitution that was hotly de-
bated during the 1849 Constitutional Convention:
All property, both real and personal, of the wife, owned or claimed
by her before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise
or descent, shall be her separate property; and laws shall be passed
more clearly defining the rights of the wife, in relation as well to her
separate property, as to that held in common with her husband.
Laws shall also be passed providing for the registration of the wife's
separate property.a
This clause, in turn, is taken from language in the Texas Constitution
that adopted the Spanish-Mexican community property system as that
state's marital property regime.45
Both the language of California's first constitution and the statu-
tory scheme enacted by California's first legislature to implement com-
43. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21.
44. CAL. CONST. OF 1849 art. XI, § 14. See generally Prager, The Persistence of Sepa-
rate Property Concepts in Caifornia's Community Property System, 1849-1975, 24 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1, 8-24 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Prager, Separate Property Concepts).
45. TEx. CONST. OF 1845 art. VII, § 19. See Huie, The Texas Constitutional Defition
of the ife's Separate Property, 35 TEX. L. REV. 1054, 1058-59 (1957); Prager, Separate
Property Concepts, supra note 44, at 21 n.109.
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munity property46 reflect a decision to adopt a civil law rather than a
common law system of marital property. 47 This original scheme re-
tained as separate property the property brought to a marriage by
either of the parties and property acquired during marriage by gift, de-
scent, or devise. All other property, including the "rents and profits" of
separate property, was community property.48
Ten years later, however, in George v. Ransom,49 the California
Supreme Court misinterpreted this clear constitutional and legislative
history, confusing the civil law regime of community property with
common law property notions.50 As a result, the court held that the
46. See note 48 infra.
47. Professor Prager suggests that the decision to adopt a civil law marital property
system was influenced by (1) a spirit of conciliation towards the Spanish-speaking natives of
California, (2) a genuine commitment to induce women to come to California and to im-
prove the status of married women by awarding them substantial property rights, and (3) the
possibility that many of the delegates did not understand the essential elements of the civil
law community of acquests and gains. Prager, Separate Property Concepts, supra note 44, at
8-24. She nevertheless emphasizes that the convention did view its choice as being between
the civil law and the common law with respect to marital property. Id. at 22. Consistent
with that choice, the implementing legislation adopted in 1850 was in general agreement
with Spanish civil law principles, including the concept that the rents and profits of separate
property were common property. See note 48 infra.
48. 1849-50 Cal. Stats. ch. 103, § 9, at 254. This definition was in accord with the pre-
vailing civil law marital property concepts. The Spanish community or ganancial system
included as common property "the fruits of their separate property which each brings to the
marriage; and of that which either acquires for himself by any lucrative title, whilst the
conjugal society subsists. It is the common property of the husband and wife, and belongs
the half to each of them: although the husband has more separate property than the wife or
the wife more than the husband: although one, after marriage, acquires more than the other,
and although it may be one alone who by commerce or toil accumulates the property." R.
BALLINGER, A TREATISE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, UNDER THE
COMMUNITY OR GANANCIAL SYSTEM § 5, at 25 (1895); see also W. DE FUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 71 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DE
FUNIAK & VAUGHN]; G. SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO art. 44, at 12-13
(1851).
49. 15 Cal. 322 (1860).
50. The decision is much criticized. See R. BALLINGER, A TREATISE ON THE PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, UNDER THE COMMUNITY OR GANANCIAL SYSTEM
§§ 22-23, at 56-58 (1895); W. REPPY AND W. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES 248-49, 511 (1975); H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 3, 36-37, 158 (2d ed. 1971); Bodenheimer, The Commu-
nity Without Community Property. The Needfor Legislative Attention to Separate-Property
Marriages Under Community Property Laws, 8 CAL. W. L. REV. 381, 384-85 (1972) [herein-
after cited as Bodenheimer, Separate-Property Marriages]; Huie, The Texas Constitutional
Defnition o/the Wfe's Separate Property, 35 TEX. L. REV. 1054, 1058-59 (1957); Knutson,
California Community Property Laws A Pleafor Legislative Study and Reform, 39 S. CAL. L.
REV. 240, 261-66 (1966); Prager, Separate Property Concepts, supra note 44, at 41-43;




fruits of separate property remained separate property.51 Since that de-
cision, community property in California has encompassed property
that is produced by the efforts of the spouses during marriage, but not
the increases in the value of separate property that are not the product
of community efforts.5 2
Under this "source rule" and a related presumption that property
acquired during the marriage is community property,5 3 much of Cali-
fornia's case law since George has involved two factual settings. In the
first, a spouse attempts to trace property that presumptively belongs to
the community back to a separate property source, thereby establishing
a 100% ownership interest in the property and its fruits.5 4 In the sec-
ond, a spouse seeks to establish a community interest in property that
would otherwise be deemed the other spouse's separate property,
thereby securing a 50% ownership interest. 55 Additional cases address
the special problems of marriages in which separate property was the
sole or predominant source of wealth, and no community assets are
identified for division at divorce.56 The following sections describe
51. The court reasoned that the constitutional provision focused primarily on a married
woman's right to separate property. Because separate property "has a fixed meaning in the
common law" that precludes the right of another to control the property or enjoy its benefits,
and because most of the framers of the state constitution were familiar with this rule of the
common law, the court concluded that the constitutional protection of a wife's separate
property would be violated if the rents and profits were included in the couple's common
property. 15 Cal. at 324 (emphasis added). The court's error is patent. While the common
law might not recognize that the fruits of separate property could be anything but separate
property, the civil law system of community property both could and did, and it was this
Spanish-Mexican system that was adopted by the Constitutional Convention and imple-
mented through the legislation that was tested in George. See note 48 & accompanying text
supra. Further, one commentator has suggested that even common law principles were mis-
applied by the court, and could have been used instead to bolster a finding that the fruits of
separate property were community property. See Comment, Apportionment of Incomefrom
a Spouser' Separately Owned Property, 51 CALiF. L. REv. 161, 165 n.43 (1963).
52. The rule is currently codified in CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1970). The
Texas Supreme Court, confronted in 1925 with just such a statutory scheme, struck it down
by applying identical state constitutional language to that which led to an opposite result in
George. See Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925). In accord with the civil
law tradition, the Texas court held that revenue from a wife's separate property must go to
the community; it reasoned that the constitutional definition prevented the legislature from
either adding to or subtracting from the wife's separate estate.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1981).
54. See, e.g., Estate of Murphy, 15 Cal. 3d 907, 544 P.2d 956, 126 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1976);
In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975); See v. See, 64
Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
55. See, eg., Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909); Schuyler v. Broughton, 70
Cal. 282, 11 P. 719 (1886); Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 P. 640 (2d Dist. 1926).
56. See, e.g., Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137
(1971). See notes 73-80 & accompanying text ifra.
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these difficulties and propose doctrinal simplification.
Separating Community and Separate Property Interests
Community property may become mixed or commingled with the
separate property of one spouse, or occasionally both spouses, in a
number of ways. Although the types are not pure, it is helpful to distin-
guish "commingled property," such as the balance in a bank account in
which funds from various sources have been deposited and withdrawn
from time to time, from "mixed assets," in which funds of different
sorts have been invested and remain in identifiable proportions.
Commingled Property
Commingled property is troublesome in two respects. First, if
both separate and community property have been deposited to a com-
mon account from which some funds have been removed, it is often
difficult to determine the respective ownership interests in the remain-
ing funds. To do so, both deposits, including interest, and withdrawals
must be characterized. If funds have been hopelessly commingled, so
that no tracing can be accomplished, community ownership is pre-
sumed 57 unless the community investment was minimal in relationship
to that of the separate property. 58 The second problem is related. To
characterize the ownership of property that was purchased with with-
drawals from the commingled funds, it is necessary to know whether
the withdrawals were of community or separate property. If the
drawer's intent can be ascertained, and sufficient funds were on hand to
satisfy that intent, the appropriate funds are deemed removed. If
records are not precisely kept, however, it is often difficult to establish
the intent of the person who removed and applied the funds.59
57. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1981). Although most joint savings or broker-
age accounts are held in-joint tenancy form, the cases on tracing generally ignore this fact
and, accordingly, do not consider the possible transmutation issues that arise when either
separate or community property is deposited to such an account. Sims, Consequences of
Depositing Separate Property in Joint Bank Accounts, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 452, 452 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as Sims, Joint Bank Accounts]. See generally Griffith, Community Property in
Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Griffith, Community
Property]; Marshall, Joint Tenancy, Taxwise and Otherwise, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 501, 520-21
(1952) [hereinafter cited as Marshall, Joint Tenancy]; Mills, Community Joint Tenancy-A
Paradoxical Problem In Estate Administration, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 38 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Mills, Community Joint Tenancy].
58. Estate of Cudworth, 133 Cal. 462, 65 P. 1041 (1901).
59. See, e.g., Estate of Murphy, 15 Cal. 3d 907, 544 P.2d 956, 126 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1976);
In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 536 P.2d 479, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1975); See v. See, 64
Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
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In an effort to clarify the ownership of the purchased property, the
courts have established some general guidelines. The burden of estab-
lishing that a particular item was purchased with separate rather than
community property rests on the person who seeks to establish the sep-
arate property character of the purchased property.60 Although this
burden must ordinarily be established by adequate records,61 it is theo-
retically possible, under the "family expense doctrine," to show that
only separate property remained in the account at the time of purchase
by showing that all community funds previously had been withdrawn
to pay community living expenses. 62
Because the courts presume that living expenses, no matter how
extravagant, are paid first from community property,63 this approach
unfairly benefits a wealthy spouse, who may be able to establish that
the family's living expenses were greater than community property
earnings. This situation occurs even though the community property
earnings might have been more than adequate for reasonable living
expenses had the parties not considered themselves rich.64 Because the
doctrine works to the detriment of the poorer spouse, its negative effect
may be felt by men as well as women. Its application seems especially
60. Freese v. Hibernia Say. & Loan Soc., 139 Cal. 392, 73 P. 172 (1903).
61. Estate of Murphy, 15 Cal. 3d 911, 918, 544 P.2d 956, 965, 126 Cal. Rptr. 820, 829
(1976); In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 612-13, 536 P.2d 479, 484, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79,
84 (1975); See'v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 784, 415 P.2d 776, 780, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (1966);
see Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144, 154, 27 Cal. Rptr. 307, 314 (4th Dist. 1962).
62. See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966).
63. In Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144, 27 Cal. Rptr. 307 (4th Dist. 1962), there
had been a total income of approximately $550,000 and a community income of approxi-
mately $289,000 during the eight years of marriage; the community was charged with ex-
penses for a full-time gardener and housekeeper, a monthly swimming pool maintenance
charge, membership in five country clubs, and the expense of renting a summer home. See
also Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971); Huber
v. Huber, 27 Cal. 2d 784, 792, 167 P.2d 708, 713 (1946); Estate of Ades, 81 Cal. App. 2d 334,
184 P.2d 1 (1st Dist. 1947).
64. The rule has been often criticized. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, Separate-Properly Mar-
riages, supra note 50, at 396-400; Bruch, Management Powers, supra note 11, at n.148 &
accompanying text. See also Note, Communi y Property: Commingled Accounts and the
Family-Expense Presumption, 19 STAN. L. REv. 661, 662 (1967): "While most expenses dur-
ing marriage are incurred for the common benefit of the spouses, it is also likely that living
expenses for a family with both separate and community income will be higher than they
would be if the family had only the community income. When community and separate
funds are commingled, the family may not differentiate between the sources of income and
may feel they can afford to live at a higher level because of their larger aggregate income.
The wife is thus treated unfairly when the increased living expenses are paid for entirely out
of the community's income, to which she must look for protection upon the husband's death
or divorce. The net result is that a wife whose husband has both community and separate
income will recover less community property on dissolution of the marriage than she would
have been entitled to if her husband had earned only the community. income."
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harsh if community income has been exhausted on consumption items
while durable assets were purchased with separate property.
In families of more modest means, commingling often occurs in
another common, yet equally troublesome, fashion. Because commu-
nity property results from the expenditure of efforts by a spouse during
marriage, it is possible-through the labor of either spouse-for com-
munity property to be applied to one spouse's separate property. If the
separate property is held in a business or professional practice,65 a com-
munity property salary may be paid that recompenses the community
for a spouse's services. If no salary was taken, and there was no gift of
the community property efforts that were used in the business, the com-
munity may be able to claim payment for those efforts 66 or, alterna-
tively, to assert an ownership interest in the property.67 The issue may
become even more complicated. Although wages were paid for spousal
services to the separate property enterprise, the salary may later be
deemed an incomplete payment, and the value of the uncompensated
community property wages that were not withdrawn will have become
a portion of the business' capital, creating a community property inter-
est in the concern.68 If the business has increased greatly in value, a
court may be asked to decide to what extent the appreciation is attribu-
table to the uncompensated, capitalized community property efforts of
one or both of the spouses, creating a community property interest, and
to what extent the appreciation is attributable to the original, separate
property investment and therefore constitutes separate property.69 If
loans have been repaid with earnings from the business, increasing the
capital investment, the computations become even more complex.70
65. Such separate property interests may reflect a direct infusion of separate property
funds or, as in the case of a professional practice established before marriage, value created
by separate property efforts.
66. See, e.g., Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (2d Dist. 1921).
67. See, e.g., Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909).
68. See, e.g., Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953).
69. Eg., Gilmore v. Gilmore, 45 Cal. 2d 142, 287 P.2d 769 (1955) (husband's salary
held an adequate measure of the community interest in three auto dealerships; the remain-
ing earnings were attributed to his separate property investment); Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal.
1, 103 P. 488 (1909) (husband entitled to at least the usual interest on a long-term well-
secured investment for his separate property capital in a profitable cigar and saloon busi-
ness); In re Marriage of Folb, 53 Cal. App. 3d 862, 126 Cal. Rptr. 306 (2d Dist. 1975) (hus-
band, who was allowed 12% annual rate of return on his separate commercial investments
with excess to the community, argued unsuccessfully that he was a "passive investor" and
deserved a higher rate of return); Tassi v. Tassi, 160 Cal. App. 2d 680, 325 P.2d 872 (1st Dist.
1958) (no part of the increase in value of a wholesale meat business allocated to the commu-
nity; court concluded that the. high profits were produced by the wartime market rather than
the husband's services).
70. See, e.g., Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953).
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California courts have developed polar apportionment doctrines
by which trial courts may choose as equity prompts when capital of one
source and labor of another are commingled. The Pereira doctrine71
first measures a fair rate of return on the capital investment, and then
awards the excess, if any, to the community in payment. for a spouse's
efforts. Conversely, the Van Camp doctrine7 2 first measures a reason-
able rate of pay for the spouse's efforts, and then awards the excess, if
any, to the capital investment.
The potential inequities of both the family expense doctrine as it
relates to commingled funds and the Pereira-VanCamp doctrines on
commingled capital and efforts are demonstrated by Beam v. Bank of
America.73 In Beam, no salary was withdrawn by a millionaire who
spent his twenty-nine married years managing his separate wealth and
engaging in private ventures with those funds; these sources provided
the family's support. The trial court applied Pereira to these facts and
held that interest at seven percent would fully account for the increase
in Mr. Beam's separate assets, leaving no excess for the community.74
71. This approach is named for the landmark case, Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P.
488 (1909). The 7% interest figure used in that case was arrived at by agreement of the
parties. When no agreement exists, the appropriate rate is a matter for proof. See Gilmore
v. Gilmore, 45 Cal. 2d 142, 150, 287 P.2d 769, 774 (1955).
72. Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (2d Dist. 1921), gives this
formula its name. Mr. Van Camp, the controlling shareholder of the Van Camp Sea Food
Company, devoted his efforts exclusively to the management of the business. During the
marriage, he received $141,000 as dividends on his stock in the company as well as $69,203
in salary; the latter was deemed a reasonable allowance for his services. Although the salary
was community property, that amount was charged with the family support, leaving $8,573,
from which the community's share of the couple's income taxes was still to be subtracted.
Id. at 25-26, 199 P. at 888-89.
73. 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971).
74. During the marriage, Mr. Beam's separate estate had increased from an initial
worth of $1,629,129 to only $1,850,507. An additional $1,458,127 had been spent over the
years, for a total value of $3,308,634. Id. at 19 n.5, 490 P.2d at 262 n.5, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 142
n.5. Allowing the separate property a 7% interest growth factor would have given a total
value of $4.2 million, or a net estate of $2,741,873 at the time of the trial. Id. at 19, 490 P.2d
at 262, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 142. The court's conclusion that Mr. Beam was "not particularly
successful in [his] effort to manage the separate estate," id. at 16, 490 P.2d at 260, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 140, may be inaccurate, however, given the realities of'estate planning. Justice
Brown, in his partial dissent in the court of appeal, noted that during the early years of the
marriage, a substantial portion of Mr. Beam's separate estate was invested in municipal tax
free bonds earning about 1% interest. Beam v. Beam, 89 Cal. Rptr. 280, 288 (1st Dist. 1970)
(Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Using the Pereira formula of 7%
interest thus would give a large part of his assets "seven times the income that was actually
realized. . . ." Id. Furthermore, Mr. Beam's assets "consisted of a number of enterprises
which did not realize any immediate profit but did have ultimate prospects of a greater
future growth value, and thus would be of a greater ultimate benefit to the respondent." Id.
Today, in contrast to the conditions prevailing in 1909, at the time of Pereira, "[the desire
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On appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected Mrs. Beam's argu-
ment that the court had abused its discretion in refusing to apply the
Van Camp doctrine, which would have compensated the community
for the value of Mr. Beam's services. It reasoned that even under Van
Camp no community property residue would have remained. Al-
though Mr. Beam would be deemed to have earned what an investment
counselor would have charged to manage the property, $17,000 per
year, the entire imputed salary would have been exhausted under the
family expense doctrine by the family's living expenses, which aver-
aged $24,000 per year.75 Mrs. Beam thus left the lengthy marriage al-
most without property, while Mr. Beam remained a millionaire.76
As noted by Professor Bodenheimer, California's community
property laws are woefully inadequate in such cases. 77 First, the Per-
for immediate profit to one in high income tax bracket necessarily is subordinated to consid-
erations of growth and capital gains to minimize those taxes." Id.
75. 6 Cal. 3d at 20-21, 490 P.2d at 263, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The total of Mr. Beam's
imputed earnings over the marriage was $357,000 under the court's analysis. Id. The esti-
mate would appear to be extremely conservative. The primary evidence relied upon in the
valuation of an owner-spouse's services is the amount a manager of a similar business would
receive as a salary. Bodenheimer, Separate-Property Marriages, supra note 50, at 396. The
use of this evidence, however, has been criticized: "This is not realistic. The employed
manager watches the clock .... In contrast, the husband put his whole being into the
enterprise." W. BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 176 (1962).
The inequity of charging the community property first with all living expenses in such cases
is discussed in note 64 supra.
76. The trial court concluded that the only community property existing at the time of
trial was a promissory note for $38,000, which was awarded to Mrs. Beam upon Mr. Beam's
stipulation; Mr. Beam's estate was worth $1,850,507. 6 Cal. 3d at 16, 490 P.2d at 260, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 140. Although Mrs. Beam did receive a spousal support award, it did not replace
the property interest she sought. The award was to terminate on her remarriage or the death
of either Mr. Beam or herself. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1981). If she had
outlived him, her final years might have been spent in relative poverty. In fact, however, she
predeceased him while the case was on appeal, and her estate was the unsuccessful appellant
in the California Supreme Court. See 6 Cal. 3d at 15 n.l, 490 P.2d at 259 n.1, 98 Cal. Rptr.
at 139 n.l.
77. Bodenheimer, Separate-Properly Marriages, supra note 50, at 394: "The apportion-
ment process is in fact usually undertaken at great expense to the litigants and with consider-
able expenditure of judicial time and energy. And yet, the outcome is frequently totally
negative-that is, nothing is being apportioned-so that the whole complex process of ad-
ducing the evidence and making the necessary computations is a futile exercise which ends
where it begins, [with] unshared net gain in the separate estate. It is true, as has been
pointed out, that the courts have in some cases apportioned the profits, and that, with or
without the help of other doctrines [e.g., transmutation] they have achieved some measure of
equity in certain situations. Generally speaking, however, the results are uncertain and un-
predictable, often unfair to either husband or wife-under present societal conditions more
often the wife. Thus, it is probably no overstatement to say that present apportionment
mechanisms are not working."
Other apportionment methods have been tried and suggested. Two tax cases have
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eira-Van Camp doctrines in fact have not been applied to vindicate
community property interests when a spouse has pursued a separate
property business during marriage.78 Second, the community expense
doctrine often vitiates that community property which does exist in
wealthy marriages.79 Third, a refusal to invade separate property,
when it is the basis of a family's wealth, is often unjust.8 0
MixedAssets
Couples often use both community and separate property in the
acquisition of major assets, especially those paid for overtime. One
who purchases a home or begins a business before marriage, for exam-
ple, may use borrowed funds and have loans still outstanding at the
time of marriage. Typically, payments on such debts during marriage
are made from current income, community property. Similarly, life in-
surance policies or retirement plans are often initiated before marriage
with separate property funds or efforts, and continuing payments or
efforts are expended during the marriage to maintain or increase the
coverage. Even when a business or home is purchased during mar-
presented a mathematical scheme of apportionment. In Todd v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d
553 (9th Cir. 1945), and Todd v. McColgan, 89 Cal. App. 2d 509, 201 P.2d 414 (3d Dist.
1949), an apportionment formula was used that first estimates a fair rate of return on the
capital investment and a fair salary for the owner-spouse. Then, "[i]f the total surplus of the
separate investment is larger than the sum of the two figures so determined, the balance is
divided between the community and the separate estate in the ratio the two original figures
bore to the total. If the total surplus is smaller than the sum of 'salary' and interest, the two
shares would presumably be reduced proportionately." Bodenheimer, Separate-Property
Marriages, supra note 50, at 413. Professor Bodenheimer has suggested a "Specified-Share
Apportionment Scheme," a "Pure Equity Rule," and an "Improvement Rule." Id. at 409-
13.
A Wisconsin proposal attempts to avoid the California apportionment rules by institut-
ing a marital property system that classifies the fruits of separate property as marital partner-
ship property. Wisc. A.B. 370 § 766.31(2)(b)-(c) (1981). A discussion sheet prepared by
Professor June Miller Weisberger of the University of Wisconsin Law School explains:
"This rule represents a departure from the existing practices of the community property
states and a return to an earlier version of community property. The rationale supporting
this policy choice is primarily that marital partners have a 'stake' in the capital appreciation
of separate property because it is often the frugality and conscious choice of consumption
patterns of the marital partnership which permit separate assets to be held as capital assets
instead of being liquidated to meet current community living expenses." Weisberger, Dis-
cussion Sheet 2 on Wisc. A.B. 1090 (1979) (later Wisc. A.B. 370 (1981)). See notes 105-06 &
accompanying text infra.
78. Bodenheimer, Separate-Propery Marriages, supra note 50, at 388: "The apportion-
ment doctrine has been involved many times in California litigation, but it has seldom re-
sulted in the allocation of a sizeable share of separate property profits to the community
under either of the two tests."
79. Bodenheimer, Separate-Property Marriages, supra note 50, at 396.
80. Id. at 422.
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riage, separate property acquired before the marriage or from a
spouse's family is often incorporated in the down payment. Current
income is typically used to meet the monthly mortgage payments that
are an almost inevitable part of the scheme. Rarely do couples give
any thought to their respective ownership interests in the home or busi-
ness, other than to indicate with survivorship provisions that each
wishes the other spouse to retain the home after his or her death.81
Indeed, only some of those who have given the matter thought will
have actually discussed their views with their spouses. Yet, when death
or divorce occurs, some allocation of the asset, including any apprecia-
tion, must be made.82
Case law has developed several applicable doctrines. Originally, a
property's character as separate or community theoretically was estab-
fished at the time of purchase. According to this "inception of the
right" doctrine, unless the parties agreed to alter the nature of the prop-
erty, ownership interests were fixed at the time title was acquired. 83 If
property of another source was later used to improve the property, ab-
sent a gift, the owner of the property had a right to reimbursement for
either the amount expended or the benefit to the improved property.
84
This rule, too, and its accompanying presumptions could be displaced
by showing that the parties had agreed otherwise, because California
freely permits spouses to alter marital property rights by agreement. 85
Although these doctrines often operated sensibly during the era of
sole management and control, when only one spouse had management
power over any given item of community or separate property, they did
not provide satisfactory results in all cases. An exception gradually de-
veloped. Life insurance and pensions, which were typically acquired
with payments over many years, came to be considered "installment
purchases" rather than rights acquired at the time of an initial pay-
ment.86 This treatment permitted a fair accounting of both separate
property payments before and after marriage and community property
81. Articles in 1952 and 1961 reported that 85% of the recorded California deeds held
by husbands, wives, or both were held by spouses as joint tenants. Marshall, Joint Tenancy,
supra note 57, at 501 n.2; Griffith, CommuniZy Property, supra note 57, at 88. There is no
reason to think that this practice has changed in the years since.
82. For a discussion of the varying treatment accorded such property, see Griffith,
Community Property; Marshall, Joint Tenancy; Mills, Community Joint Tenancy; and Sims,
Joint Bank Accounts, supra note 57.
83. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 48, § 64, at 130.
84. In re Marriage of Warren, 28 Cal. App. 3d 777, 104 Cal. Rptr. 860 (2d Dist. 1972).
85. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5103, 5133-5135 (West 1970).
86. See Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (retire-
ment plans); Gettman v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862,
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payments during marriage. Title was accordingly treated as having
been acquired pro rata by all payments from whatever sources, when-
ever made.
This reasoning was readily extended to the purchase of a home.
Faced with separate property title acquired by one party shortly before
marriage, the court in Vieux v. Vieux 87 refused to hold that the home
was separate property and that the community had, at best, a right to
reimbursement for its expenditures. Instead, it reasoned that for mari-
tal property purposes the home should be viewed as an asset that Was
purchased over time, and that the respective property sources should be
given pro rata ownership interests in proportion to their contributions.
In a rising market, where the equity contributed in payments was fre-
quently less substantial than that which was added to the home's value
by appreciation, this rule gave the community a share in the home's
increased value. The doctrine was later extended to the purchase dur-
ing marriage of a business in a case involving a separate property down
payment, borrowed funds, and repayment from the business'
earnings. 88
In recent years, interest rates have increased, taxes have become a
major expense for home owners, and the appreciation in home values
has risen dramatically. As a result, the details of shared ownership in-
terests have been the subject of frequent litigation. Two recent deci-
sions of the California Supreme Court have attempted to bring order to
the case law.8 9 Unfortunately, these opinions rely on strict property
notions and questionable doctrines concerning borrowed funds. The
consequences are far less sensible than those prompted by the Vieux
case,90 which first applied an installment purchase analysis to home
ownership. Under these recent cases, form of title9' and timing of the
197 P.2d 817 (2d Dist. 1948) (life insurance); Modem Woodman of America v. Gray, 113
Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754 (1st Dist. 1931) (term life insurance).
87. 80 C. App. 222, 251 P. 640 (2d Dist. 1926).
88. Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953) (separate property down
payment, borrowed funds, repayment out of the business' earnings).
89. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980); In
re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
90. 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 P. 640 (2d Dist. 1926). In Vieux, ownership became an issue
after the property had been entirely paid for. Title was apportioned according to the ratio of
"direct contributions made by the respective parties to the purchase price," including ex-
penditures for taxes and interest; "funds issuing directly from the property" were ignored.
Id. at 229, 251 P. at 643.
91. The placement of separate funds in a joint tenancy title is held to constitute a gift
that cannot be avoided by demonstrating that no gift was intended. Instead, "an agreement
or understanding" to hold as other than joint tenants is required. In re Marriage of Lucas,
27 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (1980).
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purchase 92 have become determinative. Monthly payments on the loan
are relegated to a relatively minor role because payments of interest are
ignored, and no credit is given for costs incurred for maintenance, in-
surance, or property taxes.93
The effects of these decisions on a couple's property interests are
illustrated by the following hypothetical case.94 While she is single,
Susan purchases a home in 1980 for $140,000, making a $40,000 down
payment and taking title in her name. The interest rate on the $100,000
mortgage is 1412%. Shortly thereafter, she and John, who chose the
home together, are married. During their ten-year marriage, monthly
payments of $1,205 on the loan are made from the couple's current
earnings, community property. Taxes, insurance, and maintenance ex-
penses are also paid from that source. By the time of their divorce, the
community will have made payments totalling $144,600 in interest and
principal, plus additional expenditures for taxes, insurance, and up-
keep. The loan balance will have been reduced to $95,480.
Assuming that the house has doubled in value to $280,000, the
currently controlling case law would allocate the ownership interests in
the house as follows. Direct contributions are apportioned first. Susan
is credited with her $40,000 separate property down payment, the bank
is entitled to the outstanding loan balance of $95,480, and the commu-
nity receives $4,520. This last amount is the community's "contribu-
tion" to the capital investment in the house-that is, the amount that
the loan principal was reduced by the monthly community property
payments. The $140,000 of appreciation in the home's market value is
then shared in the proportions that are established by these three
figures, and Susan, as the borrower, is credited with the portion of the
appreciation that is attributable to the loan amount still outstanding
from the initial purchase. Accordingly, Susan's separate property share
92. Under the Lucas and Moore decisions, appreciation reflects the character of the
loan that was used to purchase the asset. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 372, 618
P.2d 208, 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662, 665 (1980); In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 816
n.3, 614 P.2d 285, 290 n.3, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 858 n.3 (1980). A loan received on the basis of
a person's current earning power is deemed separate property if it is taken out before mar-
riage, but is deemed community property if it is secured during marriage. See Bruch, Man-
agement Powers, supra note 11, at n.68; Young, Community Property Classification of Credit
Acquisitions in California.- Law Without Logic?, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 173 (1981).
93. Only the amount paid on the principal of the loan is recognized. In re Marriage of
Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 372, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665. The prior leading case on
installment purchase theory had recognized payments on interest and taxes as well. See
Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222, 229, 251 P. 641, 643 (2d Dist. 1926).
94. The hypothetical figures on payment costs and reduction in loan principal are
taken from CAL. FAM. L. REP. 1463 (1980).
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of the home's $140,000 in appreciation is based upon $40,000 (the down
payment) plus $95,480 (the loan balance), while the community's inter-
est is based upon $4,520 (the "paydown"). 95 Of course, Susan also re-
ceives her one-half of the community property share. If the house is
sold, the final figures are as follows:
Out-of-Pocket Costs:
Susan's separate property (down payment) ............ $ 40,000
Community property:
interest (monthly payments) ........... $140,080 1
capital (monthly payments) ............ $ 4,520 $144,600+
insurance, taxes, maintenance ? J
$184,600+
Distribution of the $280,000 Sales Proceeds:
Repayment of the outstanding loan ................... $ 95,480
Community interest:
return of capital ....................... $ 4,520 $
share in appreciation (from capital) .... $ 4,520J $ 9,040
Susan's separate interest:
return of capital ....................... $ 40,000
share in appreciation (from capital) .... $ 40,000 $175,480
share in appreciation (from loan) ...... $ 95,000J
$280,000
Totals to the Parties:
Bank (loan balance) ................................. $ 95,480
Susan (separate property) .................. $175,480 $180000
(community property) ............... $ 4,520 1
John (community property ) .......................... $ 4,520
$280,000
A quite different result occurs if all the facts are the same except
that Susan purchases the house in her name one week after her
marriage to John and the court concludes that a community loan was
used in the purchase--that is, the lender intended to rely upon the
general creditworthiness of either spouse, or upon community property,
95. See In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 373-74, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr.
at 665.
March 1982]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
for repayment. 96 Assuming that Susan can show the separate property
source of her $40,000 down payment,97 and that the monthly payments
were not a gift to her separate property, 98 the result would be as
follows:
Out-of-Pocket Costs:
Susan's separate property (down payment) ............ $ 40,000
Community property:
interest (monthly payments) ........... $140,080 1
capital (monthly payments) ............ $ 4,520 $144,600+
insurance, taxes, maintenance .......... _ ?__
$184,600+
Distribution of the $280,000 Sales Proceeds:
Repayment of outstanding loan ............ $ 95,480
Community interest:
return of capital ....................... $ 4,520
share in appreciation (from capital) .... $ 4,520 $104,520
share in appreciation (from loan) ...... $95,480J
Susan's separate interest:
return of capital ....................... $40,000 [$ 80,000
share in appreciation (from capital) .... $40,000J
$280,000
Totals to the Parties:
Bank (loan balance) ................................. $ 95,000
Susan (separate property) ............... $80,000 1$132,260
(community property) ............... $52,260 $
John (community property ........................... $ 52,260
$280,000
Yet another minor change produces dramatic consequences. If
title to the house is taken in joint tenancy form, as is usual in California
96. See note 92 supra.
97. Although all property acquired by a spouse in his or her name during marriage is
presumptively community property, this presumption may be rebutted by tracing to a
separate property source. See note 236 infra.
98. Under case law that predates the adoption of equal management and control,
contributions made by John, but not Susan, from community property sources to Susan's
separate property would have been presumed a gift. Bruch, Management Powers, supra
note 11, at nn.114-22.
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for married couples who seek a survivorship provision,99 but the couple
thereafter divorces, Susan will have lost her separate property interest
unless the parties had "an agreement or understanding" to the
contrary. 100 The results, then, on the same facts as to payment sources
and value, would be:
Out-of-pocket Costs:
Susan's separate property (down payment) ........... $ 40,000
Community property:
interest (monthly payments) ........... $140,080 1
capital (monthly payments) ............ $ 4,520 $144,600+
insurance, taxes, maintenance ........... J
$184,600+
Distribution of the $280,000 Sales Proceeds:
Repayment of outstanding loan ...................... $ 95,480
Community interest:
return of capital (down payment) ...... $40,000 'I
return of capital ("pay down") ......... $ 4,520 $
share in appreciation (from all capital). $44,520 $184,520
share in appreciation (from loan) ...... $95,480J
Susan's separate interest ............... 0
$280,000
Totals to the Parties:
Bank (loan balance) ............................... $ 95,480
Susan (separate property) .................. 0 $ 92,260
(community property)'............. $92,260 9
John (community property) .......................... $ 92,260
$280,000
The three examples share several common defects. Important
ownership consequences flow from the attribution of a separate or
community property character to borrowed funds. Yet actual out-of-
pocket costs incurred in repaying such funds are ignored.
Furthermore, timing and form of title are elevated in importance.
99. See note 81 supra.
100. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 815, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
See note 91 supra. See generally Comment, Form of Title Presumptions in California
Community Property Law: The Test for a "Common Understanding or Agreement," 15
U.C.D. L. REv. 95 (1981).
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None of the three examples produces an equitable result, in which
ownership is allocated in some reasonable way in proportion to the
actual costs incurred from varying funding sources. Instead, litigation
is invited by the danger of forfeiting important community or separate
interests unless an agreement or understanding that displaces these
rules can be shown.
Summary
The difficulties posed under current law by the above examples of
mixed and commingled assets can be summarized. First, the family
expense doctrine, which assumes that living costs are satisfied first from
community property sources, even when considerable separate prop-
erty wealth is present, is unreasonable. The doctrine ignores the likeli-
hood that spouses with both forms of wealth will maintain a higher
standard of living than they would if they realized that only separate
property wealth would remain unless the family's living standard were
reduced. The doctrine improperly places the burden of commingling
on the community property by depriving the community of a presump-
tion that separate property was contributed to meet the family's
expenses.
Second, the Pereira- Van Camp approach to the allocation of sepa-
rate and community interests in businesses operated during marriage
permits inconsistent results and, in practice, undervalues the commu-
nity's investment. Its questionable foundations are apparent when an
entrepreneur, seeking to minimize the community's interest, argues that
his or her talents and efforts had little to do with the business' suc-
cess.'01 This behavior is inconsistent with a common sense understand-
ing of the involvement that an owner, as opposed to an employee,
typically devotes to a family enterprise. 102
101. See, e.g., Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 45 Cal. 2d 142, 287 P.2d 769 (1955); Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.
2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953); Millington v. Millington, 259 Cal. App. 2d 896, 67 Cal. Rptr.
128 (1st Dist. 1968); Somps v. Somps, 250 Cal. App. 2d 328, 58 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1st Dist.
1967). Occasionally, however, the more natural exuberance of the entrepreneur overcomes
his or her legal savvy. Mr. Pereira himself is quoted as follows from the transcript on appeal
in his case: "Q. Of course that is an enormous profit Mr. Pereira on that amount of money.
I suppose it is due to your individual efforts? A. I judge it is. . . The Court. Mr. Periera, it
is due to your own efforts you made this money? A. Yes sir, hard labor, day and night."
Comment, Apportionment of Income from a Spouse's Separately Owned Property, 51 CALIF.
L. REv. 161, 171 n.108 (1963). The trial court held that all the profits were community
property, but the California Supreme Court held that Mr. Periera was entitled to interest on
his separate property capital. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 7, 103 P. 488, 490-91 (1909).
102. See notes 75 & 101 supra.
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Finally, actual contributions to the purchase of a major asset over
time may or may not be adequately recognized. The results turn upon
such seemingly trivial variables as the time and manner in which title is
taken and funds are borrowed, rather than upon the parties' probable
expectations or the sources from which payments are made.
Redefining Ownership Interests: Separate versus Community
One straightforward reform would do much to alleviate these
problems: a return to the original definition of community property,
which allocates the fruits of separate property to the community.103
For this purpose, the fruits of separate property should be defined to
include natural appreciation. 104 First, this reform would solve the
103. This step has been proposed by other commentators. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, Sepa-
rate-Propery Marriages, supra note 50, at 408; Knutson, California Community Property
Laws. A Pleafor Legislative Study and .Reform, 39 S. CAL. L. Rav. 240, 266 (1966) ("If we
are to have a clean, simple and fair community property system, consistent with our other
property, family and commercial goals, we must go to the root of the difficulty, which is the
underlying classifications and asumptions."); Comment, Apportionment of Income from a
Spouse's Separately Owned Property, 51 CALIF. L. Rav. 161, 202 (1963); Note, In re Estate of
Neilson, 36 S. CAL. L. Rv. 481, 485 (1963).
This change would bring California in line with the three community property states
that in one form or another have retained the civil law concept that the rents and profits of
separate property are community property, and would comport with the proposed draft of
the Uniform Marital Property Act and Wisconsin's proposed marital property system. See
IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (1963); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2339 (West Supp. 1981); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1981); UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
§§ 3(c)(2)(v), 3(d)(1) (Submission Draft 1981); 1981 Wisc. A.B. 370 at §§ 766.31(l)(e), (h),
(i), (k), 766.31(2)(c).
104. The Spanish-Mexican system distinguished natural appreciation, excluding it from
fruits and profits. Marienzo, Commentary on Novisima Recopilacion, Book 10, Title 4, Law 1,
at Gloss I (88) in W. DE FUNLAK, 2 PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 137 (1943). The
distinction is not immutable under the California Constitution. The constitution of 1849,
which adopted the civil law system of marital property, granted the legislature broad powers
of definition and implementation. See text accompanying note 44 supra. Although the spe-
cific language of implementation was dropped in a subsequent streamlining of the constitu-
tion, see CAL. Co NsT. OF 1879 art. XX, § 8, the original intent to adopt a system with flexible
contours has subsequently been recognized. Numerous definitional changes have been
made over the years. Consider, for example, the development of varying ownership'rules for
personal injury damages: McFadden v. Santa Ana, 0. & T. St. Ry., 87 Cal. 464, 25 P. 681
(1891); Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949); Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d
622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952); former CAL. CIV. CODE § 163.5 (enacted by 1957 Cal. Stats. ch.
2334, § I at 4065, amended by 1968 Cal. Stats. ch. 457, § 2 at 1078, repealed by 1969 Cal.
Stats. ch. 1608, § 3 at 3313); former CAL. CIV. CODE § 5109 (derived from § 163.5) (enacted
by 1969 Cal. Stats. ch. 1608, tit. 8 at 3338, and repealed by 1979 Cal. Stats. ch. 638, § 2 at
1971); CAL. Civ. CODE § 5126 (West Supp. 1981), (enacted by 1969 Cal. Stats. ch. 1608, tit. 8
at 3342, amended by 1970 Cal. Stats. ch. 1575, § 5 at 3286, 1972 Cal. Stats. ch. 905, § 1, at
1609, 1979 Cal. Stats. ch. 638, § 3 at 1971). See also changes in the general community
property ownership and management rules, Siberall v. Siberall, 214 Cal. 767, 772, 7 P.2d
1003, 1005 (1932) (listing changes); 1927 Cal. Stats. ch. 265, § 1, at 484 (enacting former
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problem of a spouse who would otherwise receive no property distribu-
tion at divorce from an independently wealthy spouse. Because the in-
come from separate property would gradually replace the original
capital as the property's predominant characteristic, a spouse in a
lengthy marriage would benefit to a greater degree than would a spouse
in a brief marriage. Without giving the divorce court jurisdiction to
divide separate property, this automatic and gradual shift to commu-
nity property would provide equitable results in most cases.10 5 Second,
this rule would obviate the current need for complex, costly litigation to
untangle commingled or mixed assets.106 Once a separate property in-
terest was established, only that capital would be reimbursed; all in-
creases would become a part of the community interest, subject to
equal division. The community expense doctrine, which vitiates the
Civil Code § 161a, now CAL. CIv. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1981), giving wife a present
vested interest). See generally H. VERRALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY 2 (3d ed. 1977) ("The character and extent of the statutes defining the
system and a course of decisional law peculiar to California have resulted in a community
property system substantially different from that of the Mexican-Spanish parent system
The division of natural increases is an important element in the simplification process.
See note 105 infra (protections for the community) and note 106 infra (apportionment
issues).
105. Unless natural increases are subject to division, however, selective investments in
growth assets that produce no income, such as jewelry, art, coins, precious metals and some
forms of realty, could avoid any benefit to the community.
106. The problems of apportionment under the Idaho, Louisiana and Texas versions of
the Spanish-Mexican system are far less onerous than those arising under California's doc-
trines. See Huie, The Texas Constitutional Definition of the Wife's Separate Property, 35 TEx.
L. REV. 1054, 1059 (1957). Natural appreciation, however, must be distinguished from rents
and profits. See Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d 844 (1974); Speer v. Quinlan, 96
Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314 (1974); Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 Idaho 44, 277 P.2d 278 (1954); Hurta
v. Hurta, 260 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 1972); Bakken v. Bakken, 503 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973). See generally W. HUIE, TExAS CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF MARITAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 271-88 (1966); W. REPPY & W. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES 282-83 (1975); Annot., 29 A.L.R. 2d 530 (1953). As in California, a
separate property business operated by a spouse during marriage must be valued in light of
market fluctuations or natural growth on one hand and undistributed income on the other.
No income, however, is distributed to the separate property interest in states following the
Spanish-Mexican rule. Compare Beals v. Foutenot, Ill F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1940) (Louisiana
rule) with Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909) (California rule). See also Wisc.
A.B. 370 § 766.32 (1981) (defining "mixed property"). Lucas-AMoore apportionments of in-
creased home equities would also be required under the pure Spanish-Mexican system, al-
though within that system appropriate legislation could replace the lender's intent test for
loans with the rule that any funds borrowed during the marriage are community property.
See text following note 123 infra. See generally DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 48, at
§ 78 (describing the varying case law of sister states). These litigious matters would disap-
pear and gradual transfers of wealth to the community would occur if all increases were
made subject to equal division.
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supposed ameliorative effects of California's apportionment doctrines,
would be rendered unimportant, because income from all sources
would belong to the community. 10 7 Finally, the inequities of the artifi-
cial "lender's intent" doctrine would be ended: rather than character-
ize loan proceeds according to whether the lender expected repayment
from separate wealth or from the community, all loans obtained during
marriage would produce community property, and purchases made on
credit would be divided equally, except for actual separate property
contributions.10 8 Similarly, a home purchased before marriage would
be divided equally, except to the extent of separate property actually
invested in the property. Although this rule would be less favorable to
the separate property owner than is the current case law that controls
when property is acquired before marriage and held in the sole name of
the purchaser, 1' 9 it could appropriately be combined with a rule that
would return separate property contributions whenever possible after
preservation of direct community property contributions.110 This result
would be far more just than that imposed by the current case law rule,
which works a forfeiture of separate property interests when they are
placed in jointly titled property."1
107. The family expense doctrine should be expressly overruled by statute in any event.
Full protection will require the division of both separate property income and natural appre-
ciation. See Professor Weisberger's analysis, set forth at note 77 supra.
108. This result would follow under the reasoning that loans, whether the fruit of sepa-
rate or community property, would be community property. If separate property natural
appreciation were not included in community property, separate property contributions and
a pro rata share of appreciation would go to the separate property estate. In that case, the
role of borrowed funds in allocating appreciation would have to be defined. Even under
these circumstances, the law would be rendered more equitable and simple if credit acquisi-
tions were treated as purchased by direct contributions only, ignoring borrowed funds and
payments produced by the property itself. Payments on interest should be included in these
computations as a reflection of the true purchase costs. Only if no direct contributions from
outside sources were made should the property be characterized as community property on
the basis of the loan itself.
109. See In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662
(1980).
110. A statute should clarify the allocation of ownership interests if property depreci-
ates. The text recommends a scheme in which the separate property acts as the guarantor of
the community on the theory that the owner of separate property permits mixing at his or
her own peril. Alternatively, relative ownership interests in depreciated property could be
prescribed by direct contributions including interest payments, just as for appreciated prop-
erty, with losses shared accordingly. Under this approach, an exception calling for full res-
toration of the community's costs should be provided when restitution is in order-for
example, when community funds were invested in violation of the good faith management
standard.
Ill. See In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853
(1980).
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The compromises are these: First, rather than impose blanket di-
vorce court jurisdiction over the separate property, the only other plau-
sible response to the inequities of Beam ,112 a gradual shift of separate
to community property would ordinarily occur, affording greater pro-
tection to spouses in lengthy marriages than to those in brief ones. Al-
though the separate property interest would never convert entirely into
community property absent donative intent, 113 the passage of time and
the working of inflation would effectively replace separate with com-
munity interests. Second, the current rule that ignores actual contribu-
tions to assets purchased over time and inappropriately credits
appreciation to the loan would be replaced. Instead, the community's
direct contributions would be secured, and all appreciation would be-
long to it. At the same time, the separate property would be guaran-
teed the return of its investment far more frequently than at present, a
rule of special importance in short marriages.
The appreciation in other mixed or commingled assets would also
be divided equally as community property, reducing the current incen-
tive to recharacterize banking transactions or agreements after the fact
to attribute the most favorable investments to the separate property."1
4
Several variations of this approach are possible. For example, the
1981 Submission Draft of the Uniform Marital Property Act distin-
guishes between "appreciation" ' 1 5 and "income." ' 1 6 At divorce, in-
come from separate property is divided, as is all other marital property,
"in equal proportions. . . unless the court finds that there are unusual
and extraordinary circumstances which would cause an equal division
to be repugnant to justice."'"I 7 In contrast, appreciation belongs to an
individual's separate property, 118 and is subject to "equitable appor-
tionment" 119 at divorce.
Unless appreciation may be divided, selective investments could
112. See notes 73-80 & accompanying text supra.
113. Compare note 121 infra.
114. The incentive to attribute losing investments to the community would remain.
115. Appreciation is defined as the "realized or unrealized increase in value of prop-
erty." UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 1(2) (Submission Draft 1981).
116. Income, under the Draft, consists of "dividend, interest, rental, or trust income, and
all other kinds of benefits, payments, or other considerations derived from the investment,
rental, licensing, or other non-consumptive use of property except those received on the sale
or exchange of property as a return of capital or as realized appreciation." Id. § 1(9). The
Wisconsin proposal provides for sole management of separate property income until "any
realization or partition." Wisc. A.B. 370 § 766.51(3) (1981).
117. UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 16(b) (Submission Draft 1981).
118. The Draft uses the term "individual property." Id. § 3(c)(2)(v).
119. Id. § 16(c).
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vitiate the purposes of the "fruits" rule.120 Accordingly, should Cali-
fornia, too, choose to distinguish between appreciation and income, it
should provide divorce and probate courts with authority to make
awards from separate property appreciation. 12' A perhaps better rule
would include both forms of increased wealth in community property
but permit unequal distribution in appropriate cases, such as to retain
full title to inherited property of historical or emotional significance in
the heir's name.
Instead of adopting this major reform, California could institute a
number of more limited reforms, each designed to rectify one facet of
the problems outlined above. Thus, a special rule could be enacted to
control the division of the matrimonial home. 22 More generally, the
court could be given authority to award separate property, or at least
divide certain forms of separate property, such as joint tenancy or all
jointly held property.- 3 The family expense doctrine could be abro-
gated by legislation, as could the doctrines that characterize loan pro-
ceeds by the "lender's intent" and credit the appreciation of property
purchased with borrowed funds according to that characterization. Fi-
nally, a single formula could replace judicial discretion in valuing in-
terests in businesses and professions that contain both separate and
community components.'24 This piecemeal approach is a less prefera-
ble model for reform. It would be more complicated, less satisfactory,
and inconsistent with both the historical basis for California's marital
property regime and the model that is currently being proposed for
adoption in common law states. Nevertheless, it could institute impor-
tant improvements.
120. See note 105 supra.
121. This system would protect a spouse who divorces or survives the separate property
owner. It would not, however, include any portion of the appreciation in the non-owner's
estate, should he or she die first. Other approaches are possible that would depend less on
fluctuating inflation and interest rates. One could convert separate property into community
property by operation of law (for example, at an annual rate of 5%) so that after a given
period the parties would hold all of their property as community property. Unless this con-
version were but a rule for division at death or divorce, however, serious tracing, manage-
ment, and creditor access problems could arise during marriage. Because the separate
property corpus would eventually be forfeited, this scheme would require a conforming con-
stitutional amendment. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21, quoted in text accompanying note 93
supra. The general acceptability of this conversion scheme is doubtful, however, because a
marriage that is sufficiently lengthy to justify a universal community in one person's view
may seem too brief to another.
122. See notes 319-27 & accompanying text infra.
123. See note 38 supra (listing the rules for jurisdiction and division at divorce in the
community property states) and notes 315-16 and 404-07 infra (describing separate property
awards at death).124. See notes 77, 101-02 & accompanying text supra.
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Mixed Assets that Require Special Ownership Rules
Some forms of property merit special treatment under any system.
In this section, these assets, the current definitions of ownership inter-
ests in them, and needed reforms are discussed, both in the context of
California's current rule that earnings of separate property are separate
and in the context of a reform that would characterize such earnings as
community.
Life Insurance Policies and Pensions
Because pensions and life insurance typically are acquired over the
entire span of adult work years, they are often purchased with a combi-
nation of prenuptial, marital, and post-marital assets. The installment
purchase doctrine, which developed to allocate proportionate owner-
ship interest to the sources of funds or efforts with which such policies
were purchased,125 has worked well on the whole and should be
retained. Several specific ownership problems, however, deserve
attention.
Beneficiary Provisions
A spouse is not ordinarily permitted to destroy the other spouse's
ownership interest in a policy or plan by naming a third party as bene-
ficiary. This attempted gift of community property assets without the
consent of the other spouse may be set aside as to the portion of the
benefit that is owned by the wronged spouse. 126 If a spouse has inno-
cently assumed that a policy on his or her life could be left to a third
party and has made estate plans that incorporate this disposition, the
ability of the nonconsenting spouse to set aside part of the plan without
contesting other parts of it may create injustice. Assume, for example,
125. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 355, 530 P.2d 589, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 625
(1975) (retirement plan); Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 218, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210, 215
(2d Dist. 1976) (employee group life insurance and pension death benefits); Gettman v. City
of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 197 P.2d 817 (2d Dist. 1948)
(whole life insurance); Modem Woodman of America v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754
(1st Dist. 1931) (term life insurance).
126. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(b) (West Supp. 1981); see also Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Cal. 2d
799, 376 P.2d 563, 26 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1962) (wife's one-half interest in policy proceeds recog-
nized as against named beneficiaries although subject to administration in husband's estate
under then-existing Probate Code provisions); Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135
Cal. Rptr. 210 (2d Dist. 1976); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602,
214 P. 61 (1st Dist. 1923). If no challenge is made, the survivor becomes liable for gift tax as
to his or her share, which passes to the beneficiary. Jones, Transfers of Community Property
Insurance Proceeds to Third-Party Beneficiaries." The Federal Gift Tax Consequences, 5 COM-
MUNITY PROP. J. 258 (1978).
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that a couple owns community property assets worth $200,000 and that
the wife makes plans to dispose of one half that amount ($100,000) at
her death. Wishing to divide her assets equally between her father and
her husband, she names her father beneficiary of a $50,000 community
property life insurance policy, and leaves the residue of her estate to
her husband by will. Her husband, however, may challenge her at-
tempted unilateral gift of the insurance proceeds after her death and
recover his community share ($25,000).127 Should he do so, only
$25,000 of her $100,000 share in the couple's community property will
pass to her father via the policy. The remaining $75,000 of her share
will pass to her husband under her will,12 8 to be added to his own
$25,000 community share of the insurance policy and $75,000 share of
the couple's other community assets. Had she made a $50,000 bequest
to her father instead and named her husband as both the beneficiary of
the policy and the residual beneficiary under her will, her overall plan
would have been fulfilled: her father would have received the amount
she had intended for him ($50,000), and her husband would also have
received a total of $50,000 from her share of their assets ($25,000 under
her will and $25,000 as the beneficiary of the policy).129 As before, he
would also retain his $100,000 ownership share in the couple's property
($25,000 in policy benefits and $75,000 in other assets).
These disparities should be eliminated. The current system can be
improved by insisting that beneficiary designations of community
property assets be made jointly, avoiding unanticipated gift chal-
lenges. 30 To the extent that problems persist, challenges to gifts or be-
quests that take effect upon the death of the donor should be permitted
only if the total of the decedent's assets that would go to third parties
under such instruments exceeds the total amount available to the dece-
dent for disposition. Thus, all joint tenancies, insurance or pension
benefits, or other dispositions or transfers occurring upon death would
be considered together with the assets passing through the decedent's
estate in determining whether the surviving spouse should be permitted
127. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956) provides: "Upon the death of either husband
or wife, one-half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse; the other half is
subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent, and in the absence thereof goes to
the surviving spouse. .. "
128. His decision to stand on his community property rights as to the policy does not
operate as an election to take against the will. See E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 186 (2d ed. 1973): "[T]hese [insur-
ance] proceeds... are not part of [the] estate for purposes of the forced share of a surviving
spouse."
129. Her husband would have no reason to challenge the gift to himself.
130. Bruch, Management Powers, supra note 11, at n.42 (recommendation 8).
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to set aside any of the transfers as improperly impinging on community
property rights. 131
A second problem currently exists if a person whose pension plan
was acquired with community funds from a former marriage dies leav-
ing death benefits or a survivor's annuity to a third party, most com-
monly a subsequent spouse. Normal community property ownership
principles and tracing techniques indicate that one-half of all such ben-
efits should belong to the nonemployee former spouse, and should be
subject to that spouse's set-aside if the former spouse did not give con-
sent to the naming of the third party. The rule of Benson v. City of Los
Angeles,132 however, does not recognize the former spouse's claim if
the plan specifies that the survivorship benefit may only go to named
parties and the former spouse is not one of those so listed. 33 In Ben-
son, the second Mrs. Benson married Mr. Benson after he had retired,
outlived him, and became eligible for a widow's pension. The first
Mrs. Benson, who had been married to Mr. Benson during almost all of
his employed life, claimed one-half the pension payments, asserting her
community ownership interest. Her suit was denied by the California
Supreme Court on the ground that she was not his "widow."' 134 This
reasoning collapses under careful analysis. For example, if community
property life insurance proceeds are left to a third party, a surviving
spouse who challenges the disposition does not claim to be that third
person. In either situation, the survivor's community property claim is
based upon ownership principles, not upon the plan's scheme for distri-
bution of benefits. Benson should be legislatively overruled, and an
employee's opportunity to disadvantage a former spouse by a unilateral
choice of options should be restricted.13- Furthermore, such plans
131. This is a modification of the augmented estate concept found in the UNIFORM PRO-
BATE CODE. See notes 409-10 & accompanying text infra.
132. 60 Cal. 2d 355, 394 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963).
133. Id. at 359, 384 P.2d at 651, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
134. Id.
135. See Bruch, Management Powers, supra note 11, at n.42 (recommendation 7).
Others have identified the same problem. The United States Department of Justice Task
Force on Sex Discrimination, for example, reports that the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1381 (1976), requires that "any plan which provides
benefits in the form of an annuity (which includes almost all private pension plans) must
offer an optional 'joint and survivor annuity.' However, ERISA also provides that, before
retirement, the worker must be given an explanation of the joint and survivor option, and an
opportunity to reject it in favor of a single annuity on his own life, with no benefits to his
survivor [29 U.S.C. § 1055]. There is no requirement that his spouse be informed of the
option or of his decision, and no provision for her to make the election. This is significant
because the standard form of the benefit is still considered the single life annuity for the
worker, and if the worker elects to have a portion of his benefits paid to his spouse after his
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should be required to include former spouses in the class of authorized
beneficiaries for death or survivor's benefits.136
Death of the Nonemployee Spouse Before Death of the Employee
The California Supreme Court promulgated another peculiar rule
in Waite v. Waite,' 37 which involved the termination of a thirty-three
year marriage. Although the court held that Mrs. Waite owned a one-
half interest in her husband's pension, it also held that, should she pre-
decease him, her interest in the payments he would receive after her
death would not pass to her estate. Noting that this rule would vitiate
the mandated equal division of community property at divorce, how-
ever, the court suggested that Mrs. Waite could be compensated for her
lost ownership interest if the trial court on remand should see "fit" to
do so.1 38 This remarkable substitute of equitable distribution, and the
court's accompanying remarks on evaluating the damage that its hold-
ing had inflicted on Mrs. Waite's property rights,139 are as unsound as
they are baffling. The opinion forces a divorce court seeking an equal
division to consult actuarial tables, but to ignore the likelihood of fu-
ture changes in Mr. Waite's pension, and then requires that Mr. Waite
buy out Mrs. Waite's interest in these future amounts. The case
removes from the court the sensible option of waiting to see if in fact
Mr. Waite will outlive Mrs. Waite and, if so, how much money Mr.
Waite will thereafter receive from his pension.
In practice, because most wives are younger than their husbands
and women outlive men in any event, it is relatively unlikely that Mrs.
Waite or any other wife will be able to establish that she is apt to prede-
cease her husband and therefore is entitled to significant present com-
pensation for the interest that she may be. denied by the court's
death the joint' benefit he will receive during his life will be lower than his individual bene-
fit because of 'actuarial reduction' to reflect the 'cost' of the survivor's annuity. This aspect
of the system has been criticized on the grounds that many workers will elect the higher
immediate benefit because of need if the amount is barely adequate to begin with, or be-
cause of lack of foresight or just plain selfishness, and that the spouse, who is obviously
vitally interested in the decision, need not even be informed of it." CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION
TASK FORCE ON SEx DISCRIMINATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, THE PENSION GAME: THE
AMERICAN PENSION SYSTEM FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE AVERAGE WOMAN 27-28 (1979)
(footnote omitted).
136. See also id. at 47.
137. 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972).
138. Id. at 474 n.9, 492 P.2d at 22 n.9, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 334 n.9.
139. "In making the computation of actuarial value, the trial court may disregard the
possibility that defendant's pension benefits may be affected by legislative amendment to the
Judge's Retirement Law, by an increase in the salary paid to the judge holding defendant's
former office, or by defendant's accepting temporary judicial assignment." Id.
CALIFORNIA MAR.ITAL PROPERTYMarch 1982]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
"terminable interest" rule. If, contrary to statistical predictions, she ul-
timately predeceases him, it will be too late to request additional com-
pensation because the property division will have been made final. 140
Instead, because of the spouses' relative life expectancies, the Waite
"terminable interest" rule will almost always require that a working
wife pay her husband with current dollars for the predicted future
value of her pension after his death, while her estate will receive little
should she predecease him.
Although couples should remain free to buy one another's pension
interests when the sale is mutually agreeable, the forced forfeiture or
sale of possible future benefits under the Waite rule is an oddity that
should be legislatively overruled. 14' Benson and Waite were designed
to curtail a woman's community property ownership interests in her
former husband's employment benefits; they are gender-biased both in
conception and in operation, and have a negative impact on the already
poor financial status of elderly women. 142 Pension interests are an in-
creasingly important asset in many families. As such, they should be
consistently treated as property, and the interests of both spouses
should be fully protected.
Disability and Tort Recoveries that Include Compensation for Lost Wages
A spouse may be compensated for personal injuries by a damage
recovery, public or private disability benefits, or workers' compensa-
tion. The cases and statutes have inadequately considered to what ex-
tent characterization of these funds should reflect that which was lost,
and to what extent the source of premium payments should govern
under tracing principles. Nevertheless, the rules that currently govern
a divorce court's distribution of recoveries from third parties for per-
sonal injury are generally satisfactory.
There are two statutory directives. The first concerns recoveries
from third parties: the timing of the injury rather than the nature or
timing of the tort recovery controls, and recoveries, whenever received,
140. Property divisions are non-modifiable under California law. Bradley v. Superior
Court, 48 Cal. 2d 509, 518, 31.0 P.2d 634, 640 (1957); Carlson v. Carlson, 221 Cal. App. 2d
47, 50, 34 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199 (2d Dist. 1963); Wunch v. Wunch, 184 Cal. App. 2d 527, 531, 7
Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (2d Dist. 1960).
141. See In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 656, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184, 194
(2d Dist. 1974) ("We do not believe the rule which we must follow is fair."). Economic
considerations justify deferred division in such cases. Cf. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800(b)(l)
(West Supp. 1981), set forth at note 2 supra (award of asset to one party on conditions in lieu
of immediate division); notes 304-12 & accompanying text infra (deferred division cases
involving homes and businesses).
142. See note 339 infra.
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for personal injuries that were suffered during cohabitation are com-
munity property, 143 subject to a special rule of division at divorce.144
Under this rule, recoveries that have been commingled with other com-
munity property will be divided equally between the parties without
regard to the nature of the losses that were recompensed. Uncommin-
gled recoveries, however, will go entirely to the injured spouse unless
"the interests of justice" require that some amount, but not more than
one half, be awarded to the uninjured spouse. Again, the kinds of
losses that were sustained are not mentioned, but the court is directed
to consider "the economic condition and needs of each party, the time
that has elapsed since the recovery of the damages of the accrual of the
cause of action, and all other facts of the case. .... ,,145 Thus, the court
will undoubtedly consider to what extent the damages incurred were
peculiarly personal, whether wages in the past or the future were lost,
and whether continuing support needs for either spouse should be met
through the division. Under no circumstances will the injured party
receive less than one-half the award, and frequently he or she will be
awarded the total amount.
The rule probably works well in most cases.146 Commingling
143. "(a) All money or other property received or to be received by a person in satisfac-
tion of a judgment for damages for personal injuries or pursuant to an greement for the
settlement or compromise of a claim for such damages is the separate property of the injured
person if the cause of action for such damages arose as follows:
"(1) After the rendition of a decree of legal separation or a final judgment of dissolu-
tion of a marriage.
"(2) While either spouse, if he or she is the injured person, is living separate from the
other spouse.
"(3) After the rendition of an interlocutory decree of dissolution of a marriage.
"This subdivision shall apply retroactively to any case where the property rights of the
marriage have not been adjudicated by a decree of dissolution or separation which has
become final.
"(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if the spouse of the injured person has paid ex-
penses by reason of his spouse's personal injuries from his separate property or from the
community property subject to his management and control, he is entitled to reimbursement
of his separate property or the community property subject to his management and control
for such expenses from the separate property received by his spouse under subdivision (a)."
CAL. CrV. CODE § 5126(a), (b) (West Supp. 1981).
144. Id. § 4800(c), set forth at note 2 supra.
145. Id.
146. Settlements and jury verdicts alike often fail to indicate the precise breakdown of a
damage recovery. Such allocations would not bind a non-party spouse in any event. Ac-
cordingly, § 4800(c) sensibly permits a divorce court to exercise discretion in dividing per-
sonal injury tort recoveries. Section 4800 is set forth at note 2 supra. Although the statutory
language does not refer to the nature of the recompense (for example, whether for lost
wages, disfigurement, pain and suffering, medical expenses or as punitive damages), it di-
rects the court's attention to several factors that suggest the relevance of these concerns.
During the ongoing marriage, community property treatment permits appropriate creditor
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alone, however, should not remove damage recoveries from the court's
discretionary powers of divison if normal tracing principles can be used
to identify their presence in the commingled fund. The current con-
trary rule encourages hoarding of the recovery by the injured spouse,
with possible detriment to the family's welfare during the continuing
marriage. Section 4800(c) should be amended by removing the lan-
guage that restricts its operation to uncommingled damage recoveries.
Next, to lessen untoward tax effects, minor rewording is also needed to
indicate that the court's award establishes the spouses' relative commu-
nity and separate interests in the property. 147 Finally, the provision
should be duplicated in the Probate Code so that the same considera-
tions will be relevant if the marriage continues until the death of one of
the spouses. 148
The second relevant statute defines personal injury damages that
are received by one spouse from the other as the separate property of
the injured spouse.149 There is no express right to reimbursement from
the injured party's recovery for expenses paid from either the commu-
access. To retain this feature without prejudicing the tax-free allocation of separate and
community interests at divorce, the community property treatment during marriage should
be achieved by a presumption that operates conclusively except between the spouses or their
representatives at the marriage's termination. But see Akers, Separate or Community Char-
acter of Personal Injury Recovery, 5 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 107, 121 & n.122, 147 (1978)
(arguing that recoveries should be apportioned between separate and community compo-
nents despite administrative inconvenience, but endorsing a community characterization
"[ilf a jurisdiction insists on the recovery being all separate or all community"). See note
153 infra.
147. If community property damage recoveries are divided unequally, the overall divi-
sion of the couple's community property will also be unequal, and will therefore be taxed to
the extent of the disparity. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); Carrieres v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), a ffd, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977). But see Anglea &
Chomsky, Property Divisions-Income Tax Aspects in CALIF. C.E.B., TAX ASPECTS OF MAR-
ITAL DISSOLUTIONS: A BASIC GUIDE FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS § 3.5 (Walker ed.
1979) (questioning authority for Carrieres dictum).
148. See notes 379-80 & accompanying text infra.
149. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126(c) (West Supp. 1981) reads: "Notwithstanding subdivision
(a), if one spouse has a cause of action against the other spouse which arose during the
marriage of the parties, money or property paid or to be paid by or on behalf of a party to
his or her spouse of that marriage in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for personal
injuries to such spouse or pursuant to an agreement for the settlement or compromise of a
claim for such damages is the separate property of the injured spouse."
Distinctive treatment for interspousal torts first resulted when the Law Revision Com-
mission recommended that community property ownership for personal injury damage re-
coveries be restored, but only to recoveries from third parties. See California Law Revision
Commission, California Personal Injury Damage A wards to Married Persons, Parts 11 & IV
(Recommendations), 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 608, 610, 620 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Califor-
nia Law Revision Commission]; see also 1968 Cal. Stats. ch. 457, § 2, at 1078.
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nity property or the separate property of the tortfeasor, 150 and no spe-
cial rule controls the disposition of the recovery at the termination of
marriage. 151 An express right to reimbursement should be enacted, 152
requiring the injured spouse, upon recovery of judgment against the
tortfeasor spouse, to repay amounts advanced from the community or
from the tortfeasor's separate property, to the extent that a damages
offset has not already accomplished this result. In addition, for the
same reasons that the Law Revision Commission recommended in
1966 that recoveries from third parties be restored to community prop-
erty treatment, 153 recoveries for interspousal torts should also become
community property, subject to a special rule of division at the mar-
riage's termination. 154-
150. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126(b) (authorizing such reimbursement from other sepa-
rate property recoveries for personal injuries), set forth at note 143 supra.
151. Cf. id. § 4800(c) (directing that at least one-half of uncommingled community
property personal injury damages be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries). Sec-
tion 4800 is set forth at note 2 supra.
152. Absent express language, it is possible that no reimbursement would be permitted
as a result of statutory construction, because an express right does exist as to other separate
property recoveries. See id. § 5126(b). This was the intent of the Commission, although no
explanation for its recommendation was given. California Law Revision Commission, supra
note 149, at 630. The section should also be amended to make clear that damages recovered
for prenuptial injuries are also subject to the reimbursement rule of § 5126(b).
153. See California Law Revision Commission, supra note 149, at 609-10. The Com-
mission noted that it is incongruous to characterize recoveries for future earnings or medical
expenses as separate property because earnings are often the chief source of community
property and community funds are usually used to meet injury-related expenses. The Com-
mission apparently assumed that these two damage elements were sufficiently important to
justify treating the whole recovery according to their characterization. Neither their Tenta-
tive Recommendation nor their consultant's background study, Brunn, California Personal
Injury Damage Awards to Married Persons (Part I A Study ofthe Effects of Caiforia Civil
Code Section 163.5), 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 586 (1966), discusses other elements of recovery or
the possibility of apportioning damages. Cf. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2344 (West Supp.
1981) (providing separate property treatment except for community earnings and injury-
related expenses paid by the community). See note 146 supra. Furthermore, the Commis-
sion reasoned that separate property characterization unadvisedly placed recoveries beyond
the jurisdiction of a divorce court, led to undesirable consequences at the death of an injured
spouse, and could impose inadvertant gift tax liabilities on spouses who commingled recov-
eries with community property. Most of these reasons apply with equal force to recoveries
by one spouse from the other. Although it is clearly appropriate to require that such dam-
ages be paid to the extent possible from insurance proceeds or the separate property of the
tortfeasor, it does not follow that the recovery should be other than community property.
See generally Bruch, Management Powers, supra note 11, at nn.43-53. Exclusive manage-
ment by the injured spouse should be available if there is wasteful conduct by the other
spouse. Id. at nn.179-82 (recommendation 40).
154. The Commission's only explanation for proposing a distinctive rule for interspousal
torts was cryptic: "If damages paid by one spouse to the other in compensation for a tortious
injury were regarded as community property, the payment would be somewhat circular in
that the tortfeasor spouse would be compensating himself to the extent of his interest in the
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More troublesome questions are posed by recoveries under em-
ployment-related schemes, or under disability insurance policies
purchased with community funds. In either situation, an argument can
be made under the reasoning of the life insurance cases that the parties,
as equal owners, are equally entitled to the plan's proceeds.
Had no injury occurred, however, wages earned after divorce
would have been the separate property of the injured spouse. There
seems to be no policy reason for a different ownership rule for substi-
tuted income payments that will be received for postdivorce unemploy-
ment simply because the injury occurred during marriage.1 55 It is
unlikely that the spouses contemplated any such result when coverage
was obtained. One could reach an appropriate result through the
fiction of an implied gift of coverage to the injured spouse. A more
direct analysis would conclude that recovery for injuries that will con-
tinue into the postdivorce period should normally go to the injured
spouse, subject to the uninjured spouse's right to support, when appro-
priate, and to community property claims for reimbursed premium
costs, displaced retirement benefits, and receipts in excess of lost earn-
ings and expenses. As with the installment purchase of homes and
term insurance, strict ownership concepts disserve rather than further
the legitimate purposes of community property law, and should be dis-
regarded to the extent that sensible policy requires. 156 Section 4800(c),
community property." California Law Revision Commission, supra note 149, at 610. Its
concern seems not to have been for imputed negligence, as the Commission recommended
that this doctrine be legislatively overruled. Id. at 612, 620-21. See generaly Lantis v. Con-
don, 93 Cal. App. 3d 152, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1st Dist. 1979); Jones, Toward a Theory of
Comparative Contribution, - ARIZ. ST. L.J. - (19**). The suggestion that there is some-
thing circular overlooks both the appropriate damage measurement and the requirement
that recompense be made from the tortfeasor's separate property. The tortfeasor, too, is
injured when the spouse loses community income. Replacing the community's loss, accord-
ingly, also restores the tortfeasor's share in the loss. If damages are paid instead to the
injured spouse's separate property, only the injured spouse's one-half is restored. So long as
correct damage measures are employed, no unjust enrichment to the tortfeasor occurs. See
Bruch, Management Powers, supra note 11, at nn.210-21 1. The special division rule that
currently applies to community property personal injury damages at divorce would auto-
matically apply to damages for interspousal torts if they were recharacterized as community
property.
155. In contrast to tort recoveries, these forms of compensation are attributed to specific
damage elements at the time of payment.
156. Worker's compensation, for example, consists of periodic payments in lieu of salary
(measured as a percentage of lost wages and degree of disability), payments for actual medi-
cal expenses, and survivor's benefits. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4653-4660 (West 1971 & Supp.
1981); but see id. § 4662 (providing conclusive presumption of total disability in some cases).
See generally 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION chs. 12-17 (2d ed. 1981); 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Workmen's Compensation §§ 158-197 (8th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1980). Only rarely is a lump
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which governs the division of personal injury damages that are pre-
sumptively community property, should be broadened to include all
forms of recovery for personal injuries. The new rule should be quali-
fied, however, to ensure normal community property treatment for any
portion of an injury recovery that replaces community property retire-
sum paid in advance for anticipated losses. Id. § 160. Such lump sums should be treated as
community property personal injury damages subject to division under CAL. Civ. CODE
& 4800(c) (West Supp. 1981). Survivor's benefits, in contrast, go to those who were depen-
dents of the worker at the time of injury, not death. Id. § 192. Accordingly, worker's com-
pensation law appropriately reflects community property principles to a far greater degree
than does public pension law. See text accompanying notes 132-36 supra. Detailed review
of the presumptions and distribution patterns of the Labor Code would be appropriate to
ascertain to what degree a social insurance scheme or a private insurance plan is the appro-
priate model for benefit distributions. Social security disability benefits, in contrast, need
not be considered, as they seem clearly beyond the reach of California's community prop-
erty laws. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
The third major source of work-related compensation schemes, private disability plans,
vary greatly, but generally provide benefits that are measured by the insured's salary level,
actual medical or rehabilitative costs, or the nature of permanent physical impairment, such
as loss of an eye. M. MAiSEL, HOW TO UsE DISABILITY PLANNING TO GUARANTEE YOUR
BusiNEss INTEREST AND INCOME ch. III (1973). Monthly benefits may provide the insured
with greater income than he or she had at the time of the injury (see id. at 111-20) and may be
payable in addition to wages, id. at 111-12, 111-24. Some policies include death benefits, id.,
at 111-17, and provisions for return of premiums if disability does not occur within a speci-
fied period, id. at 111-27, or if coverage is less than the insured originally contemplated, id. at
111-22. These variations and continuing innovations in coverage make generalized treatment
,difficult. The provisions of § 4800(c) may, however, provide a model for a new or revised
section that would direct attention to the degree to which wages or retirement benefits are
replaced or exceeded by payments or reimbursements under the policy or plan. See note 2
supra. This would be consistent with California's common law rule, which holds that disa-
bility recoveries after separation or divorce are the separate property of the injured spouse
except to the extent that they replace accrued community property rights. In re Marriage of
Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978); In re Marriage of Jones, 13
Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
Codification of these cases is advisable, because their analogy to personal injury dam-
ages does not survive recent amendments to the Civil Code, and the rule they establish may
therefore be subject to question. When Steinquist and Jones were decided, the ownership of
personal injury damages depended on the date of their receipt; damages recovered when
earnings were separate property were also separate property. Compare 1972 Cal. Stats. ch.
905, § 1, at 1609 with CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5118, 5119 (West Supp. 1981). Civil Code
§ 5126(a), set forth in note 143 supra, now provides that damage recoveries are separate
property only if the cause of action arises after separation, that is, at a time when earnings
would be separate property; the date of recovery is irrelevant. Recoveries after separation or
divorce for personal injuries incurred during marital cohabitation are therefore community
property under the new rule, subject to the special rule of Civil Code § 4800(c) for division
at divorce. See note 2 supra. No reported case has tested Jones since the amended treatment
for personal injury damages became effective. Because Jones pronounced a common law
rule, however, it may remain intact despite revisions to the statutory scheme that originally
provided stipport for its conceptual approach. Uncertainty would be removed by the recom-
mended codification.
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ment benefits. Excess payments alone should be subject to the court's
discretionary division.
Defining the Current Value of Increased Capacity to Earn
Goodwill of a Business or Professional Practice (Business Capital)
The buyer of a going concern expects the enterprise's income after
acquisition to be greater than it would have been if the business had
been first organized on the purchase date. Because of this advantage,
which is the product of the clientele and reputation that were built up
by the former owner, the buyer will pay more than the inventory and
accounts receivable alone would justify. This important extra is "good-
will," an intangible yet valuable asset of most businesses and profes-
sions that entail skill and reputation. 57
Because cases involving community property businesses or profes-
sional practices are common, California appellate courts have fre-
quently considered goodwill valuation questions in recent years.' 58
The case law is confused and internally inconsistent, however,' 59 and
157. In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 581-82, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (Ist
Dist. 1974); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737 (2d Dist.
1969) (sole medical practice); Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 251-52, 301 P.2d 90,
94 (3d Dist. 1956) (goodwill attaches not only to a trade or business, but also to a profes-
sional practice that depends on the "personal skill and confidence in a particular person");
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14100 (West 1964); 38 AM. JUR. 2d, Good Will§§ 1-11 (1968).
Accord CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 1263.510(b) (West Supp. 1981) (definition for purposes of
eminent domain).
158. See In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1st Dist.
1979); In re Marriage of Webb, 94 Cal. App. 3d 335, 156 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Ist Dist. 1979); In
re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ist Dist. 1979); In re
Marriage of Barnert, 85 Cal. App. 3d 413, 149 Cal. Rptr. 616 (2d Dist. 1978); In re Marriage
of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 557, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1st Dist. 1974); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38
Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (3d Dist. 1974); In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d
384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (2d Dist. 1973); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr.
131 (3d Dist. 1969); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401; 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (2d Dist.
1969); Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 (3d Dist. 1962); Bur-
ton v. Burton, 161 Cal. App. 2d 572, 326 P.2d 855 (4th Dist. 1958); Mueller v. Mueller, 144
Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (3d Dist. 1956).
159. California courts have arrived at alarmingly disparate valuations of goodwill for
practices that would at least appear to be similar, and the Courts of Appeal have uniformly
found these valuations not to be abuses of discretion. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App.
2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (3d Dist. 1969) (law practice's goodwill valued at $1000 when
annual net income was $23,412); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735
(2d Dist. 1969) (medical practice's goodwill valued at $32,500 when net annual income was
approximately $45,000). Cf. In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 463-64, 152
Cal. Rptr. 668, 678-79 (1st Dist. 1979) (no goodwill in law practice when husband's saleable
interest exceeded $35,000 and husband's gross salary was $63,000 plus four annual bonuses;
court confused husband's contribution to goodwill with community ownership in firm's
goodwill).
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the California Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue.
The current value of goodwill to a purchaser, as indicated, is a
reflection of the expected future income or opportunity for income that
results from the owner's past efforts. 160 Yet California courts have
sometimes become confused, even stating in one divorce case that one
may not determine the present value of goodwill by considering the
expected amount of future income. 161 These decisions lose sight of the
fact that future earnings in any business with goodwill will be a combi-
nation of earnings produced by postdivorce efforts and earnings that
stem from the predivorce efforts that established the goodwill. 162
Approved valuation techniques, therefore, often take into account
a business' recent earnings in assessing a current value for the expecta-
tion that future earnings will exceed those that future efforts alone
would produce. I63 Because many factors affect goodwill, there appear
to be almost as many formulas as there are accountants, 64 and the case
160. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14100 (West 1964); Miller, Valuing the Goodwill of a
Professional Practice, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 107, 151 (1975).
161. See In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (2d
Dist. 1973); see also In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (3d Dist.
1974); Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: Is It Property or Another Name
for Alimony?, 52 CAL. ST. B.I 27 (1977); Walzer, Divorce and the Professional Man, 4 FAM.
L.Q. 363 (1970).
162. Some courts and commentators argue that double payment is required if one must
both purchase goodwill and pay spousal support on the basis of income derived from the
business. This argument confuses the differing issues that arise in the support context. In-
come actually received is relevant both to ability to pay and to need for support. Other
community assets, such as bonds, apartment complexes, and commercial buildings, will also
reflect expected future income in their fair market values at divorce. Yet no one would
suggest that post-divorce income from these sources is irrelevant in determining whether the
owner is subsequently able to pay or in need of support. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4806 (West
1970) ("When either party ... has ... a separate estate ... or there is community prop-
erty or quasi-community property sufficient to give him or her proper support. . . the court
may withhold any allowance. . . out of the separate property of the other party. .... );
Fain, The Effect of Property Distribution on Spousal Support in California, 5 COMMUNITY
PROP. J. 187 (1978); Propper, Goodwill and the Family Business: Why the Confusion?, 9 CAL.
TRIAL LAW. ASS'N F., October 1979, at 15.
163. In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 581, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (1st Dist.
1974).
164. See Oatway, Allocation of Purchase Price: Goodwill the Major Problem; Generally
AcceptedAccounting Principles and Correct Tax Accounting, 29 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX 511
(1971); Freeman, Valuation of Goodwill of a Professional Practice, in AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, FOURTH ANNUAL BAY AREA COUNTIES REGIONAL FAMILY
LAW SymposIuM 233 (1978). For businesses that are frequently bought and sold, there are
accepted formulas. Bergman, The Valuation of Goodwill, 53 L.A. B.J. 87, 93-94 (1977). Ab-
sent such a formula, the methods that are employed fall roughly into one of four categories:
(I) gross income, (2) net income, (3) excess earnings capitalization, or (4) residual approach.
The gross income approach values goodwill at all or some percentage of one year's
gross income. See, eg., In re Marriage of Barnert, 85 Cal. App. 3d 413, 417, 149 Cal. Rptr.
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law displays the resulting confusion. 165 Appellate courts, reluctant to
curb trial court discretion in this relatively new area, have approved
sharply dispa ate values for seemingly comparable practices or
businesses. 66
The current practice may also be embraced by the bench and bar
for pragmatic, rather than doctrinal, reasons. Many attorneys have re-
marked, "We know how much the goodwill is worth; it's worth the
equity in the house." If, as this comment suggests, mismeasurement of
goodwill serves to permit equitable results in some cases, the problem is
that comparable flexibility is unavailable to those without professions
or businesses.1 67 A reasoned reform of community property should
consider the problems that motivate such manipulation, while also
seeking a principled method of valuing goodwill.
That the asset does exist is clear; both case law and statutory de-
616, 623 (2d Dist. 1978). The net income method multiplies one year's net income by some
factor from 2 to 10. This approach was suggested and rejected in Fortier as using "future
earnings." See text accompanying note 161 supra.
The excess earnings method takes the difference between the gross income of the practi-
tioner and a reasonable salary, and capitalizes it over some number of years. Freeman,
supra, at 234-35. Capitalization in this context entails determining the amount of principal
that, if invested at a reasonable rate of interest, would yield interest and principal over the
professional's remaining career equal to the difference between his or her earnings and those
of similar professionals. Bergman, supra, at 92 (quoting In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal.
App. 3d 384, 387, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915, 917 (1973)).
The residual approach uses some fixed value, such as that contained in a partnership
agreement, or in a recent or proposed sale. The "residual" value of goodwill, then, is that
remaining after allowance has been made for such items as capital assets and accounts re-
ceivable in the contract or market value. Oatway, supra. This value will frequently be of
questionable relevance in dissolution cases, because the price set for contract or sale pur-
poses rarely embodies the same considerations that a value for community property pur-
poses would require. A sale of a professional practice, for example, contemplates the
termination of the practice as it presently exists; in contrast, following dissolution the prac-
tice will ordinarily continue unchanged. Also, the parties to a contract may seek to mini-
mize the value of a business or practice for tax reasons or to avoid the consequences of
dissolution, as was apparently done in Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr.
131 (3d Dist. 1969).
165. See In re Marriage of Barnert, 85 Cal. App. 3d 413, 417, 149 Cal. Rptr. 616, 623 (2d
Dist. 1978); In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 387, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915, 917 (2d
Dist. 1973); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (3d Dist. 1969).
166. See note 159 supra.
167. Accountants consider goodwill to represent the value of a practice over and above a
reasonable salary. Adams, Professional Goodwill as Community Property. How Should Idaho
Rule?, 14 IDAHO L. REv. 473 (1978). It follows that salaried professionals such as staff
attorneys ordinarily will not possess goodwill. To the extent that a spouse's reasonable sal-
ary itself is the product of training and efforts that were undertaken during marriage, the
broader concept of enhanced earning capacity is available to measure the community's in-
terest. See notes 170-203 & accompanying text infra. This measure of human capital com-
plements the measure of business capital called goodwill.
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velopments in other areas are consistent on this point.168 Some greater
certainty regarding valuation, however, is needed. In cooperation with
members of the accounting profession, an effort should be made to de-
velop statutory formulas to value the goodwill of major classes of busi-
ness. The legislated test should be designed to control absent a
showing of extraordinary circumstances. 69 The benefits in reduced
costs of litigation and increased uniformity would outweigh the theo-
retical possibility of less precise results in individual cases.
Enhanced Personal Earning Capacity (Human Capital)
Recent divorce cases in several states have recognized financial
claims by one spouse based on an education, degree, or license that was
obtained by the other spouse during the couple's marriage. 70 The rea-
168. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.510 (West Supp. 1981) (eminent domain);.Berg-
man, The Valuation of Goodwill, 53 L.A. B.J. 87 (1977).
169. For example, one such formula might measure three months' accounts receivable
or multiply one year's net income by a given factor.
170. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661,365 N.E.2d 792 (1977) (court was constrained
by statute prohibiting alimony absent incapacitation, but awarded wife virtually all the
traditional marital assets); Horstmann v. Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (court
held that future earning capacity of both parties, including education, skill and talent, may
be considered by trial court in making equitable distribution of marital assets and in deter-
mining whether alimony award should be made and in what amount); Inman v. Imnan, 578
S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1979) (court treated professional license of dentist husband as marital prop-
erty in an attempt to reach an equitable result; remanded with directions to find the approxi-
mate dollar value of wife's contribution to her husband's acquisition of license to practice,
the approximate dollar value of husband's increased earning capacity, and the approximate
dollar value, if any, of wife's contribution to worth of husband's dental practice); Moss v.
Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (court awarded "alimony in gross," $15,000
in future payments, which it said "fairly represents the wife's contribution to the acquisition
of the asset," husband's medical education); In re Marriage of DeLa Rosa, 390 N.W.2d 755
(Minn. 1981) (reimbursement of husband's living expenses and direct educational costs
awarded to wife who was capable of seif-support and therefore ineligible for support); In re
Marriage of Cropp, 48 U.S.L.W. 2286 (D. Minn. Sept. 26, 1979) (in unpublished opinion
court found value of wife's contribution to husband's medical education and awarded her
$24,684 lump sum payable periodically, ceasing on death of either spouse; "maintenance" of
approximately $8,000 was also awarded, payable if wife attended graduate school); Lynn v.
Lynn, 49 U.S.L.W. 2402 (N.J. Super. Ct., Bergen Count y, Dec. 5, 1980) (court found hus-
band's medical education, valued at $306,886, the only marital asset subject to equitable
distribution and awarded wife 20%, payable over a period of five years, plus alimony); Dan-
iels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961) (court held medical practice
property in the nature of a franchise, and held trial court had a right to consider it in making
alimony award); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979) (court held wife who sup-
ported family during husband's training to become neurosurgeon entitled to lump sum ali-
mony in lieu of property award; distinguished situation in which wife, too, has enhanced
earning capacity or has received financial benefit from investment, or equity can be achieved
through division of conventional community property); see also In re Marriage of Sullivan,
127 Cal. App. 3d 656 (4th Dist. 1982) (opinion [later withdrawn] that would have permitted
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soning parallels that of the goodwill cases: efforts during the marriage
have produced an asset that can be expected to provide future returns
beyond those that would have been generated in its absence. Although
various methods have been applied to value this asset,' 71 and the theo-
ries and rules for compensating the nonstudent spouse differ from state
to state,172 there is a striking similarity in the facts that have initially
prompted judicial relief: "Typically, one spouse attains a degree while
the other provides support; then a divorce occurs soon after graduation.
Usually there are few assets immediately available, but one spouse
showing of community property interest in education, degree, or license to practice). See
generally Brief for Appellant, In re Marriage of Sullivan, 4th Civ. No. 23634 (Cal. Ct. App.
4th Dist. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan Brief]; Brief for Defendant, Lynn v. Lynn, No.
M-9842-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. Bergen County 1980); Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing
Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L.
REV. 380 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Krauskopf, Recompense]; Comment, The Interest ofthe
Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 590 (1974); Comment, A Prop-
erty Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution Proceedings, 56 WASH. L. REV. 277
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Property Theory]; Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 1294 (1981).
171. See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1979) (costs incurred with allow-
ance for interest and inflation); Lynn v. Lynn, M-9842-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. Bergen County,
filed Dec. 5, 1980) (capitalized, discounted value of the differential earning capacity of a
male with a four-year college degree and a specialist in internal medicine, the husband hav-
ing received his medical education and license to practice during marriage); note 190 infra.
See also Krauskopf, Recompense, supra note 170, at 382-84 (deducting investment costs such
as out-of-pocket expenses, tuition and books from expected total earnings in determining
discounted differential earnings).
172. Litigants, courts, and commentators have reasoned that compensation of one
spouse for contributions made to the education of the other is appropriate under several
property theories: (1) Implied or express contract. Sullivan Brief, supra note 170, at 18;
Krauskopf, Recompense, supra note 170, at 389-90. (2) Partnership. Comment, Property
Theory, supra note 170, at 283. (3) Restitution, reimbursement, unjust enrichment, or return
on investment. In re Marriage of DeLa Rosa, 390 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Sullivan Brief,
supra note 170, at 17-18, 20; Krauskopf, Recompense, supra note 170, at 392; Comment,
Property Theory, supra note 170, at 283; 4 A.L.R. 4th 1294, 1298-99 (1981). (4) Asset (educa-
tion, professional license or increased earning capacity) is marital property subject to prop-
erty distribution. Sullivan Brief, supra note 170, at 21-22; Comment, Property Theory, supra,
note 170, at 283; 4 A.L.R. 4th 1294, 1295-96 (1981).
In some instances the courts have refused to consider the education, a professional li-
cense, or increased earning capacity itself as being subject to division. Many of these same
courts, however, have tried to mitigate the resulting injustice through other awards made to
the claimant spouse. Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 345, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (1975) (earning
capacity held a factor to be considered in equitably distributing property and setting ali-
mony; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d
1071, 1073 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) ("permanent alimony" awarded in lieu of property divi-
sion). See also cases cited in note 170 supra. In 1947, a California court awarded $7500 to a
woman who had put her husband through medical school "for compensation therefor...
and by reason of [her husband's] extreme cruelty to [her] and in view of the potential earn-
ing power now and in the future to be possessed and enjoyed by the defendant by reason of
[her] efforts in his behalf .. " Aarons v. Brasch, 229 Cal. App. 2d 197, 200 n. 1, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 156 n.1 (1st Dist. 1964) (quoting the parties' 1947 interlocutory divorce judgment).
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leaves the marriage with an education and increased earning potential,
while the other spouse is given nothing for her efforts."' 173 A New
Jersey judge, recently recognized the property interests of a wife in the
medical education of her husband, noting: "Either a professional de-
gree and/or license is or is not property. . . .To find that a non-li-
censed spouse in one case is entitled to [a property] distribution and a
non-licensed spouse in another case is not, is to substitute legal
mumbo-jumbo for legal analysis and application."' 174
In California, where recognition of a property interest would
seemingly require that its value be subjected to equal division, the
characterization issue is not yet settled. Neither the California
Supreme Court nor the legislature has addressed the issue.175 Although
one trial court's restitutionary award was later interpreted as an en-
forceable award of lump sum alimony,176 the Todd and Aufmuth cases
suggest that nothing more is required than a traditional division of
other community assets or a modifiable award of spousal support. 177
Most recently, these latter cases were distinguished in In re Marriage of
Sullivan, 78 by the first California appellate opinion to direct property
relief on such facts. The Sullivan court, however, refrained from order-
173. Comment, Property Theory, supra note 170, at 282-83. -
174. Lynn v. Lynn, No. M-9842-77, slip op. at 21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Bergen County, Dec.
5, 1980) (emphasis in original).
175. The legislature has, however, provided some reief. The spouse of a former student
need no longer bear one-half of the burden of repaying related educational loans. Compare
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(4) (West Supp. 1981) with In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal.
App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677 (1st Dist. 1979).
176. The trial court did not characterize its $7,500 award. When the husband later re-
sisted enforcement on the grounds that it was a property award and hence dischargeable in
his pending bankruptcy action, the court of appeal held it enforceable as lump sum alimony.
Aarons v. Brasch, 229 Cal. App. 2d 197, 40 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Ist Dist. 1964); see note 172
supra.
177. In Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (3d Dist. 1969), the court
reasoned that the husband's legal education was probably not community property (reason-
ing by analogy to personal injury claims, which have since been given community property
status); even if it were, the court continued, "it manifestly is of such a character that a value
for division [purposes] cannot be placed upon it." Id. at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134. The court
then noted that the wife's share of the couple's other community assets "were the results of
[her husband's] legal education and that in a sense [she] realized the value [of the education]
in [their] award to her. . . ." Id. Ten years later, another appellate panel followed Todd,
refusing to reconsider the characterization and valuation issues. In re Marriage of Aufmuth,
89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 460-61, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677-78 (1st Dist. 1979). It too reasoned that
community property "does not encompass every property right," that, "to the extent com-
munity assets were the product of the husband's legal education, wife has realized their
value," and that "the trial court must have considered husband's earning capacity in award-
ing spousal and child support." Id.
178. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d 656 (4th Dist. 1982), (opinion later
withdrawn).
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ing equal division in all cases, suggesting instead that reimbursement
principles might sometimes apply. 179 Because this opinion subse-
quently was withdrawn pending a rehearing, 180 California law remains
as before.
Todd and Aufmuth are poorly reasoned. Past indicia of enhanced
earnings support rather than negate the claim that one spouse will reap
continuing benefits from increased earnings after divorce. Further-
more, assertions that modifiable spousal support can redress property
division inequities, once offered to avoid ownership treatment of good-
will and pensions,' 8' have proved false. First, significant support
awards are rarely entered. 82 Second, they are infrequently en-
forced. 83 Third, support may terminate long before recompense has
been made, because court-awarded support ends upon the death of
either spouse or the remarriage of the supported spouse. 184 Fourth, and
perhaps most importantly, the nonstudent spouse is often capable of
self-support, although at a much more modest standard of living than
that anticipated by the educated spouse. If so, no "support," hence no
recompense at all for the lost ownership interest, may be received. 85
Facts that were assumed to preclude a support remedy are in-
volved in In re Marriage of Sullivan,t86 prompting the fourth district
179. Id. at 681-83. See note 190 infra for a discussion of the court's suggested valuation
approaches.
180. Fourth District Court of Appeal Minutes, 128 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 59 (Feb. 5, 1982)
(granting rehearing for In re Marriage of Sullivan).
181. See In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 427, 629 P.2d 1, 7, 174 Cal. Rptr.
493, 499 (1981) (pension). See generally Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolu-
tion.- Is It Property or Another Name for Alimony?, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 27 (1977); Walzer,
Divorce and the Professional Man, 4 FAM. L.Q. 363 (1970) (goodwill).
182. Weitzman & Dixon, Alimony Myth, supra note 13, at 154-59, 179-82.
183. Forty-six percent of the 14% of divorcees awarded spousal support regularly collect
or receive their spousal support. B. BRYANT, AMERICAN WOMEN TODAY AND TOMMOR-
ROw 24, U.S. National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year
(1977). Out of 4.5 million divorced or separated women, only 4 percent reported that they
had received alimony in 1975. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORTS, Series P-23, No. 84, Divorce, Child Custody and Child Support, at table 10 (June
1979).
184. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(b) (West Supp. 1981); accord Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603
P.2d 747, 751-52 (Okla. 1979) (awarding lump sum alimony): "Equity would not be served
by holding, as appellant [Dr. Hubbard] suggests, that Mrs. Hubbard's recovery be limited to
alimony for support and maintenance. To do so would force her to forego remarriage and
perhaps even be celibate [citing Oklahoma's statute on spousal support and cohabitation] for
many years simply to realize a return on her investments and sacrifices of the past twelve
years."
185. See Weitzman & Dixon, Alimony Myth, supra note 13, at 168-70.
186. 4th Civ. No. 23634 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1981). The Sullivans were married in
1967, as she was completing her third year of college and he his fourth. Except for a four-
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court of appeal, in its initial opinion, to distinguish Todd and Aufmuth
and provide a form of property relief.187 The court correctly reasoned
that the community can hold a financial interest in an intangible asset
that necessarily goes to one spouse after divorce.1 88 It also recognized
that such a community interest arises if any portion of a spouse's en-
hanced earning capacity is acquired during marriage. 189 However, the
court's suggested valuation and recompense techniques were inade-
quately reasoned.1 90 Perhaps their inconsistencies were prompted by
teen-month period following the birth of a'child in 1974, Janet Sullivan was employed from
1969 until 1978, while Mark Sullivan attended medical school and completed his training.
In 1978, as Dr. Sullivan opened his medical practice with borrowed funds (stipulated to be
separate property), he filed for dissolution of the marriage. Mrs. Sullivan received $500,
some of the couple's furniture and an automobile, including the obligation for its payments.
The court awarded her no spousal support, but reserved support jurisdiction for five'years.
Sullivan Brief, supra note 170, at 1-2, 20. Had the loan been community property, Mrs.
Sullivan would have been equally responsible for its repayment. See notes 280-84 & accom-
panying text infra. The court concluded that Mrs. Sullivan's established ability to support
herself prevented an award of spousal support under CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West Supp.
1981). 127 Cal. App. 3d at 664-68. Its discussion was, however, incomplete. Although the
court's opinion listed the subsections of § 4801, it did not discuss subdivision (9), which
specifically authorizes spousal support based upon "[any . .. factors which [the court]
deems just and equitable." Instead, it focused on the impropriety of awarding support as a
substitute for a foregone or lost property right. In this context, the discussion was somewhat
circular. If enhanced earning capacity did not constitute property for divorce purposes, an
award of spousal support in recognition of the equities need not constitute a disguised prop-
erty award. The result would turn on the method used by the court in establishing the
amount of its award. In re Marriage of Cobb, 68 Cal. App. 3d 855, 137 Cal. Rptr. 670 (4th
Dist. 1977), discussed by the court, is a modification case that is simply not on point.
187. 127 Cal. App. 3d at 686-88.
188. Id. at 672, 675, 678-80.
189. The court recognized that any portion of an education can be viewed indepen-
dently. Thus, it remarked that the trial court would be free on remand to consider Mrs.
SuUivan's education and bachelor's degree, although only one year of her college studies
were completed during the marriage. Although this dictum was illuminating in this regard,
it also was somewhat puzzling because Dr. Sullivan apparently made no claim to Mrs. Sulli-
van's education or degree, and the matter therefore seemingly was not before the appellate
court.
190. The court confused California's installment sale cases with restitutionary princi-
ples. Installment sales analysis requires that the respective shares of the purchase price be
identified, and that excess value, or profit, be distributed according to the ratio established
by the respective cost figures. In the case of enhanced earning capacity, it would be virtually
impossible to reconstruct the lifetime educational costs that were incurred prior to marriage,
and without this figure, no pro rata approach is possible.
In contrast, restitution to avoid unjust enrichment may be accomplished by either (a)
reimbursement of the costs incurred, or (b) a damages award that measures the benefits
received. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REmEDIES § 4.5 (1973). In cases like
Sullivan, it may be possible (a) to assess the costs incurred by the community, providing a
basis for a reimbursement damages measure, or (b) to measure one's lifetime earning capac-
ity at the time of divorce and subtract the lifetime earnings that would have been expected if
the spouse had retained only the knowledge and skills that were present when the couple
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the court's reluctance either to leave Mrs. Sullivan without a remedy or
to provide her the full proportionate community interest in Dr. Suli-
van's enhanced earning capacity that a rigorous application of Califor-
nia's community property doctrines might be thought to dictate. The
court's valuation remarks would have authorized a broad range of trial
court dispositions. Although flexibility may well be desirable, unjust
enrichment principles or a legislative solution might better serve the
court's concerns.
Although the equities may support special rules for division at di-
vorce, they do not support a blanket refusal to recognize economic real-
ity of the sort seen in Todd and Aufmuth. Important rights to future
income are disposed of by marital property divisions, whether they are
acknowledged and measured or are awarded sub silentio. Taking the
clearest example, Professor Krauskopf has analyzed the economic fac-
tors that operate in a marriage in which one spouse studies while the
other works. 19' She lists the costs that are incurred by the couple in
exchange for the increased human capital, including the enhanced
earning capacity, of the student spouse. First, there are the foregone
wages of the student spouse-and the foregone living standard that the
couple sacrifices-a form of "opportunity cost.' 192 Next, there is the
direct monetary contribution of the working spouse. 93 Finally, there
may be opportunity costs to the working spouse if that person thereby
foregoes further education that might enhance his or her own lifetime
earning capacity. 194 All these costs are.shared by the spouses; each is
willing to endure them because of the anticipated increase in the
human capital of the student spouse and the assumption that this bene-
fit will redound to both of them.195
married. This latter measure was perhaps misunderstood by the Sullivan court. Although
Dr. Sullivan had obtained the final year of his undergraduate education plus all of his medi-
cal education and training during marriage, the valuation examples given by the court ad-
dressed only the much more limited question of valuing a license to practice. See 127 Cal.
App. 3d at 660-61, 682-83 & n.17.
Because unjust enrichment is an established equitable doctrine, ample precedent exists
to guide the courts in choosing appropriate measurement standards. It is even possible that
no unjust enrichment will occur in some cases if a spouse retains the asset free of community
claims. See note 350 infra. Contrary to the Sullivan court's suggestion, reimbursement
principles are an acceptable mode of adjusting property interests at divorce. Compare In re
Marriage of Sullivan, 127 Cal. App. 3d at 683-84 & n.18, with In re Marriage of Warren, 28
Cal. App. 3d 777, 104 Cal. Rptr. 860 (2d Dist. 1972).
191. Krauskopf, Recompense, supra note 170, at 384-88.
192. Id. at 384.
193. Id. at 387.
194. Id.
195. The economic concept of human capital views education as an investment produc-
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If the marriage remains intact, the investment decision may prove
to have been a wise one. If divorce occurs, however, the human capital
increase leaves the marriage with the student spouse, while the other
continues to bear a share of the opportunity costs. 196 What was an eco-
nomically sound investment is thus transformed into a windfall for one
spouse and a serious loss to the other.
Statistics on the postdivorce wealth of California men and women
emphasize the immediate and dramatic consequences of disparate
earning capacities in the postdivorce period. 197 To the extent that these
differences have been exacerbated because the earning potential of one
spouse was enhanced while that of the other either -was not or was
harmed, the concept of enhanced earning capacity as a form of prop-
erty could relieve the inequity. Developed in cases involving formal
education and professional licenses, the theory applies equally when
earning potential has been increased through other community
ing a return in the form of more effective producers and consumers. Id. at 381; Schultz,
Optimal Investment in College Instruction, 80 J. PoIT. ECON. 52 (1972).
196. The only current relief occurs to the extent that costs were met with educational
loans that are still outstanding at the time of divorce. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(4)
(West Supp. 1981), set forth at note 2 supra. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1981) (impaired earning capacity through unemployment relevant to spousal
support), set forth at note 226 infra.
197.
Post-Divorce Incomes of Couples Married 18 Years or More
From hireryiewa u mn and wmag-LsAngde$ COwMty 1978
MEVDI~AN POST-DIVortCE INCOME
PRE-DrvoRcE YEARLY MEAN YEARLY SUPPORT MDIAN POSTDIvoRCE INCOME AS PERCENTAoE 
OF
FAMILY INCOME AWARDED TO WIE ME PEE-DIVORCE FAMILY INCOME
WIFE'S HUSBAND'S WIFE HUSBAND
(,Adfiaed)t d ./rred)* (.,fimed) (d./kted)
under =.000 $ Z460 S-7,500 $14,940 54% 90%
(n-12)*. _
20-29,000 $ 4,200 $ 6,300 S20,000 24% 87%(a-13) S47
S30-39,000
(n-16) $5.400 $14,500 S29,004 46% 83%
$40,000 or more $13,700 S16,875 $33,700 26% 68%
(n-22)
.Alimony and child support, including zero and one dollar awards.
tWife's adjusted income calculated by adding wife's earnings plus alimony and child support awarded plus income from any
other source (sud as welfare).
*lusband's adjusted income calculated by subtracting alimony and child support ordered paid from husband's total income.
•*n refers to the number of cases on which the percentages are based.
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efforts. 198
The proposals of Equity in the Family, a membership organization
based in Northern California, have encompassed this broader defini-
tion of enhanced earning capacity.1 99 Because the concept is akin to
those that may be relevant in wrongful death or tort cases, 200 and is
familiar to economists who study career and educational decisions, 20 ' a
Median Post-Divorce Per Capita Incomes of Couples Married 18 Years or More
From interviews with divorced men and women,
Los Angeles County, 1978
POST-DIVORCE PER CAPITA
PRE-DIVORCE YEARLY PER CAPITA POST- IOS % P O AILY
FAMILY INCOME FAMILY INCOME DIVORCE PER CAPITA INCOME INCOMEPER CAPITA INCOME
WIFE HUSBAND WIFE HUSBAND
(Adjusted). (Adjusted)t# (Adjusted) (Adted)
Under 20,000 S 5,750 $6,500 S11,950 102% 160%(n-12)**
S20-29,000(n=13) $11,500 S6,100 $11,500 48% 97%
S30-39000 S12,306 $9,100 $18,000 60% 158%
(n= 16) 1 1
$40,000 or more S20,162 S8,500 S28,640 42% 175%(n=22)
*Wife's post-divorce adjusted per capita family income was calculated by taking the wife's total income (from all sources
including alimony and chtld support) and dividing by the number of people in her post-divorce family (including children to her
custody).
Husband's post-divorce adjusted per capita income was calculated by taking the husband's total income, subtracting any
alimony and child support awarded to his ex-wife, and dividing the remaining amount by the number of people in his post-divorce
family (including new spouses, permanent cohabitants and children in his custody).
tThese figures do not include any additional income provided by the new spouse for the 36 percent of the divorced men and
the 6 percent of the divorced women who had remarried by the time of the interview (approximately one year after the legal
divorce).
'In refers to the number of cases in which the percentages are based.
Weitzman & Dixon, Alimony Myth, supra note 13, at 174, 176. See note 324 infra.
198. Comment, Property Theory, supra note 170, at 284-85.
199. The organization proposes the adoption of the following statutory language:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
marriage or a legal separation, the court shall regard the interests in the increase achieved in
the gainful-employment earning capacity of each spouse during the marriage as community
property. In determining such interests, the court shall regard the spouse's earning capacity
on the date of the marriage, and at all times subsequent to said date, as reduced by the
percentage comprising the interests which are property from a previous marriage." See Let-
ter from Elaine Elwell, Legislative Chairman of Equity in the Family, to the author (April
22, 1981) (on file with the author). This proposal differs from others in contemplating that
one former spouse would be awarded a percentage ownership interest in the other's future
earnings, to be paid out as realized. See Letter of Elaine Elwell to the author, Enclosure at
pp. 5-7 (Feb. 18, 1981) (on file with the author).
200. See, e.g., Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 320, 239 P.2d 48, 60 (1st Dist.
1951) (wrongful death case capitalizing lost lifetime earnings).
201. See G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d ed. 1975); INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL
xi (B. Kiker ed. 1971); G. MUMEY, PERSONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING (1972); T. SCHULTZ,
INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL (1971); T. SCHULTZ, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF EDUCA-
TION (1963); L. THUROW, INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL (1970); Hansen, Total and Pri-
vate Rates of Return to Investment in Schooling, in INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 211 (B.
Kiker ed. 1971); Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10
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body of measurement knowledge already exists.
For most couples, the ability to earn is the sole significant financial
asset at divorce.20 2 To recognize accrued property rights in accounts
receivable, pensions, and goodwill but in no other form of future in-
come provides protection to the relatively affluent without providing
comparable benefits to those who depend on wages alone for suste-
nance. The most pressing need in California divorce reform is to find a
way to distribute more fairly the true community wealth of former
spouses. Recognition of enhanced earning capacity, either as a prop-
erty interest or in some other significant fashion, is an important ave-
nue to that end.20 3
Removing Special Treatment for Some Forms of Marital Wealth
Doctrinal simplification and fairer treatment of spouses and credi-
tors can be accomplished by incorporating three forms of wealth that
now receive special treatment into the parent definition of community
property: earnings after separation, earnings during a marriage in
which there is a putative spouse, and earnings acquired before a couple
moves to California. As to each, the historical basis for distinctive rules
has disappeared.
Postseparation Earnings
Prior to 1972, California law provided that a married man's earn-
ings were community property unless the parties agreed otherwise or
obtained a decree of legal separation or an interlocutory decree of dis-
solution.204 His wife's earnings, in contrast, reverted to separate prop-
erty once the couple lived "separate and apart. ' 20 5 The ambiguities of
CAL. W. L. REV. 590 (1974). See generally Krauskopf, Recompense, supra note 170, at 381-
85.
202. Weitzman & Dixon, Alimony Myth, supra note 13, at 169 ("[M]ost divorc[ing]
couples are young, and have little property at the time of the divorce . . . ."); see also
Weitzman & Dixon, Alimony Myth, supra note 13, at 184-85; note 197 supra.
203. Because of the differing equities on various facts, some flexibility in dispositions is
needed. See note 350 infra. In the absence of legislative reform, unjust enrichment princi-
ples should be applied to measure the community's interest in a spouse's capacity, as sug-
gested in note 190 supra. A better ultimate resolution might be achieved either by providing
a special rule directing equitable division of this asset, if it is confirmed as a property inter-
est, or by authorizing an equitable award on some other theory, such as lump sum support.
204. Former CAL. CIV. CODE § 5119, 1969 Cal. Stats. ch. 1608, § 8, at 3340 (amended
1971). The rule was originally enacted as CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 169.1 and 169.2. 1951 Cal.
Stats. ch. 1700, § 12, at 3913, amended by 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1699, §§ 1, 2, at 3640 (amend-
ing Civil Code §§ 5118, 5119).
205. 1869-70 Cal. Stats. ch. 161, § 2, at 226; former CAL. Civ. CODE § 169, AN AcT TO
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this language created controversy only infrequently2°6 until Civil Code
section 5118 was amended in 1971 to extend to husbands the rule that
makes earnings separate property while spouses live separate and
apart.207
Because husbands' earnings are much greater than wives' earnings
for most families, the new rule has major implications.208 First, it
changes the ownership of current earnings even though the spouses
have taken no legal steps to alter their relationship, frequently catching
one or both spouses or their creditors without notice. Second, it forces
litigation or negotiation to preserve legal rights at a time when the
spouses might better focus on their marital problems.2°9 Finally,
should the couple later divorce, the vague test invites litigation as the
parties argue over the date at which their informal separation evi-
ESTABLISH A CIVIL CODE ch. 3, § 169, at 57 (1872); former CAL. CIv. CODE § 5118, 1969
Cal. Stats. ch. 1608, § 8, at 3340.
206. Bruch, The Legal Import of Informal Marital Separations: .4 Survey of California
Law and a Callfor Change, 65 CALIF. L. REy. 1015, 1020-21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Bruch, Informal Marital Separations].
207. 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1699, §§ 1, 2, at 3640 (amending Civil Code §§ 5118, 5119).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1981), now provides: "The earnings and accumulations
of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living
separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."
208. See generally Bruch, Informal Marital Separations, supra note 206.
209. "[T]hose who... obtain professional advice will find themselves engaged in po-
tentially selfish or defensive maneuvering. An already strained relationship may be exacer-
bated and property rights may be jeopardized. Frequently, for example, an earning spouse
will suggest to a nonearner that the nonearner's expenses be met out of the couple's savings
and that the earner use current income for self-support. This will produce a dissipation of
the community property, including the one-half interest that belongs to the nonearning
spouse, rather than payment of current living expenses out of current income, as would be
the case if a support order were sought. Relieved of such responsibilities, the wage earner
will acquire as separate property whatever current earnings are not consumed." Bruch, In-
formal Marital Separations, supra note 206, at 1024 (footnotes omitted). The treatment of
ongoing obligations and current support needs is poorly rationalized by current law. Al-
though the code now directs that court-ordered support be paid with current separate prop-
erty earnings, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4805 (West Supp. 1981), informal arrangements may
seriously prejudice the community. A spouse who uses current earnings to meet ongoing
needs will be entitled to claim reimbursement from the community for whatever payments a
court later decides were not a gift or in the nature of support or rent. In re Marriage of
Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1165, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1979). If accrued community
property assets are used for support, however, the community will have no right to reim-
bursement from separate property earnings, even if the spouse who depleted the community
was employed at the time. In re Marriage of Cohen, 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 844, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 672, 676-77 (2d Dist. 1980) (employed husband cashed in pension, sold community
furniture, cashed refund checks, and withdrew funds from community bank accounts to use
for support for himself and cohabiting woman; court found no misappropriation because
amounts "could" all have been spent on his necessities of life).
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denced a final marital rupture.210
Except for this aberrational rule on earnings, California's family
law has consistently recognized marriages and the incidents of marital
status until divorce or the death of one spouse.211 Even today, after the
community has ceased to benefit from earnings under section 5118, the
community is nevertheless implicated for whatever new obligations
either spouse incurs-not only when creditors seek satisfaction, but also
between the parties upon dissolution.212
Although couples are free to agree to alter their property rights
during marriage,213 only section 5118 imposes important property
changes on them absent an agreement or court order.214 The inequities
of a rule that gives legal effect to informal separations and seriously
depletes community resources are apparent. Section 5118 should be
repealed.215 As a result, balance would be restored, a litigious question
would be removed, and jockeying for financial advantage would be
lessened.
210. See, ag., In re Marriage of Baragry, 73 Cal. App. 3d 444, 140 CaL Rptr. 779 (2d
Dist. 1977); Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 209, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (2d Dist. 1976). Hind-
sight seems elevated over foreseeability in some cases. See Bruch, InformalMarital Separa-
tions, supra note 206, at 1021 n.13, 1023 & n.16. The problem was exacerbated in 1976 when
the California Supreme Court held that the 1971 amendment to §§ 5118 and 5119 applies
retroactively. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr.
427 (1976).
211. Only death or a final judgment of dissolution or nullity terminates marriage. CAL.
Cirv. CODE § 4350 (West Supp. 1981). Accordingly, an informal separation, an interlocutory
judgment of dissolution or a decree of legal separation does not affect a party's status as a
spouse. See, eg., In re Estate of Dargie, 162 Cal. 51, 121 P. 320 (1912) (woman held entitled
to family allowance from a decedent's estate as his widow despite earlier entry of an inter-
locutory decree of divorce).
212. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5116, 5122 (West Supp. 1981); Bruch, InformalMaritalSepara-
tion, supra note 206, at 1067-68. But see In re Marriage of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d 591,
"600, 141 Cal. Rptr. 597, 602 (2d Dist. 1977) ("That an unpaid [postseparation] creditor of
[wife's] might have been entitled to recover against the community under Civil Code section
5116 should not mean that the trial court is disabled from requiring a spouse after separation
to pay his or her post-separation bills.").
213. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West 1970).
214. Bruch, InformalMarital Sefparations, supra note 206, discusses the legal effects of
§ 5118 in the areas of marital property, spousal support, child custody, child support, per-
sonal income tax, contract creditors, insurance and retirement plans, torts, public benefits,
and probate.
215. This proposed change was endorsed by the Executive Committee of the State Bar's
Family Law Section in 1977 and by the Advisory Commission on Family Law to the Senate
Subcommittee on Administration'of Justice. ADvISORY COMMISSION ON FAMILY LAW TO
THE SENATE SuBcoMMrrrEE ON ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE,
SUBsTANTIVE FAMILY LAW PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 7,
Recommendation ID (Final Report 1979). The Family Law Section's Executive Committee
reversed its position in 1981, however.
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Quasi-Marital Property
A second special rule that should be abandoned affects void or
voidable marriages that one or both of the spouses believe to be valid.
One who in good faith but mistakenly believes himself or herself to be
married is a "putative spouse.' '216 At the end of a void or voidable
marriage in which one or both parties are putative spouses, Civil Code
section 4452 directs that the marital property be divided as if the mar-
riage had been valid. 217 Although the section's language implies that
the couple's property will be divided equally in all cases, legislative
history makes clear that in cases of void marriages, which entail big-
amy or incest, the drafters intended equal divisions only when it would
operate to the protection of "an innocent spouse. ' 218 As to voidable
marriages, however, the Governor's Commission on the Family recom-
mended equating the rules for marital termination with those for other
marriages:
[I]f the parties can live and function with the alleged impediment,
then the marriage is viable and should not be dissolved. If they can-
not, then the marriage has broken down in fact and so should be
ended at law. . . . [W]e recommend. . . the coalescence of all dis-
solution proceedings (save for declarations of nullity in the case of
void marriages) into a single form of action governed by a single
standard. 219
This recommendation was not followed, however, and voidable mar-
riages are also governed by section 4452.220
The section needs to be amended. It should either make clear that
normal community property and quasi-community property principles
apply during and at the termination of all void and voidable marriages,
or it should specify the results for situations involving only one putative
spouse. Finally, the rules for property management and ownership fol-
lowing a discovery of the marriage's defect by a former putative spouse
216. E.g., Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 768, 189 P.2d 741, 742 (2d Dist. 1948).
217. "Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the
court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was
valid, the court shall declare such party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse,
and, if the division of the property is in issue, shall divide, in accordance with Section 4800,
that property acquired during the union which would have been community property or
quasi-community property if the union had not been void or voidable. Such property shall
be termed 'quasi-marital property'. If the court expressly reserves jurisdiction, it may make
the property division at a time subsequent to the judgment." CAL. Civ. CODE § 4452 (West
Supp. 1981).
218. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 36-37.
219. Id. at 36.
220. See note 217 supra.
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should be prescribed. 221
There is good reason to eliminate special rules for void and voida-
ble marriages, both during the relationship and upon termination.222
Whether innocent or guilty, these spouses have entered into and re-
mained in the relationship expecting their earnings and acquisitions to
be shared. That one spouse knows, for example, that he or she has not
validly ended an earlier marriage is unlikely to affect either person's
property expectations or "marital" behavior. Nor will creditors have
notice that this purported marriage is flawed. If the fraudulent spouse
is forbidden any share in the marital gains, the injured spouse may
receive a windfall that is unrelated to the degree of emotional damage
incurred, especially if the relationship has lasted many years. A rule
that permits an unequal property award or a suit for damages to com-
pensate the deceived spouse's emotional injury would be preferable to
the current rule, which upsets creditors' expectations and denies
financial rights to an admittedly guilty spouse, who nevertheless may
have worked at home or for wages as a partner in the building of the
couple's financial welfare.223 Absorbing property treatment for those
spouses into the normal marital property regime simplifies manage-
ment, creditor access, and probate law,224 and seems more likely than
any other rule to comport with the parties' expectations.
Similarly, Civil Code section 4455,225 which authorizes support
awards to putative spouses, should be extended to any spouse in a void
or voidable marriage in which at least one spouse initially held a good-
faith belief in the validity of the marriage. To the extent that a
221. Under Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (2d Dist.
1948), the rules of nonnarital cohabitation apply once a putative spouse learns of the mar-
riage's invalidity.
222. Professor Reppy agrees. Reppy, Debt Collection from Married Califormians..
Problems Caused by Transmutations, Single-Spouse Management, and Invalid Marriage, 18
SAN DIEGO L. REy. 143, 216 (1981).
223. The absence of a bright-line rule would entail some costs, but the number of af-
fected cases is small, and equitable considerations justify the exception.
224. Case law recognizes a putative spouse as a surviving spouse under Probate Code
§ 201, which controls descent of the couple's quasi-marital property, but refuses such status
as to the decedent's separate property. Estate of Levie, 50 Cal. App. 3d 572, 123 Cal. Rptr.
445 (1st Dist. 1975). Levie should be overruled, and putative spouses should be permitted to
take as legal spouses in both respects. Only cases with surviving nonputative spouses or
multiple surviving "spouses" need special rules. See notes 383-86 & accompanying text
infra.
225. "The court may, during the pendency of a proceeding to have a marriage adjudged
a nullity or upon judgment, order a party to pay for the support of the other party in the
same manner as if the marriage had not been void or voidable, provided that the party for
whose benefit the order is made is found to be a putative spouse." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4455
(West Supp. 1981).
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nonputative spouse's behavior would render support inequitable, statu-
tory language is already present that directs the court's attention to
"[a]ny. . .factors which it deems just and equitable. 226
No statutory scheme can adequately anticipate the variety of
problems created by bigamous marriages. Special questions that arise
when there are conflicting claims by legal and putative spouses should,
therefore, continue to be handled in equity, as prescribed by current
case law.227 Consideration should also be given to extending this equi-
table rule by statute to cases in which marital property interests of legal
or putative spouses conflict with property claims of third parties that
are based upon nonmarital relationships. 228
226. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a) (West Supp. 1981): "(a) In any judgment decreeing the
dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation of the parties, the court may order a party to
pay for the support of the other party any amount, and for such period of time, as the court
may deem just and reasonable. In making the award, the court shall consider the following
circumstances of the respective parties:
"(1) The earning capacity of each spouse, taking into account the extent to which the
supported spouse's present and future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemploy-
ment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported spouse to devote time
to domestic duties.
"(2) The needs of each party.
"(3) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each.
"(4) The duration of the marriage.
"(5) The ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without inter-
fering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the spouse.
"(6) The time required for the supported spouse to acquire appropriate education, train-
ing, and employment.
"(7) The age and health of the parties.
"(8) The standard of living of the parties.
"(9) Any other factors which it deems just and equitable.
"At the request of either party, the court shall make appropriate findings with respect to
the circumstances. The court may order the party required to make such payment of sup-
port to give reasonable security therefor. Any order for support of the other party may be
modified or revoked as the court may deem necessary, except as to any amount that may
have accrued prior to the date of the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to
modify or revoke. At the request of either party, the order of modification or revocation
shall include findings of fact and may be made retroactive to the date of filing of the notice
of motion or order to show cause to modify or revoke, or to any date subsequent thereto."
227. See, e.g., In re Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (2d Dist.
1974) (husband maintained two households and reared two families over 24-year period).
Most bigamy is technical in nature; the bigamous spouse lives monogamously with the puta-
tive spouse. In such cases it is possible to treat the property interests arising out of the
subsequent relationship as distinct from those arising from the former. The recommended
repeal of Civil Code § 5118 would not preclude this result, as the bigamist's earnings would
become separate property as to the first spouse by implied agreement once their ties had
been severed and each had gone his or her own way. See Bruch, Informal Marital Separa-
tions, supra note 206, at 1021 n.13 (discussing Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wash. 2d 844, 190
P.2d 575 (1948)).
228. In two recent cases, possible conflicts were avoided because the legal spouses had
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Quasi-Commuznity Property
Similar questions concerning management and creditor rights dur-
ing marriage and probate rules upon the death of one spouse arise in a
second context: the property rights of couples who move to California
after they have begun to acquire marital assets. Because the marital
property rules of California are unique, the property regimes to which
these couples have previously been subject will not track California's in
any case; when a couple moves to California from a non-community
property jurisdiction, the change is most dramatic.229
Beginning more than fifty years ago, one distinguished scholar af-
ter another has advocated the abandonment of quasi-community prop-
erty concepts and the forthright application of community property
laws to property acquired elsewhere that would have been community
property if the couple had been domiciled in California at the time of
acquisitionP0 Although in 1964 the California Supreme Court invited
this legislative reform,231 none has been attempted. The misconceived
received full recovery in divorce'actions before property claims were asserted by their hus-
bands' cohabiting partners. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815 (1976); In re Marriage of Baragry, 73 Cal. App. 3d 444, 140 Cal. Rptr. 779 (2d DisL
1977). Because a cohabitant would claim as the husband's creditor, however, current case
law suggests that her claim, if pressed during the continuing marriage, would be honored in
full, leaving the legal spouse with a right against her husband for mismanagement or delib-
erate misappropriation. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 672-73, 557 P.2d at 115, 134
Cal. Rptr. at 824; CAT. CIV. CODE §§ 4800(b)(2), 5125(a), (e) (West Supp. 1981).
229. For a recent discussion of the substantive and choice of law problems that arise
when no provisions have been made to accommodate these couples' needs, see Hughes v.
Hughes, 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194 (1978). The germinal work is H. MARSH, MARITAL
PROPERTY iN CONFuCT oF LAWS (1952); see also In re Marriage of Roesch, 83 Cal. App. 3d
96, 147 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1st Dist. 1978) (husband moved to California alone and later filed for
divorce); Leflar, Community Property and Conflict of Laws, 21 CALIF. L. REv. 221, 226
(1933).
230. These scholars include Justice Peters (1927), Professor Armstrong (1945), Professor
Kay (1962), and Professor Bodenheimer (1969). See Comment, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 399
(1927) (The author of this comment was Justice Peters, according to Gardner, MaritalProp-
erty and the Conflict of Laws" The Constituttonality of the "Quasi-CommunityProperty"Leg-
islation, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 252, 259 n47 (1966)); Armstrong, "Prospective" 4pplication of
Changes in Community Property Control-Rule of Property or Constitutional Necessity?, 33
CALIF. L. REv. 476, 504-05 (1945); Schreter (now Kay), "Quasi-Community Property" in the
Conflict of Laws, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 206, 244 (1962); Bodenheimer, Justice Peters' Contribu-
tion to Family and Community Property Law, 57 CALF. L. Rnv. 577, 587 (1969); accord
Gardner, supra, at 269-80; Lay, Marital Propery Ri'ghts of the Non-Native in a Community
Property State, 18 HASTINGS LJ. 295, 307-17 (1967); Note, Retroactive Application of Cali-
fornia's Community Property Statutes, 18 STAN. L. REv. 514 (1966); see also Knutson, Cali-
fornia Community Property Laws: 4 Plea for Legislative Study and Reform, 39 S. CAL. L.
REv. 240, 266 (1966); Leflar, Community Property and Conflict of Laws, 21 CAF. L. REv.
221, 237 & n.67, 238 (1933).
231. See Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 339 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
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property and constitutional law assumptions that marred an earlier ju-
dicial response to such a legislative effort have long since been laid to
rest.232 Doctrinal simplification supports the complete absorption of
quasi-community property principles into community property law.
The Implications of Title
Property Purchased During Marriage
Central to the simplification of community property law is the
need for more satisfactory title rules. For at least twenty-five years,
commentators have advocated fundamental changes in the treatment of
joint tenancies, 233 and efforts to resolve related problems with tenancy
in common title date back an additional twenty years. 234
232. In 1965, the court questioned but did not overrule Estate of Thornton, I Cal. 2d I,
33 P.2d 1 (1934). Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d at 565-66, 339 P.2d at 901-02, 43 Cal. Rptr.
at 101-02. Thornton had held invalid an amendment to former Civil Code § 164 that
recharacterized a couple's marital acquisitions as community property once they became
California domiciliaries. 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934) (reversing on rehearing In re Thorn-
ton's Estate, 19 P.2d 778 (1933)). Thornton reasoned that, because California could not alter
the rights of Californians in their already acquired marital property, it could not impose
such changes on those arriving from other states. 1 Cal. 2d at 5, 33 P.2d at 3. California's
power to make such changes as to its own citizens has since been affirmed in In re Marriage
of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 592, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1976), in
which the court quoted Professor Armstrong: "Vested rights, of course, may be impaired
'with due process of law' under many circumstances. The state's inherent sovereign power
includes the so-called 'police power' right to interfere with vested property rights whenever
reasonably necessary to the protection of the health, safety, morals, and general well-being
of the people. . . .The constitutional question, on principle, therefore, would seem to be,
not whether a vested right is impaired by a marital property law change, but whether such a
change reasonably could be believed to be sufficiently necessary to the public welfare as to
justify the impairment." Armstrong, "'Prospective" Application of Changes in Community
Property Control-Rule of Property or Constitutional Necessity?, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 476, 495-
96 (1945) (citations omitted). The same test was cited with approval in Addison. 62 Cal. 2d
at 566, 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102. With this point firmly established, the legisla-
ture's right to enact appropriate provisions for the newly arrived is sustained. See
Bodenheimer, Justice Peters' Contribution to Family and Community Property Law, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. 577, 584-87 (1969) (discussing the privileges and immunities question).
233. See, e.g., Griffith, Community Property, Marshall, Joint Tenancy, and Mills, Com-
munity Joint Tenancy, supra note 57.
234. In 1931, the California Supreme Court held that a married couple's tenancy in
common property presumptively belonged one-half to the wife and one-half to the commu-
nity. Dunn v. Mullen, 211 Cal. 583, 296 P. 604 (1931). This result followed from the rule
that a husband's acquisitions were presumptively community property, but those of his wife,
taken in writing, were presumptively her separate property. Dunn v. Mullen was legislatively
overruled in 1935, when the Civil Code was amended to provide: "[W]hen. . .property is
acquired by husband and wife by an instrument in which they are described as husband and
wife, unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument, the presumption is that such
property is the community property of said husband and wife." 1935 Cal. Stats. ch. 707, § 1,
at 1912 (amending former CAL. CIv. CODE § 164 (the language is now found in Civil Code
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Current statutory and case law concerning title focuses on Civil
Code section 5110, which establishes the general presumption that
property acquired during marriage is community property.235 Unless
one of the special rules described below applies, this presumption may
easily be rebutted. Thus, tracing the purchase price of untitled prop-
erty, or property held in the name of one spouse, to separate property
will replace the community property presumption with a presumption
that the property is of the same character as its source.236 This pre-
sumption, in turn, can be displaced, as can any rule of community
property law, by showing that the property was transmuted by gift or
§ 5110, but restricted to pre-1975 acquisitions)). See note 232 supra. Because the policies
are the same, the presumption should apply equally to titles that do not reflect the marital
relationship, whenever acquired. See note 238 & text accompanying note 253 infra.
235. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1981) provides: "Except as provided in Sec-
tions 5107, 5108, and 5109, all real property situated in this state and all personal property
wherever situated acquired during the marriage by a married person while domiciled in this
state, and property held in trust pursuant to Section 5113.5, is community property; but
whenever any real or personal property, or any interest therein or encumbrance thereon, is
acquired prior to January 1, 1975, by a married woman by an instrument in writing, the
presumption is that the same is her separate property, and if so acquired by such married
woman and any other person the presumption is that she takes the part acquired by her, as
tenant in common, unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument; except, that
when any of such property is acquired by the husband and wife by an instrument in which
they are described as husband and wife, unless a different intention is expressed in the in-
strument, the presumption is that such property is the community property of the husband
and wife. When a single-family residence of a husband and wife is acquired by them during
marriage as joint tenants, for the purpose of the division of such property upon dissolution
of marriage or legal separation only, the presumption is that such single-family residence is
the community property of the husband and wife. The presumptions in this section men-
tioned are conclusive in favor of any person dealing in good faith and for a valuable consid-
eration with such married woman or her legal representatives or successors in interest, and
regardless of any change in her marital status after acquisition of the property.
"In cases where a married woman has conveyed, or shall hereafter convey, real prop-
erty which she acquired prior to May 19, 1889, the husband, or his heirs or assigns, or such
married woman, shall be barred from commencing or maintaining any action to show that
the real property was community property, or to recover the real property from and after
one year from the filing for record in the recorder's office of such conveyances, respectively.
"As used in this section, personal property does not include and real property does
include leasehold interests in real property."
The section is incomplete, out-of-date, and unclear. It should be broadened to include
all property, real or personal, wherever situated, and simplified to state clearly and conclu-
sively the presumptions for all titled and untitled property and the burdens that must be met
to rebut them. The references to separate property code sections should be revised, as is
appropriate once revisions to these sections are complete. Section 5109 no longer exists.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5109 (West 1970) (repealed 1979). Sections 5118, 5119, and 5126(a), (c)
also currently concern separate property. Id. §§ 5118, 5119, 5126(a), (c) (West Supp. 1981).
236. This is California's "source" or "tracing" rule. See Freese v. Hibernia Say. & Loan
Sot'y, 139 Cal. 392, 73 P. 172 (1903).
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agreement into property of another character.
237
Joint tenancy title, in contrast, has been held to signify a married
couple's intent to hold equal separate property interests. 238 Because
most couples hold their realty, bank accounts, and brokerage accounts
as joint tenants,2 39 the treatment of this title form has major implica-
237. See Woods v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657 (1956); Estate
of Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1st Dist. 1964).
238. Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003 (1932). Siberell still controls despite
important changes that have destroyed its logic. It can be understood in historical context as
a reaction to Dunn v. Mullen, 211 Cal. 583, 296 P. 604 (1931), which held that a married
couple's tenancy in common property signified a one-half separate property interest of the
wife and a one-half community property interest. For a discussion of Dunn, see note 234
supra. One year after Dunn, to avoid similar inequity as to joint tenancy property, the Sibe-
rell court seized upon the rule that joint tenancy requires equal ownership interests. Taking
title as joint tenants, it held, is "tantamount to a binding agreement between [the spouses]
that the [property] shall not thereafter be held as community property but instead as joint
tenancy with all the characteristics of such an estate. . . .[I]n it the rights of the spouses are
identical and coextensive." 214 Cal. at 773, 7 P.2d at 1005. The court concluded that joint
tenancy property "must therefore be classed as [the spouse's] separate but joint estate in the
property." Id.
Since the 1975 change to equal management and control, title taken by a married wo-
man has the same import as title taken by a married man: it raises a community property,
not a separate property, presumption. It would therefore be possible to reason that spouses
who take joint title, whether tenancy in common or joint tenancy, presumptively hold equal
community property interests. The legislature seems to have taken this view as to tenancy in
common property-the special statutory community property presumption that was needed
to overrule Dunn's rule of unequal tenancy in common interests was not retained for acqui-
sitions occurring after 1975, when the new general community presumption took effect. See
notes 234-35 supra. As to joint tenancy tile, however, the legislature appears to have rea-
soned differently. It did not assume the obsolescence of the statutory community property
presumption at divorce or separation for a single-family home held in joint tenancy. Rather,
by extending the presumption to post-1975 acquisitions as well, it signaled its understanding
that Siberell's presumption of equal separate property interests remains. Griffith, Commu-
nity Property, supra note 57, at 95, 105, would presume community property interests in-
stead. Accord Mills, Community Joint Tenancy, supra note 57, at 89. See text accompanying
note 250 infra.
239. Three widely held but largely inaccurate beliefs explain this practice: (1) there are
tax advantages; (2) this is the way married people do it, therefore this is the way it should be
done; (3) the survivorship feature is needed to avoid the expense and delay of probate when
one spouse dies. See Marshall, Joint Tenancy, supra note 57, at 501 & n.2, 505; Mills, Joint
Ownershi. A Review of Joint Tenancy and Community Property, in CALIFORNIA CONTINU-
ING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, JOINT OWNERSHIP: MARITAL AND NONMARITAL PROPERTY
1, 27-28 (1978). These beliefs are perpetuated by warnings such as the following, taken from
the top of a community property joint account agreement:
NOTICE: Use of this form by a husband and wife who are subject to the commu-
nity property laws may result in certain adverse tax consequences, and
they should consult their own attorney or tax advisor prior to signing
this form.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Community Property Joint Account Agree-
ment, Code 1016 (May 1976). No similar warning is contained on the company's forms for
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tions. To preserve the automatic survivorship feature, but permit a di-
vorce court to dispose of a family home held in joint tenancy, section
5110 was amended to provide a special rebuttable community property
presumption that applies despite the form of title.24° The presumption
applies only to a couple's single family residence in actions for divorce
or legal separation; in other contexts and for other assets, the presump-
other joint accounts. See also Mills, Community Joint Tenancy, supra note 57, at 40 n.4
(quoting cautionary statement on standard form of deposit). In fact, community property
ownership of such an account, if it isfinded with comamunity assets, is probably the more
advantageous title form from a tax perspective. A death-related transfer to the surviving
spouse-by virtue of title for joint tenancy; by will or intestacy for community property-
will result in no state inheritance tax. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 13805 (West Supp. 1981).
The federal estate tax imposed on the two kinds of property will be identical because of the
unlimited marital deduction. LR.C. §§ 2040, 2056. For state income tax purposes, there
does not appear to be any step-up or step-down in basis forjoint tenancy property passing to
a surviving spouse. CAL. R v. & TAX CODE § 18045(h) (West Supp. 1981); H. HA&sTEAD &
M. SIF oRF, CALrFoRNA INHERrTANCE TAX. PRACrICE § 5.1, at 32 (C.E.B. Supp. 1981).
The death-related transfer of community property passing to the survivor will provide a new
basis for the decedents one-half interest, but no new basis for the surviving spouse's original
one-half interest. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 18045 (a),(h) (West Supp. 1981). For federal
income tax purposes, however, the treatment differs. As to joint tenancy property, only the
decedet's one-half interest will acquire a new basis, although both spouses' interests in the
community property will acquire a new basis. LR.C. § 1014(a), (b)(6), (b)(9). Whether this
is advantageous will depend on whether the assets in the account are worth more than their
original basis at the time of death, and therefore receive an advantageous stepped-up basis,
or have declined in value, thereby receiving a disadvantageous stepped-down basis. Al-
though a blanket statement as to the relative advantages of the two title forms is therefore
impossible, the general trend of the market suggests that community property step-ups will
occur with greater frequency than step-downs; if so, community property accounts, on the
average, will be more beneficial.
If separate funds, in contrast, are placed in a community property account, a present
transfer potentially subject to the federal gift tax laws has occurred but the unlimited gift tax
marital deduction prevents the imposition of any tax. Compare C. LowNDEs, R. KRAMER &
J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 30.13, at pp. 726, 766 (3d ed. 1974) with
LR.C. § 2523. The same rules apply to some joint tenancies, but not to joint tenancy broker-
age and savings accounts, which receive more advantageous treatment under the income tax
laws controlling basis. Separate funds placed into ajoint tenancy brokerage account may be
given distinctive treatment under the income tax laws regarding basis. Under the former gift
tax laws, these accounts were not treated as true joint tenancies, but rather as revocable
transfers. See C. LowNDEs, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXES
at § 3011. If this argument is accepted under the new estate tax laws, a step-up or step-down
in basis will apply to the entire amount in the account at the time of the decedent-trans-
feror's death. See LR.C. § 2038. If, to the contrary, a true joint tenancy is deemed estab-
lished during the decedent's lifetime, only one-half will receive a step-up or step-down
under the reasoning set forth.above. This argument is, of course, irrelevant to savings ac-
counts because the concept of basis does not apply-that is, there is no previously untaxed
appreciation or depreciation. Under state law, neither gift is taxable. CAL. REv. & TAX.
CODE § 15310 (West Supp. 1981). See generally UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-103.
240. 1965 Cal. Stats. cl. 1710, § 1, at 3843.
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tion of joint tenancy controls.2 4 1 Nevertheless, because the tax treat-
ment of community property is often more advantageous than that of
joint tenancy property, at the death of one spouse the survivor fre-
quently asserts that the property was community property held in joint
tenancy form for convenience alone.2 42 Special problems also arise
when separate property is held in this form, whether in realty or in a
savings, checking, or brokerage account.243
241. Both the community property presumption and the joint tenancy presumption are
rebuttable. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1981); Estate of Watkins, 16 Cal. 2d 793,
796, 108 P.2d 417, 418-19 (1940); Mills, Community Joint Tenancy, supra note 57, at 43. The
section's restrictions have been questioned: "It would seem there is even more need for
statutory assistance in the death case where only one of the parties remains to testify. And
why should it be limited to one type of property?" H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 122 (2d ed. 1971).
242. "[I]t is a very common practice in California for spouses to hold their community
property as joint tenants. It is so common that the Inheritance Tax Department of the State
of California has a printed form of affidavit for the surviving spouse to sign, wherein the
survivor may claim the property as community property, notwithstanding the legal title may
be in the parties' names as joint tenants." Griffith, Community Property, supra note 57, at 90
n.9 (quoting Pierotti v. United States, 33 Am. Fed. Tax. Rep. 1662, 1662 (S.D. Cal. 1944),
af'd, 154 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1946)). The ease with which joint tenancy title may be taken
and the contrasting hurdles that are placed in the way of couples who seek community
property title forms promote the excessive use of joint tenancy title. Transfer agents, for
example, sometimes have strange notions about the impact of title, and discourage the tak-
ing of title in a joint form that will raise a presumption of community property. "[S]pouses
who intend to buy stocks or bonds with community funds. . . will find that transfer agents
will not necessarily issue the security in the manner requested. . . . [T]here will be a reluc-
tance to register the security 'John Doe and Mary Doe, husband and wife' (which would
raise the presumption of community property)." Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., Your
Securities and the Community Property Law: Factors Married People in California Should
Consider in Deciding the Form of Ownership of Securities 8 (June 1980). To obtain owner-
ship in community property form, the pamphlet advises taking title in one spouse's name
alone, or in both spouses' names, "followed by the words 'as community property.' The
transfer agent, however, may require a copy of a community property agreement executed
by both spouses and also require that the signatures be guaranteed by a bank or broker ...
When either spouse dies, however, some transfer agents may question whether probate is
required where a security is issued in the name of either spouse alone, or in the names of the
husband and wife, as community property, although the California law provides that the
security need not be probated if a spouse dies without a will or dies with a will leaving the
security outright to the surviving spouse." Id. at 8-9. In contrast, "it is a simple matter to
create true joint tenancy," for example, by jointly signing a letter to the broker requesting
that title be held in that form and not as community property. Id. at 22. See note 239 supra
for another stockbroker's misleading caution against community property accounts.
243. A mutual agreement or understanding of the parties may be required to rebut the
presumption of equal ownership raised by the joint title. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d
808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980); In re Marriage of Cademartori, 119 Cal. App.
3d 970, 174 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1st Dist. 1981); CAL. FIN. CODE § 852 (West 1968). Sims, Joint
Bank Accounts, supra note 57, questions whether the joint tenancy realty cases that require a
mutual agreement or understanding should control savings and checking accounts, and
notes that a line of cases permits the tracing of separate property through commingled ac-
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True joint tenancy title often disserves parties' needs.244 It is the
survivorship feature alone that most married couples seek, and it is this
feature that in fact sometimes serves their purposes.245 In other re-
counts without mentioning the joint tenancy presumption. See, e.g., Beckman v. Mayhew,
49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604, 607 (3d Dist. 1975).
244. True joint tenancy property may not be divided by a divorce court. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1981). Instead, if division is not accomplished by agreement, an
independent partition action will be required. But see Porter v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App.
3d 793, 805, 141 Cal. Rptr. 59, 66 (1st Dist. 1977) (court also has jurisdiction if parties "in-
vite" it to hear the issue). Furthermore, joint tenancy property is not subject to the commu-
nity property management protections of Civil Code §§ 5125 and 5127. Unilateral
severance is possible; the co-tenant need not be notified. Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d
30, 34-35, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (5th Dist. 1968): "While the [secret] actions of the wife [to
destroy the joint tenancy by use of a strawman], from the standpoint of a theoretically per-
fect marriage, are subject to ethical criticism. . . the question before this court is not what
should have been done. . . but whether the decedent and her attorneys acted in a legally
permissible manner." Cf. Mademann v. Sexauer, 117 Cal. App. 2d 400, 256 P.2d 34 (2d
Dist. 1953) (refusing to recognize attempted severance and holding that husband inherited
property as community property). Once a divorce action has been filed, one spouse some-
times uses a grant to himself or herself to terminate the joint tenancy in the couple's home,
then uses the tenancy in common interest as collateral for a loan. Conversation with Joan
Poulos, Esq., in Davis, California (July 6, 1981). Whether this is permissible, given the Civil
Code § 5110 community property presumption and the § 5127 joinder requirements for hy-
pothecation of community realty, is open to serious question. Furthermore, the tax treat-
ment of joint tenancy property at the death of one party may be less advantageous than that
of community property. See note 239 supra. Finally, if one secretly deeds to himself or
herself, then outlives the co-tenant, it would be a simple matter to destroy the unrecorded
deed and fraudulently take the property as a surviving joint tenant. See Burke v. Stevens,
264 Cal. App. 2d at 35-36, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 91. Joint tenancy property will, however, be
unavailable to the decedent's creditors, an advantage over community property. Marshall,
Joint Tenancy, supra note 57, at 525.
245. Griffith, Community Property, supra note 57, at 90, 96 n.31. Contra Mills, Joint
Ownersho4: 4 Review of Joint Tenancy and Community Property, in CALIFORNIA CONTINU-
ING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, JOINT OWNERSHIP: MARITAL AND NONMARITAL PROPERTY
1, 28 (1978) ("The principal advantage of joint tenancy. . . ie., the right of the survivor to
take the decedent's interest without estate administration, has been eliminated by the 1975
amendments to the Probate Code [citing §§ 202-205 on exempting community property
passing to a surviving spouse from administration]"). The new probate provisions, unlike
the rules for joint tenancy, however, do not cut off access by the decedent's creditors. Com-
pare CAL. PROB. CODE § 205 (West Supp. 1981) with Marshall, Joint Tenancy, supra note 57,
at 525. Furthermore, there may be unfavorable ultimate tax consequences if assets pass
outright, whether by operation of title, intestacy law, or bequest, to a surviving spouse and
are later included in the surviving spouse's estate. For families with moderate to large es-
tates, probate planners often use trusts as tax-avoidance devices. Halstead, The Marital De-
duction §§ 9.1-.71, in CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA
WILL DRAFTING (D. Briggs ed. Supp. 1981); Kalik & Kartiganer, Pianningfor Minimization
of the Impact of the Generation-Skioping Tax §§ 3.1-.9, in UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT
Los ANGELES & CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, ESTATE PLANNING
1980; Sacks, Inter Vivos and Testamentary Trusts § 4.17, in CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDU-
CATION OF THE BAR, ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER (C. Archer ed.
1979). As to small estates, however, Yale Griffith's remarks made twenty years ago remain
valid: "[I]n spite of all the arguments against joint tenancy, the people want it. They want it
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spects, if the purchase funds are community property, their interests
would be as well or better served by community property title.
246
For decades, suggestions have been offered that would assure mar-
ried couples both the advantages of community property and a survi-
vorship feature without the strained yet workable current doctrines and
practices that have sought this result.247 First, true joint tenancy title
should be affirmed as a form of common law ownership. 248 It should
signify equal, undivided separate property interests subject to a right of
survivorship, unless one party converts the property into tenancy in
because in most instances they want the survivor to get all the property in the event of death.
It is the poor man's will; it is faster and, in 'no-tax' cases, it is cheaper. It works well in
practice for people of modest means." Griffith, Community Property, supra note 57, at 108
(citation omitted). Beginning in 1987, such "modest" estates will include families whose
total wealth does not exceed $600,000, which is the exemption equivalent of the unified
credit. See I.R.C. § 2010.
246. See note 239 supra.
247. See sources cited in note 57 supra. The 1975 amendments to Probate Code §§ 202-
205, which now permit community property to pass without administration, were prompted
by these concerns. 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 173, §§ 2-5, at 317. See Mills, Joint Ownership: A
Review of Joint Tenancy and Community Property, in CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION
OF THE BAR, JOINT OWNERSHIP: MARITAL AND NONMARITAL PROPERTY 1, 28 (1978); CAL-
IFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, THE NEW PROBATE LEGISLATION 114
(1975).
248. This recommendation is made with some hesitation. Marshall, Joint Tenancy,
supra note 57, at 501 n.7 reports: "It is to be noted that despite its popularity, joint tenancy
has been modified and restricted in many jurisdictions. 48 C.J.S. 912 (1947); 33 CJ. 901
(1924); 14 AM. JUR. 84 (1938). Washington (REv. STAT. § 1344, 1951) has abolished the
right of survivorship[;] Louisiana (REv. STAT. 1950) does not recognize joint tenancy." See
also W. DE FUNIAK & W. VAUGHN, supra note 48, § 134 (describing the laws of all the
community property states except Louisiana, and reporting the newer Washington rule abol-
ishing most joint tenancies). The uieven ability of parties to alter the survivorship feature
sometimes creates inequities. Compare Socol v. King, 36 Cal. 2d 342, 223 P.2d 627 (1950)
(attempted devise of one-half interest by woman who had purchased property in her and her
husband's names as joint tenants, with intent to leave her one-half to her children from prior
marriage, held ineffective absent agreement of spouses; husband was not present in Califor-
nia at time of purchase and no discussion concerning form of title had occurred) with Estate
of Aiello, 106 Cal. App. 3d 669, 165 Cal. Rptr. 207 (2d Dist. 1980) (constructive trust in
favor of beneficiaries under deceased's will imposed on funds in surviving joint tenant's
possession because court concluded decedent believed that joint tenancy was appropriate
way to ensure distribution to them) and First Nat'l Bank v. Groussman, 29 Colo. App. 215,
483 P.2d 398 (1971) (octogenarian mother bought home with daughter in joint tenancy;
mother provided down payment and daughter assumed mortgage payments, but mother
secretly conveyed her interest to grandchildren seven years later, reserving life estate to her-
self). To prevent cases like Groussman, Professor Edward Rabin recommends that joint
action be required to terminate the survivorship feature. Conversation with Professor Ra-
bin, Davis, California (Summer, 1981). Because parties' needs and intentions may change
over time, however, the recommendation of this study would instead permit unilateral ac-
tion with notice, relying on estoppel and damages doctrines to protect one who would
thereby be unfairly prejudiced.
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common property, thereby destroying the survivorship feature. To en-
sure that separate property interests are in fact intended by the parties
and to clarify the consequences of this ownership form, a signed confir-
mation of title should be required to establish such true joint tenancy
property: the instrument should be required to state that the parties
hold their interests as separate property, to negate expressly other
forms of title, particularly community property, and to describe how
survivorship interests may be altered.24 9 Absent such express language,
the property should be presumed to be community property.250
True joint tenancy property under this scheme would carry all the
incidents of such property for creditor access purposes, would be sub-
ject to the tax liabilities and treatment appropriate to true joint tenan-
cies, and would be subject to conversion to tenancy in common
property by the unilateral act of one joint tenant. Under present Cali-
fornia law, a co-tenant who wishes to retain ownership, but not as a
joint tenant, may grant the joint tenancy interest directly to himself or
herself as tenant in common thereby destroying the survivorship fea-
ture.251 No notice of the transfer need be given to the other joint ten-
ant, who may therefore be misled into believing that a mutual estate
plan remains in effect.252 To prevent fraud, notice should be required:
registration and service to the joint tenant of changed ownership intent
249. See Colier v. Collier, 73 Ariz. 405, 242 P.2d 537 (1952) (signed acceptance of deed
expressly negated community property or tenancy in common ownership); In re Trimble's
Estate, 57 N.M. 51, 73, 253 P.2d 805, 819 (1953) (Sadler, C.J., dissenting from decision per-
mitting rebuttal ofjoint tenancy title and suggesting that express language detailing intent to
hold in joint tenancy may be required to forestall such challenges); Griffith, Community
Property, supra note 57, at 107-08. See generally W. REPPY & W. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 120-22 (1975). The termination-of-mutual-survivorship
explanation would help prevent ineffective efforts to alter survivorship by will and inappro-
priate reliance by one party on the provision's unalterability. See note 248 supra.
250. This presumption could be rebutted by tracing or by proof of an agreement to hold
in some other fashion. See notes 263, 265 & accompanying text infra. If information on
termination of the survivorship provision had not been set forth, survivorship could be chal-
lenged by showing a party's good faith effort to designate another beneficiary or to terminate
the joint tenancy. See note 248 supra.
251. No strawman is required. Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 530-31, 162
Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (1st Dist. 1980). The opinion reasons that a co-tenant should be able to
do directly by grant to oneself that which can be accomplished indirectly by use of a
strawman. This logic suggests that a co-tenant's attempted devise of his or her interest to a
third party should be similarly effective: what one can accomplish by the formality of con-
veyance to oneself and a subsequent devise should be possible by direct testamentary state-
ment. Cf. Socol v. King, 36 Cal. 2d 342, 223 P.2d 627 (1950) (pre-Riddle case holding
attempted testamentary disposition inoperative to terminate joint tenancy). For a discussion
of Socol, see note 248 supra.
252. Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 34,70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (5th Dist. 1968). See
note 244 supra.
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should replace the formality of a conveyance to oneself or to another as
the operative legal act.
A married couple's other tenancy in common property should be
presumptively community property.2 53 If separate property interests
are desired, a statement of that intent and formal disclaimer of intent to
hold as community property should be required. Only if tenancy in
common results from the severance of a joint tenancy should equal sep-
arate property interests be presumed.25 4
Finally, a new form of title is needed that would preserve the own-
ership characteristics of the purchasing funds and permit but not re-
quire mutual survivorship rights. For example, if title were to read
"John and Susan" or "John and Susan, as mixed property," and the
couple were married at the time, community property would be pre-
sumed, but tracing would be permitted to establish other ownership
interests in the asset.255 Inclusion of the words "with right of survivor-
ship" would provide automatic transfer of title upon the death of one
of the spouses.256 To the extent that the underlying property is commu-
nity property, this new title form would accomplish what case and stat-
utory law has sought for joint tenancy property purchased with
community funds: community property law would control creditor ac-
cess, 257 taxation,258 management, alienation,2 59 and property division at
253. See notes 234, 238 supra.
254. Conversions to tenancy in common by operation of law upon destruction of a joint
tenancy survivorship provision would not alter the parties' equal separate property interests
that were established by the joint tenancy title. Transmutation by gift or agreement would
be required.
255. This currently occurs when title is taken in one spouse's name or there is no title at
all.
256. Because the survivorship feature would be terminable at will with proper notice,
and creditor access would be maintained as for other community property, this new form of
property would not take on the disfavored characteristics of tenancy by the entireties, in
which a co-tenant is precluded from unilaterally alienating his or her share either during
marriage or upon death. See Swan v. Walden, 156 Cal. 195, 103 P. 931 (1909); 4A R. Pow-
ELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY) 621, 623
(1979).
257. See, e.g., In re McNair & Ryan, 95 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Hulse v. Lawson,
212 Cal. 614, 299 P. 525 (1931).
258. Uniform community property treatment for state tax purposes should be guaran-
teed by statute. There is reason to believe that this affirmation of the property's community
character would be recognized by federal taxing authorities. See United States v. Pierotti,
154 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1946) ("state law governs in ... determining the nature of the
tenancy by which property is held by married persons in California"). Although the federal
cases are not entirely consistent, some display a willingness to accord favorable community
property treatment even when state law might not so provide. Pierotfi, for example, found
property to be community property even though it had been held in joint tenancy title and
proceedings had been undertaken in state court to clear title accordingly. See Mills, Corn-
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divorce, but an analogy to joint tenancy doctrine would provide auto-
matic transfer of ownership at death.260
As to mixed property, the same analytical steps would be taken:
the true nature of the property would be ascertained and the legal con-
sequences then determined accordingly.2 61 Relative ownership inter-
ests, for example, would be established according to the source of
acquiring funds, subject to general rules controlling the allocation of
fruits and profits. The consequences of survivorship rights in mixed
property would also reflect the character of the underlying ownership
interests: community property treatment would be accorded to the
transferred community interests, and the law of revocable trusts would
control transfers of separate property interests.2 62
Finally, should a transmutation of past and future contributions be
desired, the form of title could indicate this expressly. For example, the
title might state that ownership is to be held by "John and Susan as
community property, and not as mixed property, with right of survivor-
ship." Here, tracing alone would not rebut community ownership; the
recital should serve as evidence that any separate property contribu-
tions were gifts to the community.263 Thus, title should be available in
a form that accurately expresses the parties' true desires concerning
ownership, if they have given the matter thought.264 If they have not
expressed their contrary intent, community property ownership should
be presumed, with tracing to separate funds producing ownership that
reflects these sources. 265 If survivorship rights are desired, they should
munity Joint Tenancy, supra note 57, at 86: "If, as Emerson said, foolish consistency is the
hobgoblin of little minds, then this area of the law is one where lawyers and judges think
big."
259. Partition, available upon demand to a joint tenant, would be possible only to the
extent that new provisions for community property would so authorize. See Bruch, Man-
agement Powers, supra note 11, recommendation 42.
260. The same mode of terminating survivorship rights should be provided as to this
new form of property. The analogy would not control creditor access at death, however,
which would be according to community property, not joint tenancy, rules. As to proce-
dures, see note 267 infra.
261. Any new title forms should be added to the lists in CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 682, 5104
(West 1954 & 1970), which should be conformed to one another in any event.
262. Revocable trust doctrine applies because the spouse who has contributed separate
funds retains both sole ownership rights to the separate property interest during his or her
lifetime, and the power to cancel the survivorship feature unilaterally.
263. A transmutation agreement would be required to rebut forms of title that both
affirmatively state the form in which title is to be held and expressly negate other ownership
interests.
264. See note 263 supra.
265. This mixed property presumption would be rebuttable upon showing of a contrary
agreement or understanding.
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be permitted, independently of the ownership of the underlying prop-
erty. Either spouse alone should be permitted to destroy the survivor-
ship feature by recording and giving notice to the other spouse,
precisely as is recommended for true joint tenancy property.2 66 Addi-
tionally, the current procedures for clearing title expeditiously follow-
ing the death of one of the co-owners of joint tenancy property or
community property should be extended to all survivorship forms. 267
With or without survivorship provisions, taxation and creditor accesss
should be dictated by the actual character of the underlying property,
whether community property, separate property, or some combination
of separate and community interests. Management powers and duties
should also be determined by the property's character, except that com-
munity property standards should control mixed assets.
266. See text accompanying notes 251-52 supra.
267. The quickest and cheapest title procedures are those available for joint tenancy
property. Ordinarily no court proceeding is held; instead, the surviving spouse completes an
affidavit and it, together with a copy of the death certificate and a certificate releasing the
inheritance tax lien, is filed with the Recorder. Although a proceeding to establish the fact
of death is available under CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1170-1174 (West Supp. 1981), it is generally
not used because it is considered unnecessary. Griffith, Community Property, supra note 57,
at 96 & n.31; Conversation with Roger Gambatese, Esq., in Davis, California (July 13,
1981). Release of joint bank, credit union, and savings accounts is even easier; the savings
institution will honor the withdrawal privileges of the survivor according to the account's
terms. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 852, 7603, 11204, 14854 (West 1968 & 1981). Any account pro-
viding for survivorship is deemed a joint tenancy account under the provision governing
banks and savings and loan associations. Id. §§ 852, 7602, 11204. Cf. UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE §§ 6-103 to 6-105 & Comments ("joint accounts").
As to community property that passes to the surviving spouse, streamlined set-aside
procedures are available that do not require administration. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 650-657
(West Supp. 1981); Lindgren, Senate Bill 341: The Community Property Set Aside Law, in
CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, THE NEW PROBATE LEGISLATION
(1975). These procedures, however, entail a filing fee if probate has not been commenced,
notice to heirs and beneficiaries, inheritance tax clearance, and a hearing that leads to an
order transferring the deceased spouse's interest and confirming the surviving spouse's inter-
est. The order is thereafter recorded as appropriate. Because of the additional steps, attor-
neys' fees may be somewhat higher than in joint tenancy cases. Conversation with Roger
Gambatese, Esq., in Davis, California (July 13, 1981). If the spouse who takes community
property wishes to avoid personal liability for the decedent's debts, administration is re-
quired. CAL. PROB. CODE § 205 (West Supp. 1981). In contrast, joint tenancy passes on no
responsibility for debts of the decedent that are not reflected in the title. Creditors, however,
are free to challenge the property's joint tenancy character. See, e.g., Estate of Watkins, 16
Cal. 2d 793, 796, 108 P.2d 417, 418-19 (1940); Marshall, Joint Tenancy, supra note 57, at 521
(bank accounts); Mills, Community Joint Tenancy, supra note 57, at 44. Because title will
express the survivor's right to take under the proposed new property form, the current joint
tenancy model seems best suited to the transfer of this property at death. There would be no
need to adjudicate the separate or community character of the underlying property to deter-
mine to whom it passes. Creditor access, however, should not be cut off by the transfer,
absent probate. Indeed, a conforming rule for joint tenancy law might be appropriate, at
least when the probate estate is insufficient to satisfy the decedent's creditors.
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Property Purchased Before Marriage
Title that was acquired before marriage is often not reformed after
marriage, even though community property assets are used to make
payments on the property.268 As discussed above, California has
adopted a pro rata ownership rationale for purchases of real property,
life insurance, and pensions under these circumstances.2 69 The same
reasoning that permits a rebuttal of presumptive community property
ownership during marriage by tracing to separate property sources sup-
ports a rebuttal of the separate property ownership presumption that
applies to prenuptial purchases by tracing to community property
sources. As has been historically recognized, any other rule would per-
mit the holder of separate property title to disadvantage the community
by unilateral action.270 Whatever rules are adopted for the allocation
of separate and community interests in mixed assets should be applied
to these cases as well.
Debts
Since the introduction of no-fault divorce, California treatment of
debts incurred by spouses has become increasingly confused. Although
most of the rules concerning creditor access during marriage have been
clarified by statute,271 treatment of debts as between the spouses and as
to creditors at divorce or death has been inconsistent.
The Governor's Commission on the Family, whose report led to
the adoption of the Family Law Act and no-fault divorce in California,
recommended that
the law provide for division of the community and quasi-community
property equally between the parties where possible, except that if
the Court should find that the economic circumstances of the parties
require it, an unequal division may be ordered .... [T]he Court
should have resort to conduct affecting the financial status and assets
of the marriage, and should make inquiry into the prior economic
dislocation of any community assets. However ... conduct unre-
lated to the finances of the marriage should not properly influence
the division of the marital property .... 272
268. Griffith, Community Property, supra note 57, at 88 & n.5 reports that 83% of all
titles in escrow are encumbered and notes that current earnings are the usual payment
source for these loans.
269. See notes 86-88 & accompanying text supra.
270. See note 84 & accompanying text supra.
271. A notable exception is the liability of a community property business under the sole
management of one spouse. Reppy, Debt Collection from Married Calfornians: Problems
Caused by Transmutations, Single-Spouse Management and Invalid Marriage, 18 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 143, 196-99 (1981).
272. GovERNoR's COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 46; see also id at I 11.
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The Commission's report concerned only assets; no express recommen-
dation concerning the definition or division of debts was made. An
equal division of assets would not have been mandated under their
proposal,273 however, and it appears that the Commission found no dif-
ficulty with unequal divisions of either debt or property that were
designed to serve the parties' post-divorce financial needs.
Although the Commission's recommendation for the division of
marital assets was rejected, 274 no prescription for the treatment of debts
was made. Consistent with the long-standing theory that debts stand-
ing alone are not property, some courts continued to allocate debts un-
equally even after the Family Law Act went into effect.275 Following a
change in the forms used for dissolution, however, it gradually became
the practice to make an equal division of overall net assets-that is,
total assets minus total liabilities.276 Still later the code section control-
ling the division of community property was amended to incorporate
an ambiguous reference to liabilities.277
Never clarified were the questions of precisely what the rules for
division should be, or even which liabilities are subject to division. In
some courts, antenuptial debts are treated as separate debts, but all
debts incurred during marriage by either spouse are divided, even
though the benefits accrue to one party's separate estate. 278 In others,
debts that are clearly for the benefit of one of the spouses alone, either
directly or for the benefit of that spouse's separate property, are also
273. See note 272 & accompanying text supra.
274. See note 2 supra.
275. See, e.g.,Inre Marriage of Eastis, 47 Cal. App. 3d 459, 463-64, 120 Cal. Rptr. 861,
863-64 (4th Dist. 1975).
276. See CAL. CIv. & CRiM. CT. R. 1285.55 (West 1981). But see In re Marriage of
Eastis, 47 Cal. App. 3d 459, 463-64, 120 Cal. Rptr. 861, 863-64 (4th Dist. 1975) (refusing to
divide debts equally to the extent that they exceed the value of the couple's property).
277. 1976 Cal. Stats. ch. 762, § 1, at 1801 (adding sentence to Civil Code § 4800 that
directs the court "[flor purposes of. . . division" to "value the assets and liabilities as near
as practicable to the time of trial"). This is not inconsistent with measuring liabilities in
relationship to assets. The statute still orders the equal division of property. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1981), set forth at note 2 supra.
278. See, e.g., Garfein v. Garfein, 16 Cal. App. 3d 155, 93 Cal. Rptr. 714 (2d Dist. 1971).
The actress Carroll Baker brought suit during her marriage on a motion picture "play or
pay" contract, incurring attorneys' fees and costs of more than $126,000. After her divorce,
recovery was had on the contract for a period beginning during marriage and extending into
the postmarital period. Her former husband requested that the attorneys' fees and costs be
allocated between the community property and separate property salary recoveries. The
court denied the request, holding that a debt "is community or separate at the time it is
incurred; it does not change its character merely because the beneficial effect of the consider-
ation received may survive the marital cohabitation." Id. at 160, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
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treated as separate debts.279 The only recent California Supreme Court
case giving guidance, however, states that all debts for which the com-
munity property is liable are subject to the equal division command.2 0
This unlikely formula would subject even antenuptial debts to division,
because community property may also be reached for the satisfaction
of these obligations. 28'
The rule cannot, or at least should not, reach so broadly. Ante-
nuptial debts should be solely the separate debt of the spouse who in-
curred them unless the community has been benefited.2 2 Debts that
have benefited the separate property of one spouse should be allocated
accordingly.283 Postseparation debts and debts for support should be
allocated as is appropriate, given the nature of the expenditure and the
receipt of any benefits, as well as the parties' relative ability to pay.284
Tort debts should be assigned according to the availability of assets to
satisfy the appropriate order of satisfaction. 28 5
Since the change in ownership of postseparation earnings, 286 the
courts have become increasingly involved in assessing the propriety of
debt payments out of separate and community funds.287 The courts
will retain their ability to make such judgments, no matter what treat-
ment given to post separation earnings. Greater consistency is needed
279. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d 591, 600, 141 Cal. Rptr. 597,
602 (2d Dist. 1977) (holding wife's postseparation department store charges her separate
debts). Because some courts treated debts incurred for the education of one spouse as the
student's separate debts and others did not, Civil Code § 4800(b)(4) was enacted, directing
the court to assign such debts to the student. 1978 Cal. Stats. ch. 1323, § 2, at 4324. See note
2 supra. Some courts resist even this modest step and persist in offsetting with other prop-
erty or debts. Cf. Letter from Assemblywoman Waters 3 CAL. F~A. L. REP. 1213 (1979)
(requesting information concerning such cases).
280. In re Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738,748, 552 P.2d 1169, 1175, 131 Cal. Rptr.
873, 879 (1976).
281. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120 (West Supp. 1981).
282. Support obligations to third parties that fall due during the marriage should receive
community debt treatment. Any other rule would reward the other spouse for discouraging
their payment.
283. The allocation should be in part or in full, as appropriate.
284. Some of these expenses are in the nature of support, such as bills for medical care,
food, rent, and clothing. See In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1165, 154
Cal. Rptr. 413 (1979). Others, however, are in breach of the good faith management duty.
See In re Marriage of Cohen, 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672 (2d Dist. 1980)
(assume, however, that husband had incurred debts to support his lover instead of dissipat-
ing community assets).
285. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5122 (West Supp. 1981).
286. See text accompanying notes 204-07 supra.
287. See, eg., In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1165, 154 Cal. Rptr.
413 (1979); In re Marriage of Smith, 79 Cal. App. 3d 725, 145 Cal. Rptr. 205 (4th Dist. 1978);
In re Marriage of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d 591, 600, 141 Cal. Rptr. 597, 602 (2d Dist. 1977).
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in the standards for allocating some debts to the community and some
to the separate property at divorce or death. A statute should be en-
acted that would permit a court to distinguish separate and community





Current law provides that the community property shall be valued
as close to trial as practicable, but permits the use of some other date
upon a motion and showing of good cause.2 89 Such a motion has been
granted when, for example, one spouse frustrated discovery for several
years and permitted community assets to deteriorate during the in-
terim.290 To prevent the spouse from benefiting by this behavior, valu-
ation at an earlier date, for which information was available, was
permitted.29'
In other contexts, the court must take into account an asset's value
both at separation and at trial. This frequently occurs because separate
and community property have become mixed during a separation in
which earnings were separate property. When this happens, the court
must determine the extent to which appreciation during separation was
produced by the original community property capital base as opposed
to the separate property component.292 If Civil Code section 5118 is
repealed, as is recommended, 293 this difficulty will disappear. In any
case, the valuation provision works well in practice and should be re-
288. See general N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-9 (1978) (definition of separate debt for both
creditor access and division purposes). Furthermore, community debts should be expressly
removed from the equal division requirement in recognition of the fact that the relative
postdivorce wealth of the spouses may otherwise be inequitably distributed. Bruch, Man-
agement Powers, supra note 11, at n.78. See notes 358-60 & accompanying text infra.
289. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1981), set forth at note 2 supra.
290. In re Marriage of Stallcup, 97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 158 Cal. Rptr. 679 (3d Dist. 1979).
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590 (2d
Dist. 1975) (Pereira- Van Camp applied in reverse to apportion increase in value of commu-
nity property business through postseparation separate property efforts). Similar concerns
currently arise if separate property payments are made on a community property house. See
In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P.2d 1165, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1979) (assuming
that reimbursement rather than ownership is the correct remedy for payments in excess of
rental value or support).
293. See text accompanying notes 204-15 supra.
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tained in its current form. 294
Jurisdiction
The divorce court currently has jurisdiction over community prop-
erty, but not over separate property except to the extent that support is
at issue.295 This limitation has hampered the court's ability to achieve
equity if a couple's wealth is exclusively or primarily separate in na-
ture.296 If the fruits of separate property are redefined as community
property, the need for further recourse to separate property wealth will
be infrequent. Even under these conditions, however, a home or busi-
ness that most appropriately would be awarded to one spouse may con-
tain some element of separate property that was contributed by the
other spouse. To permit a forced sale of the separate property compo-
nent, the divorce court should be given jurisdiction to reach separate
property in appropriate cases. If the fruits of separate property remain
separate, even broader recourse to separate property at dissolution
should be authorized.
All jointly held property of the spouse should be subject to the
court's jurisdiction in any event, without regard to its separate or com-
munity character.297 This rule should control not only joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, and mixed property held at the time of divorce,
but also omitted property, including former community property that
has become tenancy in common property by operation of law.298 Re-
course to the superior court for partition should not be required. 299
Finally, the court should be given jurisdiction to hear claims based
upon cohabitation, at least when such claims are related to marital
294. Legislation introduced in 1981 would have amended § 4800 to require valuation as
near as practicable to the time of separation. Cal. A.B. 1584 (Elder) (1981). The power of
the court upon motion to permit valuation at another time would have been removed. Such
proposals are unworkable, because they apparently do not account for appreciation or de-
predation occurring between the dates of separation and trial. Fighting would be exacer-
bated if the party to be awarded an asset at trial would thereby be advantaged or
disadvantaged by unmeasured but significant postseparation changes in value.
295. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800, 4801, 4805-4807 (West Supp. 1981).
296. See notes 73-80 & accompanying text supra.
297. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (Supp. 1980); NEV. REv. STAT. § 125.150
(1979). See note 38 supra.
298. Although courts do not discuss the point, a bifurcated divorce, that is, a divorce in
which the final judgment of dissolution is entered before the property trial is held, entails
dividing tenancy in common, not community, property. See In re Marriage of Fink, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 357, 126 Cal. Rptr. 626 (2d Dist. 1976).
299. Cf. Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 332, 605 P.2d 10, 14, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502, 506
(1980) (omitted pension must be divided in partition suit because divorce court without
jurisdiction).
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property claims otherwise before the court. This may occur if spouses
who cohabited prior to marriage later engage in litigation involving
both their marital property and claims arising from the period of co-
habitation. It may also occur if conflicting property claims are made by
one spouse and a person who cohabited with the other spouse. 3°°
Division Techniques
California authorizes three types of financial orders at divorce:
property division,30 spousal support, 30 2 and child support.30 3 Except
in unusual circumstances, an immediate equal division of community
property is made.3°4 This division rule has been especially troublesome
when a current division must be made of an asset that will not be real-
ized until some time in the future.30 5 For example, cash flow problems
may result when one spouse is awarded an entire pension or the interest
in an ongoing business and the other spouse must be compensated with
current property.306 The division of enhanced earning capacity may
entail similar practical problems.30 7
New York, in its recent divorce reform, provides a new property
division form, a distributive award. 30 8 Although payable in install-
300. See note 228 & accompanying text supra.
301. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1981).
302. Id. § 4801.
303. Id. § 4700.
304. See In re Marriage of Connolly, 23 Cal. 3d 590, 596, 602-03, 591 P.2d 911,913, 917-
18, 153 Cal. Rptr. 423, 425, 429-30 (1979) (high-risk stock); In re Marriage of Fink, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 357, 362, 126 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (2d Dist. 1976) (bifurcated trial); In re Marriage of
Boseman, 31 Cal. App. 3d 372, 375, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232, 234 (2d Dist. 1973) (family residence
sole community asset); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1981), set forth at note 2 supra.
305. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1st
Dist. 1979) (interest in ongoing medical partnership); In re Marriage of Judd, 68 Cal. App.
3d 515, 137 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1st Dist. 1977) (retirement and contingent stock plans).
306. See In re Marriage of Connolly, 23 Cal. 3d 590, 591 P.2d 911, 153 Cal. Rptr. 423
(1979) (corporate stock awarded to company director-husband); In re Marriage of Stallcup,
97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 299, 158 Cal. Rptr. 679, 681 (3d Dist. 1979) (business interests).
307. See, e.g., Lynn v. Lynn, No. M-9842-77, decision letter at 4 (N.J. Super. Ct., Bergen
County Dec. 5, 1980) (wife's $61,377.20 interest [20%] in husband's enhanced earning capac-
ity as a surgeon to be purchased in graduated semi-annual installments, set in anticipation of
husband's increasing earnings: payments of $3,000 and $5,000 in first year, $3,500 each in
second year, $5,000 each in third year, $7,500 and $8,500 in fourth year, and $10,000 and
$10,377.20 in final year; interest payable quarterly at 8% on the unpaid balance).
308. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (Part B)(5)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1981): "In any action
in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is appropriate but would be
impractical or burdensome or where the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation
or profession would be contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall
make a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court in its
discretion also may make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distri-
bution of marital property." Cf. UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY AcT § 16(e) (Submission
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ments, the award is not for spousal support. It is instead similar to the
technique developed under California case law to permit one spouse to
buy a home or business over time from the other when an immediate
division is impossible and there are economic reasons that justify one
party's retention of the asset.309
In addition, California courts sometimes retain jurisdiction for
postponed divisions. This usually occurs to avoid the dislocation of an
immediate division-for example, if there are insufficient assets to
make an outright award of a community property home to the custo-
dial parent, yet it is important that the couple's children remain in sta-
ble and relatively inexpensive housing.310 In the case of pensions, the
postponed division may result either from a difficulty in providing an
.. mediate division due to insufficient assets or from problems in estab-
lishing the asset's current value.31 Courts have also retained jurisdic-
tion when time was required to ascertain the costs of division,
especially tax liabilities.312 As the following discussion of standards for
division indicates, the courts need a variety of dispositional tools to
resolve these and similar problems efficiently and fairly.
Standards for Division
The baseline for division should remain that the couple's shared
assets be divided immediately and equally and that separate property
Draft 1981): "Division of both marital and individual property into proportions for the
spouses may be accomplished by a physical division of properties, a division based upon
their respective values, a judgment for present or future payments, a judgment for future
property transfers, or by a combination of those methods." Should California institute lump
sum support awards, the option of distributive awards should also be made available. See
notes 346, 353 infra.
309. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(1) (West Supp. 1981), set forth at note 2 supra. See
the cases cited in notes 305 & 306 supra. See also In re Marriage of Hermann, 84 Cal. App.
3d 361, 148 Cal. Rptr. 550 (2d Dist. 1978); In re Marriage of Tammen, 63 Cal. App. 3d 927,
134 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1st Dist. 1976).
310. E.g., In re Marriage of Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444 (4th Dist.
1980); In re Marriage of Boseman, 31 Cal. App. 3d 372, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (2d Dist. 1973).
311. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779; 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9
(1978); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976);
Phillipson v. Board of Admin., 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970).
312. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 86-89, 592 P.2d 1165, 1171-73,
154 Cal. Rptr. 413, 419-21 (1979) (court ordered jurisdiction reserved to assess possible capi-
tal gains taxes resulting from sale of home in event that new home was not purchased within
18 months of sale); In re Marriage of Clark, 80 Cal. App. 3d 417, 422-24, 145 Cal. Rptr. 602,
605-07 (2d Dist. 1978) (court ordered division of capital gains tax owed by wife on husband's
installment purchase of her interest in stock; authorized retention of jurisdiction for yearly
computations as payments were received and taxed, if necessary to accomplish equal
division).
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not be invaded. 313 Several qualifications, however, are appropriate.
Separate Property Marriages
Special problems may affect parties' separate property, no matter
which community property definition is adopted. If the current law is
maintained, a provision should be added permitting an unequal divi-
sion of community assets or an award out of one party's separate assets
when the presence of one spouse's separate wealth would render an
equal division of community property fundamentally unfair. This
standard could be phrased as suggested by certain features of Idaho
and Louisiana law. Idaho calls for an equal division of the community
property "[u]nless there are compelling reasons otherwise" and lists
factors to be considered in reaching that decision.314 In a somewhat
313. Separate property for this purpose excludes jointly held separate property interests.
See notes 297-98 & accompanying text supra.
314. Although the Idaho statute's introductory language sounds like a directive for equi-
table distribution, it is so strongly qualified that it instead provides equal division with lim-
ited exceptions. Of special interest are its rules concerning separate property matrimonial
homes and its reference to federal retirement and social security benefits: "In case of divorce
by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, the community property and the home-
stead must be assigned as follows:
"1. The community property must be assigned by the court in such proportions as the
court, from all the facts of the case and the condition of the parties, deems just, with due
consideration of the following factors:
"(a) Unless there are compelling reasons otherwise, there shall be a substantially
equal division in value, considering debts, between the spouses.
"(b) Factors which may bear upon whether a division shall be equal, or the
manner of division, include, but are not limited to:
"(1) Duration of the marriage;
"(2) Any antenuptial agreement of the parties; provided, however, that the
court shall have no authority to amend or rescind any such agreement;
"(3) The age, health, occupation, amount and source of income, vocational
skills, employability, and liabilities of each spouse;
"(4) The needs of each spouse;
"(5) Whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance;
"(6) The present and potential earning capability of each party; and
"(7) Retirement benefits, including, but not limited to, social security, civil
service, military and railroad retirement benefits.
"2. If a homestead has been selected from the community property, it may be assigned
to either party, either absolutely, provided such assignment is considered in distribution of
the community property, or for a limited period, subject in the later case to the future dispo-
sition of the court; or it may be divided or be sold and the proceeds divided.
"3. If a homestead has been selected from the separate property of either, it must be
assigned to the former owner of such property, subject to the power of the court to assign it
for a limited period to the other spouse." IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (Supp. 1981). Cf. UNIFORM
MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 16(c)(l)-(13) (Submission Draft 1981). The draft Uniform Act
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different but relevant context, Louisiana awards a surviving spouse a
"marital portion 315 if the decedent died "rich in comparison to the
surviving spouse."316
prescribes an equitable distribution of separate property and lists factors that the court must
take into account in making its decision. The rule is provided because in common law
property states all marital assets acquired before the Act's effective date would be treated as
separate property. This problem, of course, does not exist in California. Although Califor-
nia's presumption should therefore be that retention by the original owner of separate prop-
erty is proper in all but extreme cases, the Model Act's factors for consideration are of
interest:
"(1) duration of the marriage;
"(2) any prior marriage of either spouse;
"(3) any relevant agreement of the spouses;
"(4) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational
skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the spouses;
"(5) the contribution by one spouse to the education, training, or increased earning
power of the other;,
"(6) custodial provisions;
"(7) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance;
"(8) the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income;
"(9) the contribution or dissipation of each spouse in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates;
"(10) the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit;
"(II) whether one of the spouses has substantial assets not subject to division by the
court;
"(12) whether any alteration in the division is required to adjust the interests of the
spouses on account of a substantial expenditure of personal effort by one spouse on individ-
ual property of that spouse which resulted in a deprivation of the marital property of that
personal effort;
"(13) the desirability of awarding the marital home or the right to live in it for a rea-
sonable period to the spouse having custody of the children." Id.
Now that certain federal benefits have been held the employee's separate property,
there will be a new kind of separate property marriage, in which the only important wealth
will have been earned and will be of a much more modest scale than that in the historical
separate property marriage. See McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981); Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979). Compare the family's assets in Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d
349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) with those in Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal.
3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971). The extent to which a property division may
take into account one party's separate wealth when it was earned in a form that is preempted
from inconsistent state treatment is unclear. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 588-
90. Although a dollar-for-dollar offset is clearly impermissible, it is unlikely that a provision
directed generally to relative wealth would be similarly flawed. See notes 315-16 infra.
315. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2434 (West Supp. 1981) defines the marital portion as an
outright one-fourth interest in the decedent's estate if the decedent died without children, the
same proportion as a life estate instead if the decedent is survived by three or fewer children,
and a life estate in the same proportion as a child's share if there are more than three surviv-
ing children. A commentary is printed at 1979 La. Acts, Act. No. 710, § 1, art. 2434, at 1890.
316. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2432 (West Supp. 1981) ("When a spouse dies rich in
comparison with the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse is entitled to claim the marital
portion from the succession of the deceased spouse."). See 1979 La. Acts, Act. No. 710, § 1,
arL 2432, Comment at 1888: ("While no concrete test has ever been devised by the Louisi-
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If all fruits of separate property were redefined to be community
property, access to the separate property base would seem largely un-
necessary. An equal division of separate property fruits should not be
required, however, if it would deprive a spouse of inherited property or
gifts that are of important emotional or familial significance. 3 17
Finally, if rents and profits are deemed community property, but
natural appreciation is not, an equal division of appreciated value
should be presumptively equitable. 318
The Family Home
Greater flexibility concerning dispositions of the family home is
needed. The first step should be a codification and extension of the
case law that has developed a method for preserving the home for one
spouse's use during the children's minority.319 The provision should
make clear that use can appropriately extend throughout the children's
minority,320 and similar use awards should be available in appropriate
cases without regard to the presence of minor children. 321 The statute
should also apply to family homes that are partially or completely sep-
arate property.322 Finally, the section should permit the buy-out by
one spouse of the other spouse's interest at less than commercial inter-
est rates, recognizing that the use-of-capital concept applies in this con-
ana courts, the survivor will ordinarily be awarded the marital portion when the comparison
of patrimonial assets shows a ratio of five to one or more."). Only in cases of sharply dispar-
ate separate and community estates should unequal division be authorized.
317. Although other assets or distributive awards would permit buy-outs in many such
cases, it is possible that inherited art, jewelry, antiques or a family home might appreciate
sufficiently to place even a buy-out of one spouse's share in the community property appreci-
ation beyond the means of the separate property owner. Rather than force a sale of such
assets to permit equal division in all cases, the court should be permitted to make an unequal
division of community property appreciation if equity so requires.
318. Cf. UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY AcT §§ 3(c)(2)(v), (d)(1) (Submission Draft
1981). Note, however, that the draft Uniform Act's sharing provisions are not recommended
for unappreciated separate property interests. See note 314 supra. Furthermore, the same
qualification to protect property of familial or personal significance would be required for
this model as well. See note 317 & accompanying text supra. A redraft of the Uniform Act's
provision is expected. Conversation with William Cantwell, Reporter for the Uniform Mar-
ital Property Act, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, (January 9, 1982).
319. See In re Marriage of Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444, modeed 102
Cal. App. 3d 619, (4th Dist. 1980); In re Marriage of Herrmann, 84 Cal. App. 3d 361, 148
Cal. Rptr. 550 (2d Dist. 1978); In re Marriage of Boseman, 31 Cal. App. 3d 372, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 232 (2d Dist. 1973).
320. See note 19 supra.
321. See note 18 supra. This provision would be especially important following lengthy
marriages or when the home has been especially adapted for a handicapped adult child or
spouse's special physical needs.
322. See note 18 supra.
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text as well.3 23 Theoretically, each of these techniques is but an
application of support concepts.324 Because of problematical Califor-
nia case law, however, legislative clarification is needed. The draft
Uniform Act and provisions now in force in several sister states suggest
possible approaches. 325
323. See In re Marriage of Herrmann, 84 CaL App. 3d 361, 148 Cal. Rptr. 550 (2d Dist.
1978) (applying Boseman delayed division rather than Tammen buy-out because wife could
not afford to remain in home with child if note were subject to 40-50% discount at commer-
cial rates); In re Marriage of Tammen, 63 Cal. App. 3d 927, 936, 134 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (Ist
Dist. 1976) (note given to husband to compensate for award of house to wife must have face
value high enough to be sold in market at time of divorce for value of transferred commu-
nity property interest: "[Ilts face value would most certainly be discounted by the inferiority
of its security, the long and uncertain deferment of its enjoyment, the probable effect of
inflation upon it, and the concerns of its ownership. We.. . take judicial notice. . . that it
would at least be substantially less than its face value."); In re Marriage of Boseman, 31 Cal.
App. 3d 372, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (2d Dist. 1973) (use of house awarded as child support
pending delayed property division).
324. Boseman quotes the Journal of the Assembly at length to demonstrate that the leg-
islature contemplated conditional awards of property as exceptions to equal division when it
adopted Civil Code § 4800. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 375-76, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35. jee also id
at 375 n.1, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 234 n.1 (quoting the Report of the Assembly Committee of
Judiciary): "Where an interest in a residence which serves as the home of the family is the
major community asset, an order for the immediate sale of the residence in order to comply
with the equal division mandate... would, certainly, be unnecessarily destructive of the
economic and social circumstances of the parties and their children."
Unless sale of the home would free sufficient after-tax capital to provide large enough
after-tax support payments to secure comparable housing, while permitting the capital to
appreciate at the same rate that it would in the home, using the capital to provide housing is
economically more sound. Apart from economics are important issues of familial well-be-
ing. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND
PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 182-83, 230-31 (1980). "Overall, a relatively good standard
of living and the positive effects of economic stability were very evident in the mother-child
relationship, and reflected in the child's good adjustment.
"An important aspect of the ambiance of the divorced family is that the economic status
of mother and children does not stand alone, but is . . . compared with the standard of
living which the family had enjoyed earlier .... Where there was little change. . . the
mother and children were able to deal with the situation ....
"When [a] downward change. . . followed the divorce and the discrepancy between
the father's standard of living and that of the mother and children was striking, this discrep-
ancy was often central to the life of the family and remained as a festering source of anger
and bitter preoccupation [that] over the years generated continuing bitterness between the
parents. Mother and children were likely to share in their anger at the father and to experi-
ence a pervasive sense of deprivation, sometimes depression, accompanied by a feeling that
life was unrewarding and unjust." Id. at 231.
Wallerstein and Kelly report that "the women in our study were affected by severe
economic changes more substantially and more permanently than were the men. This was
especially true in the middle and lower-class families where . . . there was little, if any,
shared property to divide." Id. at 22-23. See note 197 supra.
325. See UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY AcT § 16(b), (c)(13), (e) (Submission Draft
1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-6A-01(b), (c), 3-6A-06 (1980); N.Y. DOM.
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The Governor's Commission on the Family recommended that an
unequal division of the community be permitted when the couple's as-
sets are nominal to preserve economical housing for at least one of the
spouses. 326 If the other reforms proposed here to ensure a more equita-
ble distribution of other family assets, such as enhanced earning capac-
ity, are not adopted, it would be sensible to provide more than a use
rule for the family home. This option would candidly recognize that an
outright award of family housing to one party might in some measure
compensate for other financial disadvantages to be incurred by that
spouse in the postdivorce period.327
The Family Business
Problems may also arise in financing the immediate division of a
business. When this occurs, courts have permitted a purchase over
time of one spouse's interest.328 Although immediate division should
continue to be preferred in these cases, a distributive award with appro-
priate interest will sometimes be in order.329 Additionally, as is recog-
nized by case law, additional spousal support may be appropriate if the
delayed access to capital produces economic hardship for the spouse
REL. LAW §§ 234, 236 (Part B)(5)(f)) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See notes 38 (Nevada and
Washington provisions quoted) & 314 (setting forth Idaho statute) supra. See also the laws
of community property states cited at note 38 supra that permit an equitable distribution of
property or an award from separate property.
326. GOVERNOR'S COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 36. The Commission was also con-
cerned that needs ordinarily met through support awards might not be met in fact in some
cases unless a deviation from equal division were permitted. "The obligor may simply stop
earning sufficient money, or more likely, may simply disappear, leaving the wife and chil-
dren with no property." Id. at 45-46. These fears were based on facts that remain largely
unchanged. See B. BRYANT, AMERICAN WOMEN TODAY AND TOMORROW (1977) (reporting
data from 1975 survey: "44 percent of divorced mothers were awarded child support ...
[O]nly 47 percent [of those who received awards] were able to collect. . . regularly"); Weitz-
man & Dixon, Child Custody Awards. Legal Standards and Empirical Patternsfor Child Cus-
tody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 473, 494-99 (1979) (reporting
1968 and 1972 California awards to 80-85% of divorced mothers, slightly less than the per-
centage receiving custody, and the filing of contempt actions within one year of the order for
nonpayment in 8-26% of the cases). Use or an outright award of a home would ensure
important continuing support in cases in which abandonment is threatened or has occurred
by the time of property division. Here the concepts of lump sum support, an almost forgot-
ten but permissible support form in California, and property division approach one another.
See 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 159, at 5026 (8th ed. 1974). See note
346 & accompanying text infra.
327. On relative postdivorce wealth, see Weitzman & Dixon, Alimony Myth, supra note
13, at 177-78; notes 197, 324 & 326 supra. See also note 350 infra.
328. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 305-06 supra.
329. In contrast to the house cases, there would ordinarily be no need to provide support
for the party retaining the business through interest-free use of the other spouse's capital.
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whose interest is being purchased.330
Pensions
Serious problems exist concerning the treatment of pensions. Be-
cause of the pressure to amass assets at divorce to offset the inflated
equity in the family home, many women have traded important inter-
ests in their spouses' pensions for the ability to stay in the home.331 The
wisdom of robbing Peter to pay Paul in this context is doubtful. In
many cases, no sufficient basis for making an accurate appraisal of the
current value of a pension is available, and seriously incorrect division
formulas have been used and espoused. 332 Those who turn to actuaries
for appraisals may not recognize questionable legal assumptions that
may be incorporated into an actuary's analysis. 333
330. Inre Marriage of Stallcup, 97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 158 Cal. Rptr. 679 (3d Dist. 1979).
331. See, e.g.,Inre Marriage of Marx, 97 Cal. App. 3d 552, 159 Cal. Rptr. 215 (2d Dist.
1979). Cf. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 588 (1979) (wife asserted interest in
husband's pension because, "[a]s [husband's] counsel bluntly put it, [wife] wants the house").
332. See, e.g.,In re Marriage of Poppe, 97 Cal. App. 3d 1, 158 Cal. Rptr. 500 (4th Dist.
1979); In re Marriage of Adams, 64 Cal. App. 3d 181, 134 Cal. Rptr. 298 (2d Dist. 1976).
Not surprisingly, there has been a tendency to apply, even inappropriately, a simple "time
rule," which allocates ownership interests by comparing covered time during marital cohabi-
tation, when earnings are community property, with covered separate property periods,
rather than measuring the actual community and separate property monetary contributions.
See In re Marriage of Poppe, 97 Cal. App. 3d 1, 158 Cal. Rptr. 500 (4th Dist. 1979);
DiFranza & Parkyn, Dividing Pensions on MaritalDissolution, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 464, 466, 468
(1980) (failing to indicate that the rule developed in defined benefit cases and may be irrele-
vant to defined contribution plans); Hardie, Pay Now or Later: Alternatives in the Disposition
o/Retirement Bene.fts on Divorce, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 106, 111 (1978) (noting that uncertainties
affecting vesting or maturation do not exist in valuing a defined contribution plan, in con-
trast to a defined benefit plan); Hardie & Reisman, Employee Benet Plans and Divorce:
Type ofPlan, Date ofRetirement, and Income Tax Consequences as Factors in Dispositions, 5
COMMUNITY PROP. J. 179, 180-81 (1978). The time rule is useful with respect to defined
benefit plans, in which benefits reflect some factor (such as final earnings) that does not
correspond directly to cash contributions to the fund. Hardie, supra, at 107-08. It is, how-
ever, unnecessary and inappropriate when more precise valuation can easily be achieved, for
example, with respect to defined contribution plans, in which past and future growth is
based on a specific dollar fund that may be traced directly to community and separate earn-
ings. Id. at 107. For a discussion of the relevance of nonliquidity and tax benefits in deter-
mining present value, see Stanley, Financial Theory and the Valuation ofDeflned Contribution
Retirement Accounts in a Community Property Divorce, 5 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 57 (1978).
333. In one article, for example, a lawyer and an actuary, concerned that an employee
may quit or be fired before retirement rights vest, suggest a formula to account for the dan-
ger of nonvesting that makes no reference to either job turnover statistics or the employee's
possible guarantee of job security. DiFranza & Parkyn, Dividing Pensions on Marital Disso-
lution, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 464, 466 (1980). They then extend their reasoning to the case of a
person who has a vested right but may or may not choose to stay with the employer until the
first available retirement date. Id. Cf. In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 423, 629
P.2d 1, 5, 174 Cal. Rptr. 493, 496 (1981) (spouse cannot, by invoking condition wholly within
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The amounts involved, even in middle-class divorces, can be large.
The margin for error, given assumptions about longevity, salaries, and
inflation, is great. In most cases, both spouses would be better served in
the long run with an approach that preserves old-age security for each,
and separates this issue from a search for current liquidity. More than
one solution is available. First, the court should normally retain juris-
diction for division if and when payments are received or are entitled to
be received. 334 If pension plans can be encouraged to permit an imme-
diate splitting of pension interests, so that each spouse immediately be-
comes the owner of a smaller individual pension, the process will be
simplified.335 In any event, efforts should be made to standardize
valuations.336
Ownership principles should control, and no forfeiture of interests,
his or her control, defeat community interest of other spouse in pension). See also In re
Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 786, 582 P.2d 96, 100, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13 (1978);
Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 472, 492 P.2d 13, 20, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 332 (1972).
334. In re Marriage of Skaden, 19 Cal. 3d 679, 566 P.2d 249, 139 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1977)
(holding that whether or not to retain jurisdiction lies within the trial court's discretion).
Courts have often chosen to maintain jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21
Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978); In re Marriage of Wilson, 10 Cal. 3d 851,
519 P.2d 165, 112 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1974); In re Marriage of Poppe, 97 Cal. App. 3d 1, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 500 (4th Dist. 1979); In re Marriage of Judd, 68 Cal. App. 3d 515, 137 Cal. Rptr. 318
(1st Dist. 1977); In re Marriage of Adams, 64 Cal. App. 3d 181, 134 Cal. Rptr. 298 (2d Dist.
1976); In re Marriage of Anderson, 64 Cal. App. 3d 36, 134 Cal. Rptr. 252 (2d Dist. 1976); In
re Marriage of Freiberg, 57 Cal. App. 3d 304, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (4th Dist. 1976).
The nonemployee spouse's right to elect payment when the retirement benefit matures
has been recognized by case law. In re Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 629 P.2d 1, 174
Cal. Rptr. 493 (1981); In re Marriage of Luciano, 104 Cal. App. 3d 956, 164 Cal. Rptr. 93
(5th Dist. 1980). The rule is sound and should be retained.
335. This comports with the recommendation of the President's Commission on Pension
Policy. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NA-
TIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 2, 45 (1981) ("In cases of separation or divorce, the
pension entitlement earned during the marriage should be divisible."). This solution has
been instituted with respect to all civil service pensions in West Germany. BGB § 1587bi,
II. See note 336 infra.
336. Splitting in kind would require decisions regarding the guidelines that would gov-
ern each of the resulting individual pensions. In the case of defined benefit plans, the role of
the employee spouse's subsequent work history in determining benefits to the nonemployee
spouse's plan would have to be articulated. Should a negotiated buy-out occur, the present
value of the purchased interest would have to be determined, as under current law. The
amount would be best ascertained according to a formula developed for the particular pen-
sion scheme that accurately reflects the plan's insurance principles. As to large pension
plans, the Commission should investigate the possibility of developing plan-specific com-
puter programs to value the interests of employees at the time of divorce, the cost to be
borne by the plan or its divorcing members, as seems appropriate. It is possible that satisfac-
tory valuation tools could be developed that would entail dramatically less total cost, yet
provide more sophisticated and consistent results than the individual, varying estimates cur-
rently provided by private experts.
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as currently prescribed by the Benson337 and Waite338 cases, should be
permitted. The problems of the elderly poor will be exacerbated in the
coming decades as the "baby boom" approaches old age and the Social
Security System is subjected to increasing stress. Those who have
taken unduly small returns on community property pension rights, the
inevitable result of an inherently conservative valuation process, may
well regret this step as they approach old age,339 and the taxpaying
public will share in the costs of their unfortunate choice.
Life Insurance
The current rules on life insurance are workable and should be
retained.34o Correction of a Judicial Council form, however, is in or-
der. This form requests information on cash value, implying that cash
value is the appropriate measure for division-a rule that excludes
term insurance from division and may inaccurately reflect the sensible
disposition of whole life insurance.341 The form instead should require
information about face value and premium costs. Retention of owner-
ship interests is the only reasonable disposition possible for term insur-
ance unless replacement coverage is purchased; a statute might
appropriately indicate this fact.
Tort Recoveries, Disability Pay, and Workers' Compensation
The basic rule of Civil Code section 4800(c) should be retained,
but should be amended to remove forfeitures and to incorporate other
forms of injury recompense, as discussed above.342
Enhanced Earning Capacity
Once the value of enhanced earning capacity has been recognized,
several possible remedies are available. The willingness of trial courts
337. See notes 132-36 & accompanying text supra.
338. See notes 137-42 & accompanying text supra.
339. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE:
TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 21-38 (1981); Lapkoff, Working Wo-
men, Marriage, and Retirement ix (August 1980) (Working paper for the President's Com-
mission on Pension Policy): "[Aln alarmingly high proportion of elderly poor are women,
either single, divorced, or widowed. Roughly three-fourths of aged units with incomes be-
low the poverty line are unmarried women. These elderly poor represent over one-third of
all aged widows and divorced women. As their age increases, even a higher proportion of
women, 42 percent over age 72, live in poverty." (Citations omitted.)
340. See note 86 & accompanying text supra.
341. See CAL. CIv. & CRiM. CT. R. 1285.5 (West 1981).
342. See text following note 142 supra.
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to value and divide this asset equally cannot yet be assessed.343 Even if
In re Marriage of Sullivan is reaffirmed following rehearing, there is
reason to believe that courts will frequently opt for reimbursement
rather than equal division and that purported division cases will dis-
play valuation disparities of the sort currently found in the goodwill
cases. This view is supported by the fact that all progress prior to Sulli-
van occurred in states that are free to award less than one half of the
asset's ascertained value, or to base an award on some measure other
than the increased capacity itself, such as lump sum support or restitu-
tion of costs incurred.344
In some equitable division states, the contribution of a spouse to
the career or career potential of the other spouse is by statute a factor to
be considered in the division of marital assets.345 Because the overall
division must be equitable and not necessarily equal, this scheme per-
mits great latitude in the impact of a decision to value the property
interest. It is difficult to gauge the depth of resistance to a property
division of spouses' enhanced earning capacities. To the extent that it
exists, a rule that would not require equal division seems more likely to
gain legislative approval. An alternate remedy such as nonmodiflable
lump sum support could provide both flexibility and certain practical
advantages,346 but should be considered only if structured to promote
adequate, enforceable awards. 347
343. See notes 175-90 & accompanying text supra.
344. See note 172 & accompanying text supra.
345. E.g, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (Part B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1981). "As of
1979, some 22 states have recognized the validity of [the] argument [in favor of valuing
homemakers' services] and by statute or court decision authorize the divorce court to con-
sider contributions as a homemaker, or parent, to the career of the other party, and to the
well-being of the family, in determining property distribution or setting the amount of ali-
mony or maintenance. Those states are Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vir-
ginia and Wisconsin." Foster & Freed, Law and the Family, N.Y.L.J., October 31, 1979, at
1, col. 1.
346. Support awards are eligible for a greater variety of enforcement techniques. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 658, 662(c) (Supp. 1981) (garnishment of federal pay); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4801.6 (West Supp. 1982) (assignment of wages). Although lump-sum spousal support
ordinarily is not deductible to the payor and includable by the payee for federal income tax
purposes, if payment were ordered over a period exceeding ten years under a distributive
award similar to that recommended for property dispositions, deductibility and includability
should be available under I.R.C. §§ 71 and 215. Finally, support orders survive the obligor's
bankruptcy; obligations under property awards do not. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 (4), 523(a) (Supp.
III 1979). But see notes 326 supra & 350 infra.
347. Clearly, there is little in traditional practice to support optimism about the court's
willingness to make adequate spousal support orders. See Weitzman & Dixon, Alimony
Myth, supra note 13. See also notes 324, 326, and 327 supra. Accordingly, if a lump sum
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How this decision on valuation and disposition is struck will have
major financial effects, especially for women, who-with only few ex-
ceptions--continue their traditional deference to their husbands' career
needs.348 Professor Krauskopf endorses unjust enrichment as a meas-
urement tool, noting that this standard sometimes reimburses costs in-
curred and sometimes compensates for the value of benefits
conferred. 349 Unjust enrichment principles should be articulated and
codified,350 either as principles of property law or as factors to control
the setting of lump sum support awards. In either case, distributive
awards should become the normal form of recovery for this interest if
divorce occurs before substantial assets have been acquired.
Abandonment
Civil Code section 4800(b)(3) permits the court to award all the
couple's community and quasi-community property to one spouse
when the other spouse cannot be located and the property is worth less
than $5,000.351 The section is apparently a response to the need to pro-
support approach is pursued, a specific section should be drafted, drawing the court's atten-
tion to the relevant equitable principles, in order that this relief does not become subsumed
and trivialized in the more traditional awards that are customary under Civil Code § 4801.
348. Professor Prager has noted that even in a world in which men and women have
equal career opportunities it will often be necessary for one spouse to make career sacrifices
to promote the other's advancement, for example, when a promotion requires relocation.
See generally Prager, Sharing Princples and the Future ofMaritalProperty Law, 25 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1, 7-11 (1977). "Although most husbands and wives [in two-career families] said
that their careers were equally important, in practice they tended to reflect traditional pat-
terms. Couples most frequently chose their current location because of the husband's job
opportunities, and about twice as many husbands as wives had relocated for their own ca-
reers." CATALYST CAREER AND FAMILY CENTER, CORPORATIONS AND Two-CAREER FAM-
ILIES: DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 4 (1981).
349. Krauskopf, Recompense, supra note 170, at 391-92.
350. It may, for example, sometimes be thought relevant that both spouses have freely
continued their educations for a similar period during marriage, although in differing fields.
If one spouse completes a doctorate in political science and obtains employment as a college
professor while the other becomes a veterinarian, there may be no inequity in allowing the
parties to go forth without equalizing their enhanced earning capacities. The equities would
be different, however, if the costs incurred in securing the educations were disparate, or a
potential computer engineer decided to study or work in a non-lucrative field such as art
history or elementary education because the couple agreed that the other spouse's well-paid
legal career would provide the family's financial security.
It should be emphasized, however, that such equitable considerations are concededly
irrelevant to most questions of property definition and division, where the equal ownership
and division concept has been uniformly adhered to since 1970. If no equitable considera-
tions are to be entertained in other areas in which 50-50 division harms women's interests, it
would be difficult to justify their adoption here, as the overall financial impact would once
again be to the significant detriment of women. See note 327 & accompanying text supra.
351. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(3) (West Supp. 1981), set forth at note 2 supra.
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tect abandoned spouses that was identified by the Governor's Commis-
sion on the Family.352 More consistent with property and support
theory would be the deletion of this provision and an express grant of
authority to the court to make lump sum spousal and child support
awards from an abandoning spouse's community or separate property
to supplement or replace periodic support payments that are likely to
be unenforceable. 353
Deliberate Misappropriation
As an offset or award "from a party's share," the divorce court is
authorized to compensate the other spouse for deliberate misappropria-
tion from the community and quasi-community property.354 This sub-
section requires minor amendments. First, it should be reworded to
make clear that the wrong to be compensated is improper management
behavior. 355 Next, jurisdiction should be granted to determine mis-
management issues and enter a damages award that may be satisfied
with property before the court.356 Finally, the reference to quasi-mari-
tal property should be removed or clarified.357
352. See note 326 supra.
353. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4700, 4801, 4806, 4807 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981); 6 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Husband and Wfe, §§ 156(3), 159(3) (8th ed.
1974). Lump sum spousal support, like child support and property awards such as those
authorized by § 4800(b)(3), is neither deductible by the payor on a federal income tax return
nor includable to the recipient unless the amount is paid over a period exceeding 10 years.
I.R.C. §§ 71, 215. Child support, when combined with spousal support and not specifically
"fixed," is treated in the same fashion as spousal support. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S.
299 (1961). In contrast to property awards, however, lump sum support awards cannot be
discharged in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4), 523(a)(5) (Supp. III 1979).
A specific dollar limit on such awards would be inappropriate, as families' needs and
circumstances will differ. Property beyond that needed for support should be subject to the
sole management of the abandoned spouse under provisions generally available for manage-
ment when one spouse is unavailable. See Bruch, Management Powers, supra note 1I, at
n.175.
354. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(2) (West Supp. 1981) set forth at note 2 supra.
355. Bruch, Management Powers, supra note 11, at nn.28-3 1.
356. The current language is ambiguous and capable of being misread to preclude a
money judgment if community assets are insufficient to compensate the harm fully. To per-
mit an efficient judicial process, the court's jurisdiction should be extended to permit en-
forcement against separate property in the same action.
357. If, as is recommended, quasi-community property is absorbed into community
property, the reference should be deleted. See notes 229-32 & accompanying text supra. If
quasi-community property remains a distinct property form, thought should be given to
what restrictions on its management and alienation may appropriately be imposed prior to
dissolution. Until dissolution, quasi-community property is technically the separate prop-
erty of the spouse who acquired it.
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Debts
The rules for division of debt require three major reforms: debts
should be classified as separate or community for division purposes, the
mode of division should reflect the parties' relative responsibilities for
payment, and it should be possible to bind creditors as well as the par-
ties to a nonfraudulent division.
The first step, distinguishing separate and community debts, would
implement the definition of the debt system proposed above.358 Debts
that have been of special benefit to one spouse's separate property or
were incurred in breach of the good faith management obligation
should be assigned to that spouse as separate debts. In contrast to the
separate-versus-community debt rules of some community property
states, 359 this distinction would have no impact on creditor access dur-
ing marriage, but would be relevant only for the purpose of division at
divorce or upon the death of one spouse.
Second, separate debts would not be offset against the community
property in determining an equal division of the couple's assets. Com-
munity debts, in contrast, would ordinarily be charged against the
property, but those incurred for family support would be divided ac-
cording to the parties' relative abilities to pay.360
358. See notes 282-88 & accompanying text supra.
359. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-9 (1978).
360. The details of allocation should be worked out once the underlying definitions of
community and separate property have been determined. Areas of special concern include
postseparation debts, debts for family support, and educational debts. In the context of
current law, the following proposed amendment to Civil Code § 4800 suggests appropriate
rules:
"(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the court may divide the community property
and quasi-community property of the parties as follows:
"(4) Debts incurred during marriage for which the community property is liable shall
be divided according to the provisions of this paragraph. In so doing the court may order
that individual items of debt be satisfied out of the community property or assigned to one
party or the other, in whole or in part, to accomplish the overall division prescribed by this
paragraph. Such allocation shall be without prejudice to the rights of third parties.
"(i) Debts incurred for the support of the parties' children shall be allocated according
to the parties' relative abilities to pay.
"(ii) Educational loans shall be assigned to the spouse receiving the education, in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances rendering such disposition unjust.
"(iii) Liabilities subject to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of section 5122 shall be as-
signed to the spouse whose act or omission provided the basis for the liability.
"(iv) Debts incurred following the parties' separation that are not allocated under sub-
paragraph (i) shall be apportioned between the parties as the court deems just and equitable.
"(v) Debts not distributed under subparagraphs (i) to (iv), inclusive, shall be divided
equally.
"(vi) Notwithstanding subparagraph (v), to the extent that the total of the debts to be
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The final reform would protect the legitimate concerns of credi-
tors, yet replace the provisions of current law that sometimes provide a
creditor windfall. If a divorce decree assigns a debt to a spouse who
did not initially incur it, current law permits a general creditor 36 1 to
demand postdivorce payment from the assets of either spouse: the
spouse who incurred the debt is liable as a matter of contract or tort
law, the other spouse according to the provisions of the decree.362 Even
if the debt is assigned to the spouse who originally incurred it, however,
the creditor is permitted to proceed against former community property
in the hands of either spouse, up to the value that it had at the time of
property division.363 This rule has two undesirable features. First,
distributed under subparagraph (v) exceeds the total of the value of the community prop-
erty, the excess of debt shall be allocated between the parties as the court deems just and
equitable, taking into account the parties' relative abilities to pay and the distribution of any
related assets." See Cal. A.B. 3621 (Waters and Fazio) (1978) ?authors' amendments offered
in committee). The educational loan provision was enacted. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800(b)(4)
(West Supp. 1981), set forth at note 2 supra.
361. For the purposes of this discussion, creditors are referred to as either lien creditors
or general creditors. Lien creditors are creditors with interests in specific items of property
whose claims are based upon statutory, consensual or judicial liens. Statutory liens, such as
mechanics liens, arise by operation of law. Consensual liens, either secured transactions or
mortgages, arise by agreement of the parties. Judicial liens, such as those arising upon the
filing of abstracts of judgment, entail formal legal proceedings. Creditors who do not enjoy
the protection of such formalized interests in specific items of property are, by contrast,
general creditors. Absent a transfer in fraud of creditors, these creditors ordinarily may not
follow property that once belonged to the debtor into the hands of a transferee, but rather
must satisfy their claims from property owned by the debtor at the time that collection on
the debt is made. California, however, has developed a special rule that benefits creditors
after divorce. See note 363 & accompanying text infra.
362. Although the creditor, as a nonparty, is not bound by the decree, the spouse is. But
Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4358 (West Supp. 1981) (creditor has no right to enforce the court's
order). The textual discussion concerns debts incurred by only one spouse. If both spouses
are responsible out of separate property because they both dealt directly with the creditor,
the creditor should retain access to the assets of both after divorce, but the spouse who was
not assigned the debt in the divorce should be permitted to insist that the creditor first seek
satisfaction from the other spouse's assets. Cf. Mayberry v. Whittier, 144 Cal. 322, 78 P. 16
(1904) (former wife who was liable out of community but not separate property after divorce
could insist that former husband's creditor resort first to his assets). It would be possible to
analogize purchases of necessaries to this rule, because the separate property of the non-
acting spouse is also implicated as a matter of law by the transaction that incurred the debt.
However, as debt allocation at divorce should reflect the parties' relative abilities to pay for
such support needs, and the creditor dealt with only one spouse, policy supports analogizing
these cases to others in which only one spouse directly assumed liability.
363. During marriage a general creditor may seek satisfaction from the community
property and the debtor spouse's separate property. After divorce, although normal credi-
tor-debtor principles would require that the creditor seek satisfaction only from the debtor
spouse, California law also permits the creditor to pursue former community property that is
now the separate property of the nondebtor spouse. See Frankel v. Boyd, 106 Cal. 608, 39 P.
939 (1895) (husband's creditor permitted to demand payment from former community prop-
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when the debt has been reassigned at divorce,364 the creditor receives
two primary debtors in place of one.365 Second, permitting access to all
former community property, absent a lien366 against the property, ele-
vates the position of general creditors to a status akin to that ordinarily
reserved to lien creditors. 367
The reform model should analogize the ending of a marriage to
the winding up of a corporation:368 absent a fraudulent conveyance,3 69
a divorce decree should be capable of substituting one spouse for the
erty owned by wife; wife had received 100% of the community assets at divorce and husband
had no separate property); Ryan v. Souza, 155 Cal. App. 2d 213, 317 P.2d 655 (3d Dist.
1957) (dictum that recovery is limited to the value of the property at the time of divorce); see
also Kinney v. Vallentyne, 15 Cal. 3d 475, 541 P.2d 537, 124 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1975) (dist-
inguishing Ryan as concerning a judgment lien that attached after the division of commu-
nity property, without reaching the question of proper creditor access on such facts). This
doctrine originated under fault-based divorce in Frankel, in which community property
went to only one spouse at divorce, leaving the other spouse without assets. Although Fran-
kel should be read as a fraudulent conveyance case on its facts and because the court analo-
gized to that concept, later cases have assumed that it would always be appropriate for the
creditors to follow property into a former spouse's hands. Compare Frankel v. Boyd, 106
Cal. 608, 39 P. 939 (1885) with Bank of America v. Mantz, 4 Cal. 2d 322, 49 P.2d 279 (1935);
Harley v. Whitmore, 242 Cal. App. 2d 461, 51 Cal. Rptr. 468 (lst Dist. 1966); Greene v.
Wilson, 208 Cal. App. 2d 852, 25 Cal. Rptr. 630 (2d Dist. 1962); Ryan v. Souza, 155 Cal.
App. 2d 213, 317 P.2d 655 (3d Dist. 1957); Vest v. Superior Ct., 140 Cal. App. 2d 91, 294
P.2d 988 (Ist Dist. 1956). But see Gould v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 18, 57 Cal. Rptr. 23 (2d
Dist. 1967) (holding property settlement that transferred community property to wife and
left husband with debts rendering him insolvent constituted fraudulent conveyance).
364. This may happen frequently-for example, because one spouse handled most of
the couple's dealings with creditors, or because an asset that was purchased on credit by one
spouse was awarded to the other, together with the balance due.
365. A credit collection agency manager reports that the majority of their postdivorce
collections are for unpaid medical bills and bad checks, and that it is common for the person
from whom they are seeking payment to resist initially, arguing that the debt was assigned to
the other spouse in the divorce settlement. Telephone conversation with Martin Marion,
General Manager, Northwest Creditors Service, Sacramento, California (Aug. 1, 1980). The
distress caused those who later learn that the divorce decree did not end their obligations to
creditors has been common enough to prompt legislative action. Divorcing spouses must
now be informed that their continuing liabilities to third parties may be inconsistent with
their interspousal rights as established by the divorce decree. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.6
(West Supp. 1981).
366. "Lien" for purposes of this discussion is defined in note 361 supra.
367. A lien creditor may obtain satisfaction to the extent possible from subject property,
including access to appreciated value. Kinney v. Vallentyne, 15 Cal. 3d 475, 541 P.2d 537,
124 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1975). Contrast the "market value at divorce" restriction articulated for
general creditors Ryan v. Souza, 155 Cal. App. 2d 213, 317 P.2d 655 (3d Dist. 1957).
368. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2004, 2005, 2009 (West 1977) (protecting creditors when
distributing corporate assets upon dissolution). Section 2004 authorizes the distribution of
remaining corporate assets to shareholders "[a]fter determining that all the known debts and
liabilities. . . have been paid or adequately provided for ... " Section 2005 explains
"adequate provision" as follows:
"The payment of a debt or liability, whether the whereabouts of the creditor is known
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other as the person to whom the creditor may turn following divorce.
All the property in that spouse's possession, however and whenever ac-
quired, would become liable to the creditor's suit, and the original
debtor spouse would be completely relieved of responsibility for the
debt.370 Provisions for notifying and binding creditors to such non-
fraudulent agreements should be patterned after those now in use for
pension plans and the division of pensions. 371 Creditors would thereby
become parties to and bound by the adjudication, except that they
would remain free to litigate questions of fraudulent conveyance. 372 If
a debt is assigned to the spouse who initially incurred it, normal credi-
tor access rules should control: the debtor should remain liable for
payment from all property sources, but property in the hands of the
other spouse should be free of all creditor access, unless a lien was pres-
ent at the time of division or the divorce agreement was in fraud of the
creditor's rights.
or unknown, has been adequately provided for if the payment has been provided for by
either of the following means:
"(a) Payment thereof has been assumed or guaranteed in good faith by one or more
financially responsible corporations or other persons or by the United States government or
any agency thereof, and the provision (including the financial responsibility of such corpora-
tions or other persons) was determined in good faith and with reasonable care by the board
to be adequate at the time of any distribution of the assets by the board pursuant to this
chapter.
"(b) The amount of the debt or liability has been deposited as provided in Section 2008.
"This section does not prescribe the exclusive means of making adequate provision for
debts and liabilities."
369. See note 372 infra.
370. Mr. Marion estimates that 90% of his office's collections are by execution against
wages, with another 5% involving levies against savings accounts, checking accounts, and
safety deposits. Although some automobile levies are made, the lengthy delay in collecting
against realty is so disadvantageous that this collection avenue is rarely employed. Tele-
phone conversation with Martin Marion, General Manager, Northwest Creditors Service,
Sacramento, California (Aug. 1, 1980). The firm's current practice is to pursue both former
spouses with respect to any debts incurred during marriage. Because of the problems the
firm has encountered with collections that are inconsistent with the terms of a divorce agree-
ment, Mr. Marion is receptive to a system that would provide the creditor with the clear
designation of one liable spouse and an opportunity to pursue fraudulently conveyed assets
in the other spouse's possession.
371. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4363-4363.2 (West Supp. 1981).
372. If the debt allocation rules proposed above were adopted, it would be unusual for a
property settlement agreement or court order to bring about insolvency when it did not
already exist. Fraudulent intent would accordingly remain the primary basis for a later
creditor challenge to division. If the creditor chose to appear and participate in the divorce
hearing in response to the notice of intended substitution of debtors, no later attack would
be available. A reasonable statute of limitations should be provided for challenges to fraud-
ulent conveyances.
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At Death
To the extent feasible, the policies that control ownership and divi-
sion of community property in the divorce context should apply to the
distribution of community assets upon the death of one spouse. Surely
a surviving spouse should not receive less favorable treatment than a
divorced spouse. Current law, however, permits such disparity.373 The
following discussion identifies current problems in the treatment of in-
trafamilial property interests at death and makes suggestions to con-
form this treatment to the proposals for definition and division outlined
above in the divorce context.
Conforming Ownershio Princples
Pensions and Death Benefits
If a nonemployee spouse dies survived by a spouse who will re-
ceive community property retirement benefits, the decedent's estate has
no interest in those future payments374 under an application of the
Waite terminable interest doctrine.375 This contrasts with a divorced
spouse's right to receive a lump sum in compensation for his or her lost
interest.376 The terminable interest rule should be legislatively over-
ruled, and the decedent's community share in the yet-to-be-received
retirement benefits377 should be subject to the testamentary disposition
of the nonemployee spouse.378
Disability and Tort Recoveries
Community property personal injury recoveries result in equal
ownership interests at the time of either spouse's death.379 Although
373. See the discussion of the terminable interest rule in notes 137-41 & accompanying
text supra, and the discussions of quasi-community property, the item theory of property
division, debts, and support rights in notes 387-90, 392-96, 401-07 & accompanying text
infra.
374. Estate of Allen, 108 Cal. App. 3d 614, 166 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1st Dist. 1980).
375. See notes 137-41 & accompanying text supra.
376. Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 474 n.9, 492 P.2d 13, 22 n.9, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 334
n.9 (1972).
377. The ownership interest should extend to benefits payable upon the death of the
retired spouse as well as to those to be received during that person's lifetime. See text ac-
companying notes 132-36 supra.
378. This would parallel the rule that applies to a deceased spouse's ownership interest
in a life insurance policy held on the life of the surviving spouse. See Scott v. Commis-
sioner, 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967) (wife's testamentary beneficiary held her interest in
policy until insured died). Because the nonemployee's interest would be community prop-
erty, in case of intestacy it would pass automatically to the surviving spouse. CAL. PROB.
CODE §§ 201, 202 (West 1956 & Supp. 1981).
379. The rule currently applies to recoveries from third parties; it is recommended that it
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this result is acceptable if the injured spouse dies first, it can produce
serious injustice if that person is the surviving spouse, and has continu-
ing special needs. Ownership at death should conform to ownership at
divorce, when the rules of division assume that the recovery will go
entirely to the injured spouse, subject to the court's authority to award
as much as one half to the other spouse in the interests of justice. 380
Enhanced Earning Capacity
If a spouse whose earning capacity was enhanced during marriage
outlives his or her partner, the community investment in the survivor's
human capital will of necessity go to that person. 381 Although strict
ownership principles would suggest that the estate should have a claim
for its interest, the result seems strained. Instead, it would be more
reasonable to assume that the spouses contemplated sharing the bene-
fits of this investment only during their lifetimes, and that the asset is
subject to an implied survivorship right in its possessor.382
Quasi-Marital Property
If the marital property and support rights of putative spouses are
equated with those of legal spouses, 383 the probate implications of their
ownership rights will be clarified automatically. 384 If they are not, spe-
cific language should be adopted to equate the treatment of a surviving
putative spouse with that of a legal spouse in all respects, 385 and to
clarify the rights of a meretricious spouse following the death of the
putative spouse to whom he or she was "married. 3
86
be extended to interspousal recoveries and to certain disability and worker's compensation
benefits as well. See notes 146, 154-55 & accompanying text supra.
380. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(c) (West Supp. 1981) (assignment of community prop-
erty personal injury damages), set forth at note 2 supra.
381. See notes 170-201 & accompanying text supra.
382. Cf. the reasoning concerning disability insurance recoveries in the text accompany-
ing notes 155-56 supra.
383. See notes 216-26 & accompanying text supra, making this recommendation.
384. Implementation would nevertheless require conforming amendments in the Pro-
bate Code. See note 385 infra.
385. Specifically, the putative spouse's right to inherit separate property as a surviving
spouse needs to be affirmed, overruling the contrary decision in Estate of Levie, 50 Cal. App.
3d 572, 123 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1st Dist. 1975). Bigamy cases are adequately treated by case law
and should remain subject to equitable rather than statutory authority. See notes 227-28 &
accompanying text supra.
386. The treatment provided at divorce should be paralleled in the probate setting. See
notes 222-26 & accompanying text supra, arguing that marital property rights should be
distinguished from damage claims that might be asserted by the deceived spouse. Equitable
considerations that might affect support rights at divorce should be made applicable to fam-
ily allowance and probate homestead rights. A formerly putative spouse should not be held
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Quasi-Community Property
Only the full absorption of quasi-community property into com-
munity property will provide completely satisfactory results.387 If that
goal is not achieved, certain more limited reforms are recommended.
First, survivor's election provisions should be modified to conform to
those for community property estates. 388 Second, and more impor-
tantly, the ability of a spouse to devise one-half of all quasi-community
property, without regard to which spouse first acquired it, should be
affirmed.389 Finally, the debt allocation provisions applicable to the
estates of other married persons should be framed in a way that equally
serves the needs of these families.390
Bifurcated Divorces in Which There has been no Property Division
Family allowance and probate homestead provisions should be ex-
panded to permit reasonable treatment for a surviving spouse whose
divorce was final, but who had not yet received a property division at
the time of the decedent's death.39'
Rules for Division
Item Versus Aggregate Theory
A divorce court may make an overall equal division of the com-
munity property and need not attempt to divide each item equally,
to have forfeited rights by continued cohabitation with the decedent after learning of the
defect in their marriage. See notes 221-23 & accompanying text supra.
387. See notes 230-32 & accompanying text supra.
388. This would entail the repeal of Probate Code § 201.7 and the amendment of
§ 201.8, which force elections more readily than does the law of community property. In
either case, the requirement of an election should only be imposed if the testator's intent to
require an election is clearly indicated. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 201.7, 201.8 (West
Supp. 1981) with In re Cowell's Estate, 164 Cal. 636, 130 P. 209 (1913) (forcing election
pursuant to testator's intent). Section 201.8, which restricts the surviving spouse's ability to
set aside gifts to third parties of quasi-community property over which the decedent had
substantial ownership or control at the time of death, should be expanded. Cf. CAL. CIv.
CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1981) (regulation of gifts to third parties during marriage).
389. The statute had provided this result but was amended, apparently because of out-
dated concerns traceable to Estate of Thorton. See Paley v. Bank of America, 159 Cal. App.
2d 500, 324 P.2d 35 (2d Dist. 1958). See note 232 supra.
390. See notes 395-96 & accompanying text infra.
391. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 660-665, 680 (West Supp. 1981); Letters from Gerald
Lichtig, Esq., Los Angeles, to the California Law Revision Commission (Oct. 23, 1979; Feb.
25, 1980) (on fie with the author). Decedents frequently will have remarried in such cases,
requiring that either the code or equity provide rules for multiple spouses. Cf. note 225 &
accompanying text supra, discussing property division in cases of bigamy.
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even if the asset is readily divisible. 392 In contrast, if the decedent
leaves his or her community property interest to a third party, the sur-
viving spouse and the third party become tenants in common in each
asset. 393 Reform is needed to authorize the probate court, or the sur-
viving spouse, to designate equally valued shares in the aggregate es-
tate.394 The resulting rule should articulate how it is to operate if a
specific item of community property has been devised or given by
means of a will substitute to a third party so that it does not force elec-
tions in inappropriate cases.
Debts
The current probate rule for debt division, which purports to allo-
cate responsibility according to creditor access rules rather than rules of
interspousal responsibility, is unfortunate.395 It should be amended to
392. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(1) (West Supp. 1981) set forth at note 2
supra; In re Marriage of Fink, 25 Cal. 3d 877, 603 P 2d 881, 160 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1979).
393. Dargie v. Patterson, 176 Cal. 714, 169 P. 360 (1917).
394. Cf. Wisc. A.B. 370, § 861.03(3) (1981): "PROPERTY RIGHTS OF SURVIVING
SPOUSE: CHOICE OF PROPERTY. As an alternative to retaining an undivided 50%
interest in each item of marital property under sub. (1), a surviving spouse may elect his or
her one-half share of the marital property from the aggregate of marital property except as
to specific property from the decedent's share which has been otherwise disposed of by will."
The use of the term "elect" is troublesome. Apparently this choice is available to the spouse
without electing against a will, because an election against the will would provide the spouse
with a 50% ownership interest in each asset, including those "disposed of" by the will. See
id § 861.01(1). See also note 409 infra (use of will substitutes).
395. CAL. PROB. CODE § 980(e) (West Supp. 1981) provides: "In the absence of an
agreement [between the personal representative of the estate and the surviving spouse that
has been approved by the court], each debt shall be apportioned to all of theproperty of the
spouse liablefor the debt, as determined by the laws of this state, in theproportion determined
by the value of the property . . . at the date of death, and the responsibility to pay the debt
shall be allocated accordingly." (Emphasis added.) Max Gutierrez has provided a sensible
albeit somewhat forced interpretation of the section that permits the probate court to take
into account debt satisfaction rules, such as those imposed for torts by CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5122 (West Supp. 198 1). See Gutierrez, Apportionment of Debts, in CALIFORNIA CONTIN-
UING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, HANDLING DISPUTES IN PROBATE 11 (1976). One hypothet-
ical case demonstrates the deficiencies of the current law. Assume that the decedent, while
married, incurred charge account debts totalling $9,000 for a trip to Europe with a lover
shortly before death. As debts incurred during marriage, both the community property and
the decedent's separate property were liable for their repayment during the decedent's life-
time. At death, assume that the decedent's estate includes $100,000 of separate assets and
the decedent's $100,000 share of community property assets totalling $200,000 in value.
Under Probate Code § 980(e), the $9,000 debt would be allocated as follows: one-third to
the decedent's separate property, one-third to the decedent's share of the community prop-
erty, and one-third to the surviving spouse's share of the community property (also worth
$100,000). If the surviving spouse were also a signator on the charge account, his or her
separate property would also have been liable, and therefore assigned a pro rata repayment
obligation. On these facts the surviving spouse should have an offsetting claim against the
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parallel to the extent practicable the debt division rules for divorce.396
Intestate Succession
If a spouse dies without a will, California law provides that the
decedent's share of the community property will pass to the surviving
spouse.397 Descent of separate property will depend on the presence of
surviving children: the surviving spouse will receive at least one-third
of the separate property, and will receive one-half if there is no issue of
the decedent, or if there is but one child or the issue of a deceased
child.39
8
The community property rule is supported by studies that report
the expectations and preferences of married people concerning the in-
testate distribution of their property,399 and may work well in most
cases. Its soundness, however, is questionable following a second mar-
riage, if the decedent had children from a prior relationship. It is no
longer likely that the deceased would assume that the surviving spouse
would care for these children, or that the property not needed by the
surviving spouse during his or her lifetime would eventually pass to
them.40° An intestate rule that would provide for such children is
estate for the decedent's mismanagement of the community. In other cases the offset might
be less clear, although the liability was not.
396. See notes 271-88 & accompanying text supra.
397. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956 & Supp. 1981).
398. Id. §§ 221, 223. If the decedent leaves no issue, parents, siblings, or issue of sib-
lings, the entire estate goes to the surviving spouse. Id. § 224.
399. The rule is supported by surveys that report the expectations and preferences of
married people concerning the intestate distribution of their property. Fellows, Simon &
Rau, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in
the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 319, 355-64. See generally Dunham,
The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv.
241 (1963); Fellows, Simon, Snapp & Snapp, An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory
Estate Plan, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 717 (1976); Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a
Community Property Jurisdiction, 50 WASH. L. REv. 277 (1975); Note, A Comparison of
Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Unform Probate
Codes, 63 IowA L. REv. 1041 (1978).
400. Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Atiitudes About Property Distribution at Death and
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 319, 364-
68. Responses to the following question are tabulated below:
How would you like your property distributed if you are survived only by your
(wife/husband) and a minor child of your previous marriage who lives with your
former spouse?
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needed40' unless general authority is given to the probate court to pro-
vide for those who equitably deserve a share in the decedent's
wealth.40 2 If no such rule is adopted, at least the probate court should
be empowered to make an award out of the estate for the support of the
decedent's minor children. 40 3
The rule for separate property also deserves reform. Although it,
too, may be acceptable as a starting point, it provides no flexibility and
therefore may often produce inequitable results. Several common law
countries have improved their rules of both intestate and testate succes-
sion by granting the probate court powers comparable to those ac-
corded a divorce court. Special awards may be made when the welfare
of one who was dependent on the decedent or is a member of a pro-
tected class would be unfairly prejudiced by the normal probate
rules.40 4 Because the relative and absolute sizes of community and sep-
TABLE 18
Distribution of Estate Between Spouse and Child of a Prior Marriage (Percent)a
Distribution Pattern by
Percent of Estate to..
Child of Percent of Respondents
Spouse Prior Marriage in Pattern N
100 0 23.0 171
51-99 1-49 28.9 215
50 50 37.2 277
0-49 51-99 11.0 82
Total ................... 100.1 745
a5 missing cases.
Id. at 366 (reporting responses from Alabama, California, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas).
401. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2102, 14-2103 (West 1975) (providing that
one-half of the separate property and all of the decedent's share of the community property
passes to the decedent's issue in such cases). Cf. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, 2-103
(providing that one-half of the separate property and one-half of the decedent's share of the
community property passes to the children).
402. See notes 404-05 & accompanying text infra.
403. Final Report of the American Assembly on Death, Taxes and Family Property, in
DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 183, 188 (E. Halbach ed. 1977): "Some support
obligation should be imposed to provide for minor children of a decedent where an obliga-
tion of support existed during life,"
404. "Dower and curtesy originated in Britain, but those devices have disappeared from
its system. Great Britain and several commonwealth countries have substituted a form of
forced provision which is very different from that which developed in this country. Instead
of providing a fixed fraction of the decedent spouse's estate, they have provided that the
disinherited surviving spouse is entitled to some portion of the estate if he or she is in need.
The share that will be given will be determined in accordance with his or her need, and it
may take the form of periodic payments or a lump sum payment, whichever fits the circum-
stances. If no need can be shown, the disinherited spouse has no claim against the estate. It
should also be noted that minor children, and even those of age, who can show need are
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arate property estates will vary widely, it is impossible for a blanket
rule to provide adequately for all cases.40 5 Especially in an era of mul-
tiple marriages and increasing nonmarital unions, greater precision is
needed than current statutes provide.
Testate Succession
For the same reasons that current intestacy laws do not always
operate sensibly, the present rules that grant only limited rights to a
surviving spouse and pretermitted heirs to challenge a will are inade-
quate. The ability of a spouse whose wealth is predominantly separate
property to disinherit a surviving spouse completely has been soundly
criticized.40 6 Here, too, it is unlikely that an arbitrary rule will provide
sensible results. The success of Lousiana and foreign countries with
discretionary relief recommends its adoption in California.40 7
Even if a spouse has been amply provided for by will, he or she
may wish to challenge certain of the decedent's attempted dispositions.
The rules controlling survivors' elections require attention. If an aggre-
gate theory of probate administration replaces the current item theory,
it would be possible to permit a spouse to request certain community
similarly protected." Haskell, Restraints Upon the Disinheritance of Family Aembers, in
DEATH, TAXEs AND FAMILY PROPERTY 105, 108 (E. Halbach ed. 1977). "Under the [Eng-
lish Administration of Estates Act 1925], if the decedent leaves no relatives to whom his
estate will pass, the Crown is authorized to grant an ex gratia payment to dependents and
others 'for whom the intestate might reasonably have been expected to make provision.'
[The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975] goes further, authorizing
any person who was dependent on the decedent at the time of death to request a portion of
the estate for maintenance either in case of intestacy or if the survivor was not adequately
provided for by the decedent's will. These provisions. . . do not matchthe Act's solicitude
for.. . legal spouses, who are entitled to a 'reasonable' award, whether or not it is required
for support purposes." Bruch, Nonmarital Cohabitation in the Common Law Countries: A
Study in Judicial-Legislative Interaction, 29 AMER. J. CoMp. L. 217, 231 (1981) (footnotes
omitted). See generally id at 231-32 regarding the laws of Ontario, New Zealand, Western
Australia, South Australia, and New South Wales.
405. "Most jurisdictions assure the surviving spouse a specific fraction (typically, one-
third) of the estate, regardless of the donor's expressed wishes and regardless of the spouse's
need, the size and sources of the estate, or the duration of the marriage. Particularly to be
considered are flexible provisions rather than fixed percentages. (Incidentally, it also was
noted that the rights of the surviving spouse, in the event of death without a will, are gener-
ally too little to reflect what most property-owners wish to make for spouses, as shown by
empirical studies.)" Final Report of the American Assembly on Death, Taxes and Family
,Propery, in DEATH, TAxEs AND FAMILY PROPERTY 183, 187-88 (E. Halbach ed. 1977).
406. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, Separate-Propery Aarriages, supra note 50, at 414-18;
Niles, Probate Reform in California, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 191 (1979): "With respect to
separate property, the rights of a surviving spouse in California are wholly inadequate by
standards prevailing in most states."
407. See notes 315-16 & accompanying text supra (Louisiana law); notes 404-05 supra
(other countries).
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property assets that the decedent had left to another without forcing an
election. 40 8 Simultaneously, the court could be authorized, for good
cause, to deny such a request if the surviving spouse's overall rights had
been secured. In this connection, an "augmented estate" concept
should be adopted. 40 9 If completely fungible assets, such as money,
have been left by will substitute to a third party, a spouse should not be
permitted to assert a community interest in those assets if the total por-
tion of the community estate passing to the survivor by will substitute,
intestacy, and testate devise equals in value that portion of the aug-
mented estate to which the spouse would be entitled under intestate
law.410 Intestate, testate, and discretionary or forced share provisions
should be formulated in light of the final definitions of separate and
community property that are adopted, and should be rationalized both
within the Probate Code and with the Family Law Act rules for prop-
erty and support at divorce.
Probate Code Section 229
Through a series of poorly drafted statutes, California has devel-
oped an almost incomprehensible rule for intestate succession if a
408. See the Wisconsin proposal, set forth at note 394 supra.
409. "The recently promulgated Uniform Probate Code, which has been adopted in a
minority of states, contains forced share provisions which go far to protect the spouse from
disinheritance. It provides that the surviving spouse is entitled to one-third of an augmented
estate, which includes the probate estate plus living transfers such as revocable trusts, irrevo-
cable trusts with retained life income, joint and survivorship property, and large outright
gifts made within two years of death. It is interesting that life insurance and pension benefits
payable to someone other than the surviving spouse are not part of the augmented estate,
and consequently remain available as a means to disinherit. Also under the Code, the out-
right living gift without strings or retained benefits generally remains available as a means of
disinheriting the spouse, with the limited exception noted above, but such transfers are a
large price to pay to accomplish the objective of disinheritance. The Code also provides that
property owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's death which was received by living
gift from the decedent is, in effect, credited against the surviving spouse's forced share
rights." Haskell, Restraints Upon the Disinheritance of Family Members, in DEATH, TAXES
AND FAMILY PROPERTY 105, 108 (E. Halbach ed. 1977). In accord with Haskell's sugges-
tion, it would seem that the augmented estate for election purposes should include those
assets included in the Uniform Probate Code's definition, plus life insurance and pension
benefits payable upon the decedent's death. Outright gifts to third parties during the dece-
dent's lifetime, however, should not be included, because the surviving spouse has an in-
dependent remedy to force recapture in such cases if the gift was inconsistent with
management constraints. Gifts received by the surviving spouse should be relevant only to
the extent that the decedent intended them as will substitutes, to provide for the surviving
spouse's future financial well-being. See generally UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Part 2, Gen-
eral Comment, §§ 2-201, 2-202; Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform
Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IowA L. REv. 981 (1977).
410. This rule should alleviate the surviving spouse's current exposure to gift tax if no
challenge is made. See note 126 supra.
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widow or widower dies without either children or a new spouse.411 In
such cases, the apparent intent of Probate Code section 229 is to benefit
children of the survivor's former spouse, but, if there are none, to di-
vide assets that came to the survivor from the former spouse equally
between the two spouses' families. A statute should be aptly drafted to
accomplish this result.
Conclusion
The promise of equality offered by the adoption of no-fault di-
vorce and equal division of community property has proved hollow.
Like the family car that has begun to cost so much in repairs that its
failings, however familiar, have become more costly than a new model,
California's marital property law has been patched and tolerated until
it no longer functions efficiently. To provide a simple, equitable prop-
erty scheme will require a new start.
Doctrines should be articulated that preserve important separate
property interests during short marriages, yet avoid complex tracing
doctrines and emphasize sharing principles in lengthy ones. Statutory
formulas and economical valuation techniques should replace the ex-
pense and uncertainty of expert testimony in all but the most unusual
cases. Economically similar households should receive comparable
treatment: community property concepts should be applied to parties
who have immigrated to California, and to those who mistakenly be-
lieved themselves to be married. Most importantly, financial reality
rather than doctrinal purity should shape the import of credit transac-
tions and attempts to achieve economic parity at a marriage's end.
Fairness and simplicity should be implemented; compromise and bal-
ance should be restored.
411. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 229 (West Supp. 1981). The original intent of former Pro-
bate Code §§ 228 and 229, now combined in § 229, was to ensure that relatives of a prede-
ceased spouse would share in the property in which that spouse had an interest when he or
she died, and which passed to the then-surviving spouse. The legislation was considered an
expression of the presumed intent of the predeceased spouse, and preferable to permitting
all of the property to pass to the relatives of the last spouse to die. See Ferrier, Rules of
Descent Under Probate Code Sections 228 and 229, and Proposed Amendments, 25 CALIF. L.
REv. 261 (1937). This presumed interest may be questioned. It appears that surviving
spouses are usually left all of a decedent's property, even when there are children. See Price,
The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Propert Jurisdiction, 50 WASH. L.
REv. 277, 283-316 (1975).
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